Saturday, April 07, 2007
electronic voting machines explained
Thursday, January 25, 2007
new blogger
This blog has just moved to the new blogger, so some things may break.
Labels: meta
Tuesday, December 19, 2006
why postal ballots also suck
1. Procedures are more complicated than in-person voting
2. No immediate feedback / oversight if there are problems with the ballots
3. People screw up and put their signed declarations in the same envelope as their vote, thus a) spoiling their ballot and/or b) revealing who they voted for
Globe and Mail - Postal-ballot errors spark review - December 19, 2006
2. No immediate feedback / oversight if there are problems with the ballots
3. People screw up and put their signed declarations in the same envelope as their vote, thus a) spoiling their ballot and/or b) revealing who they voted for
Globe and Mail - Postal-ballot errors spark review - December 19, 2006
Municipal Affairs and Housing Minister John Gerretsen says he's considering revisions to Ontario's municipal elections law as towns and townships continue to struggle through counts of problem-plagued mail-in balloting in the Nov. 13 vote.
...
This week, judges in Bracebridge and Lindsay ordered that efforts be made to count ballots that had been determined spoiled by clerks in four Ontario municipalities because no signed declaration was enclosed.
Although some other municipalities faced with high postal-ballot rejection rates -- generally about 20 per cent -- instituted procedures before election day to try to salvage the votes, that option was refused by Lake of Bays Township in Muskoka, the City of Kawartha Lakes and the townships of Highlands East and Minden Hills.
Minden Hills is the only municipality so far where the added votes have made a difference. Out of 849 rejected ballots, 256 votes were found with a signed declaration improperly inserted inside the secrecy envelope and the vote was allowed.
As a result, challenger Lisa Schell saw her 11-vote loss to Clayton Cameron reversed to give her a one-vote majority.
Saturday, December 02, 2006
US NIST recommends scanned paper ballots
Slashdot reports
(in case you're wondering, Internet voting counts as a "paperless e-voting machine")
I wonder how many experts have to say that electronic voting sucks before people will listen.
Of course, crazed luddite that I am, I would eliminate the machine-based counting as well, and just have humans count the paper.
Slashdot - NIST Condemns Paperless Electronic Voting - December 1, 2006 /.
"Paperless electronic voting machines 'cannot be made secure' [pdf] according to the [US] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In the most sweeping condemnation of voting machines issued by any federal agency, NIST echoes what critics have been saying all along, that due to the lack of verifiability, 'a single programmer could rig a major election.' Rather than adding printers, though, NIST endorses the hand-marked optical-scan system as the most reliable."
(in case you're wondering, Internet voting counts as a "paperless e-voting machine")
I wonder how many experts have to say that electronic voting sucks before people will listen.
Of course, crazed luddite that I am, I would eliminate the machine-based counting as well, and just have humans count the paper.
Slashdot - NIST Condemns Paperless Electronic Voting - December 1, 2006 /.
Tuesday, November 28, 2006
let's have a discussion
Adam asserts that I have
But Adam, you haven't responded to a single issue that I raised.
I welcome all perspectives, provided they are fact-based.
In particular, I invite realistic threat-risk assessments, cost assessments, and cultural assessments.
Let us take Internet voting.
1. Is the code open-source?
2. Has the code been audited by neutral computer security experts?
3. Where are the servers?
4. How are the servers protected?
5. Has the server security been audited by neutral computer security experts?
6. Who pays to protect the servers and the code for the thousands of days during which they are not being used for municipal elections?
7. Who wrote the code?
8. Have they all passed an independent security certification?
9. Do they have ties to any particular political party or other organization that might have an interest in the outcome of the election?
10. How do you mitigate the risk of paying or forcing someone to vote in the way you want, as you watch them on the Internet?
11. How do you mitigate the risk of the massively insecure home computers that are used for Internet voting?
12. When the full costs of security audits and thousands of days of security protection are taken into account, in order to provide a single day of municipal voting, how do you justify the expense?
There's a dozen questions. I have way more where those came from.
I challenge anyone to answer.
a very disturbing and one sided perspective
But Adam, you haven't responded to a single issue that I raised.
I welcome all perspectives, provided they are fact-based.
In particular, I invite realistic threat-risk assessments, cost assessments, and cultural assessments.
Let us take Internet voting.
1. Is the code open-source?
2. Has the code been audited by neutral computer security experts?
3. Where are the servers?
4. How are the servers protected?
5. Has the server security been audited by neutral computer security experts?
6. Who pays to protect the servers and the code for the thousands of days during which they are not being used for municipal elections?
7. Who wrote the code?
8. Have they all passed an independent security certification?
9. Do they have ties to any particular political party or other organization that might have an interest in the outcome of the election?
10. How do you mitigate the risk of paying or forcing someone to vote in the way you want, as you watch them on the Internet?
11. How do you mitigate the risk of the massively insecure home computers that are used for Internet voting?
12. When the full costs of security audits and thousands of days of security protection are taken into account, in order to provide a single day of municipal voting, how do you justify the expense?
There's a dozen questions. I have way more where those came from.
I challenge anyone to answer.
Friday, November 24, 2006
corporate voting bullshit
From a comment on my previous posting
Ah yes. The real world. The modern world. The practical, down-to-earth, realistic, Common Sense Revolution world. Paper is obsolete, so old-fashioned, like the Geneva Convention and other inconveniences.
Bullshit.
You want the real world?
The real world is run, to a very large extent, by corporations.
Corporations exist, their sole purpose is, BY LAW, to make money.
To make money, as constrained by the legal framework.
Corporations also must, under our system, continue to grow.
To grow endlessly.
There are only two ways for corporations to grow
1) By finding more ways to charge people more money for things
2) By changing the legal framework itself, to remove constraints on them making more money
A corporation is providing Internet voting in Markham not out of the goodness of its heart, not out of a passion for citizen involvement, but to make more money.
Delvinia is promoting the wonders of that Internet voting system because it was paid to.
Tobacco companies and their paid apologists promoted smoking, even when the evidence against them was damning and incontrovertable, because more smoking made them more money.
Carbon dioxide emitters and their paid apologists promote unrestricted carbon emissions, even when the climate change evidence against them is damning and incontrovertable, because emitting more carbon makes them more money.
Corporations hate, by their very nature, by their DNA, any activity that does not transfer money from the public to corporations. If they could charge us for thinking and breathing, they would.
Internet voting is not about getting more VOTERS it's about getting more MONEY from the government to voting technology CORPORATIONS.
Corporations that, as I have already noted, may have an interest in the outcome of the voting. Let's imagine that one party said they would eliminate the legal fiction of corporations as a person if elected, and the other would increase the rights of corporations and lower corporate taxes.
Now tell me, are you going to trust the corporate designed and run voting system to decide the outcome of that election?
But you don't even need to go to that extent.
Paying people to SAY stuff is much cheaper than paying people to DO stuff well.
How do I maximize profits at my corporation?
Make the cheapest, most quickly and half-assedly programmed system possible.
Don't pay to test it.
Don't pay security experts to evaluate it.
Don't bother with secure design at all.
Computer security COSTS MONEY.
Good computer security costs A LOT of money.
Corporations HATE SPENDING MONEY.
Instead, just pay some people to go out and say "hey, look at this wonderful system, it's improving your quality of life. It's yet another modern convenience, like the washing machine and refrigerator. It's all about serving you, the customer."
Who are you going to trust on electronic voting?
Paid corporate advocates?
Or neutral observers, with no financial incentive, who are trained security experts.
I am a trained computer security expert.
I make zero dollars from anyone for opposing electronic voting.
In fact, it costs me greatly in my own time to oppose it.
The reason I oppose it is that history teaches us that the integrity of our voting systems is always at risk. We have a good, cheap, transparent voting system.
To destroy that would be folly.
Everything in life is not a financial transaction, with a service provider and a client. Voting is not electronic banking, it's not paying your taxes, it's not selecting the latest reality show contestants online, it's not online gambling.
Voting translates voter INTENT into voter CONSENSUS through TRUST.
It's a civic duty. It's a free interaction between citizens and the society as a whole.
Internet voting undermines that trust.
There is no way to do secure, anonymous, independent Internet voting.
It. Is. Impossible.
To compromise a paper election, I must either compromise the ballots, the local counting, or the total tally. People understand security in the physical world extremely well. Any citizen (for that matter, any child) can understand the current paper-based voting system, and could explain to you clearly the small number of ways in which it could be compromised, and how to mitigate against those risks.
To compromise an Internet election, the easiest thing is for me to compromise the voter. This may be in charming ways, like a bottle of hard liquor in exchange for your voting code. Or in less charming ways, like holding a gun to your head and watching you vote the way I want.
I can also attack:
- the home computer
- the home computer software
- the computer network
- the corporate voting software
- the corporate vote counting software
Most citizens have not the faintest idea of the security risks involved, nor do they have the skills to rationally assess the risks. Many citizens, in fact, do not even own a computer, and instead of being empowered by Internet voting, are instead further marginalized.
Wow, that's a boon for democracy, that is.
I have written thousands of words in this blog about the folly that is Internet voting. I may, on my own free time, go back and find some of those links, for those of you too afflicted with apathy to bother to do a search.
If someone who is an actual neutral computer security expert would like to debate this issue, I would be more than happy to do so.
PS When carrying your paid advocacy over to Wikipedia, at least respect the Wikipedia rules and syntax. Thanks.
You need to recognize that municipalities such as Markham are no less concerned about the integrity of the voting process, they simply live in the real world and recognize that offering Internet voting is clearly a solution for voter apathy.
Adam Froman
President
Delvinia Interactive
Ah yes. The real world. The modern world. The practical, down-to-earth, realistic, Common Sense Revolution world. Paper is obsolete, so old-fashioned, like the Geneva Convention and other inconveniences.
Bullshit.
You want the real world?
The real world is run, to a very large extent, by corporations.
Corporations exist, their sole purpose is, BY LAW, to make money.
To make money, as constrained by the legal framework.
Corporations also must, under our system, continue to grow.
To grow endlessly.
There are only two ways for corporations to grow
1) By finding more ways to charge people more money for things
2) By changing the legal framework itself, to remove constraints on them making more money
A corporation is providing Internet voting in Markham not out of the goodness of its heart, not out of a passion for citizen involvement, but to make more money.
Delvinia is promoting the wonders of that Internet voting system because it was paid to.
Tobacco companies and their paid apologists promoted smoking, even when the evidence against them was damning and incontrovertable, because more smoking made them more money.
Carbon dioxide emitters and their paid apologists promote unrestricted carbon emissions, even when the climate change evidence against them is damning and incontrovertable, because emitting more carbon makes them more money.
Corporations hate, by their very nature, by their DNA, any activity that does not transfer money from the public to corporations. If they could charge us for thinking and breathing, they would.
Internet voting is not about getting more VOTERS it's about getting more MONEY from the government to voting technology CORPORATIONS.
Corporations that, as I have already noted, may have an interest in the outcome of the voting. Let's imagine that one party said they would eliminate the legal fiction of corporations as a person if elected, and the other would increase the rights of corporations and lower corporate taxes.
Now tell me, are you going to trust the corporate designed and run voting system to decide the outcome of that election?
But you don't even need to go to that extent.
Paying people to SAY stuff is much cheaper than paying people to DO stuff well.
How do I maximize profits at my corporation?
Make the cheapest, most quickly and half-assedly programmed system possible.
Don't pay to test it.
Don't pay security experts to evaluate it.
Don't bother with secure design at all.
Computer security COSTS MONEY.
Good computer security costs A LOT of money.
Corporations HATE SPENDING MONEY.
Instead, just pay some people to go out and say "hey, look at this wonderful system, it's improving your quality of life. It's yet another modern convenience, like the washing machine and refrigerator. It's all about serving you, the customer."
Who are you going to trust on electronic voting?
Paid corporate advocates?
Or neutral observers, with no financial incentive, who are trained security experts.
I am a trained computer security expert.
I make zero dollars from anyone for opposing electronic voting.
In fact, it costs me greatly in my own time to oppose it.
The reason I oppose it is that history teaches us that the integrity of our voting systems is always at risk. We have a good, cheap, transparent voting system.
To destroy that would be folly.
Everything in life is not a financial transaction, with a service provider and a client. Voting is not electronic banking, it's not paying your taxes, it's not selecting the latest reality show contestants online, it's not online gambling.
Voting translates voter INTENT into voter CONSENSUS through TRUST.
It's a civic duty. It's a free interaction between citizens and the society as a whole.
Internet voting undermines that trust.
There is no way to do secure, anonymous, independent Internet voting.
It. Is. Impossible.
To compromise a paper election, I must either compromise the ballots, the local counting, or the total tally. People understand security in the physical world extremely well. Any citizen (for that matter, any child) can understand the current paper-based voting system, and could explain to you clearly the small number of ways in which it could be compromised, and how to mitigate against those risks.
To compromise an Internet election, the easiest thing is for me to compromise the voter. This may be in charming ways, like a bottle of hard liquor in exchange for your voting code. Or in less charming ways, like holding a gun to your head and watching you vote the way I want.
I can also attack:
- the home computer
- the home computer software
- the computer network
- the corporate voting software
- the corporate vote counting software
Most citizens have not the faintest idea of the security risks involved, nor do they have the skills to rationally assess the risks. Many citizens, in fact, do not even own a computer, and instead of being empowered by Internet voting, are instead further marginalized.
Wow, that's a boon for democracy, that is.
I have written thousands of words in this blog about the folly that is Internet voting. I may, on my own free time, go back and find some of those links, for those of you too afflicted with apathy to bother to do a search.
If someone who is an actual neutral computer security expert would like to debate this issue, I would be more than happy to do so.
PS When carrying your paid advocacy over to Wikipedia, at least respect the Wikipedia rules and syntax. Thanks.
Wednesday, November 15, 2006
Geist on e-voting
The ubiquitous Michael Geist had a good article last month, Time To Cast A Vote Against E-Voting
Democracy depends upon a fair, accurate, and transparent electoral process with outcomes that can be independently verified. Conventional voting accomplishes many of these goals - private polling stations enable citizens to cast their votes anonymously, election day scrutineers offer independent oversight, and paper-based ballots provide a verifiable outcome that can be re-counted if necessary.
While technology may someday allow us to replicate these essential features online, many of them are currently absent from Internet voting, which is subject to any number of possible disruptions, including denial of service attacks that shut down the election process, hacks into the election system, or the insertion of computer viruses that tamper with election results.
Electronic voting machines are similarly prone to error. Last year the City of Montreal implemented an electronic voting system that was later characterized as a "debacle" with delays, equipment malfunctions, and erroneous results. The City acknowledged that some of the electronic voting machines were "lemons" - voting too quickly caused the machines to breakdown, while 45,000 ballots were counted twice (an error corrected before the results were announced).
Both Internet and electronic voting are also unable to guarantee independent verification. Unlike paper, electronic votes are subject to manipulation, placing enormous power in the hands of the electronic voting machine companies who must ensure tamper-free results.
Monday, November 13, 2006
Ontario municipal elections - Nov 13, 2006
For general information about this event see Wikipedia - Ontario municipal elections, 2006.
I voted today in Ottawa, I believe the counting system is a Diebold Accuvote OS.
As I saw my ballot slide silently into the machine with its prominent "Accu Vote" logo, I thought about how these machines silently kill the humanity of the voting process.
Plus which, you get this flimsy paper "voting shield", which they still have to open up in case your ballot is upside down (in which case, they see who you voted for), or backwards (apparently the genius counting machine can't handle backwards ballots).
The whole thing makes you feel like voting is a slipshod yet automated process, neither of which should be the impression left with citizens.
I encourage you to vote today, if applicable.
If you don't like voting on these machines, the first step is to contact your city councilor and mayor, and make them aware of your displeasure, and also of the costs associated with voting machines.
I am also happy to re-print any experiences (positive or negative) you have had with voting machines today. Just send me an email and include a line to the effect of "you have my permission to reprint this report in your blog".
On a side note, I saw with dismay that TD Bank's exciting new ATM's are made by... Diebold. Oh great, now they're handling my money too.
I voted today in Ottawa, I believe the counting system is a Diebold Accuvote OS.
As I saw my ballot slide silently into the machine with its prominent "Accu Vote" logo, I thought about how these machines silently kill the humanity of the voting process.
Plus which, you get this flimsy paper "voting shield", which they still have to open up in case your ballot is upside down (in which case, they see who you voted for), or backwards (apparently the genius counting machine can't handle backwards ballots).
The whole thing makes you feel like voting is a slipshod yet automated process, neither of which should be the impression left with citizens.
I encourage you to vote today, if applicable.
If you don't like voting on these machines, the first step is to contact your city councilor and mayor, and make them aware of your displeasure, and also of the costs associated with voting machines.
I am also happy to re-print any experiences (positive or negative) you have had with voting machines today. Just send me an email and include a line to the effect of "you have my permission to reprint this report in your blog".
On a side note, I saw with dismay that TD Bank's exciting new ATM's are made by... Diebold. Oh great, now they're handling my money too.
Thursday, November 09, 2006
City of Ottawa voting machines unhackable?
The recent voting machine controversies/disasters in the US (and Quebec) have, finally, woken Canadians up to the potential problems from the use of electronic vote counting machines.
The response from government and thought leaders is, as far as I can tell "don't worry, can't happen here, completely different, hey, look, is that a pony?"
a computer is a computer is a computer
Go take a computer science course and learn about Mr. Turing, if you don't understand that. Any computer can be hacked. You can change the software, you can alter the firmware, you can compromise the hardware. Plus which, you can't tell through external inspection whether a machine has been altered. Which means you need a perfect chain of custody for the machine, 24x7x365.
Now of course, auditing every single machine down to the assembly code level, and securing them in an e-voting machine Fort Knox for the thousands of days when they're NOT being used, just to ensure that they work for about 12 hours on one day, would be enormously, prohibitively expensive. This would also be the actual cost of voting machines.
But that would interfere with the bulls--t about voting machines being modern and efficient and cost-saving. So no one actually does it. At best, some machines are sort of checked by someone, and we sort of trust the people who are handling them on election day, and then they go to some warehouse somewhere and we forget about them.
With that in mind, read the incorrectly cheerful Ottawa Citizen editorial comment City of Ottawa Technology gets my vote, November 6, 2006, page A14 (not available online)
Correct.
None of the weaknesses? NONE OF THE WEAKNESSES? Wrong.
Did I mention that any system running computer code can be hacked?
Maybe not as easily as the crappy Windows touch-screens, but it's still possible.
Oh I see, they're just "simple tabulating machines". Sure, they have memory chips, but they're just "fancy counting machines".
FANCY COUNTING MACHINES?
What the f--k do you think a computer is?
If they're so simple, why not have humans count the votes? Why do we need simple technology to replace humans? But wait, they're fancy? If they're so complicated, aren't they vulnerable?
Machines have gears and levers and you have to be a mechanical engineer to compromise them, if you can alter their behavior at all. COMPUTERS have code. Any code can be changed.
So, they machines are out in the open... during election day. And the other THOUSANDS OF DAYS they are unused? Where are they exactly? Are there clerks and scrutineers and overseers watching them, 24x7x365?
If every tabulator failed?
And how, exactly, are we going to know if the tabulator failed?
Will there be a flashing red light indicating "tabulator now failing to count ballots correctly"?
No. In fact, these "simple machines" betray no evidence of their internal workings.
Their only, ONLY saving merit is that IF YOU CHALLENGED THE COUNT, you could count the paper.
But if counting the paper is the last word in confidence, then
JUST USE PAPER AND HAND COUNT
But wait, there's more
CFRA - City Defends Voting System - November 8, 2006
1. What standards? What auditor? Who decided the auditor was qualified and trustworthy? For this election? What about previous ones?
2. "impossible to hack"? hahah ahahahahahahaaha
I challenge the City of Ottawa to invite teams of actual computer security experts, using actual computer security standards, to openly do a threat-risk assessment on the voting system. I can guarantee it is not "impossible to hack".
Plus which, an auditor is a lot of extra expense, then re-assuring citizens reduces confidence in the elections, gee, this is a lot of hassle and money.
You know what would be cheaper and easier?
JUST USE HAND-COUNTED PAPER
I will be writing to both the Ottawa Citizen, CFRA and to my city councilor (before and after the election).
The response from government and thought leaders is, as far as I can tell "don't worry, can't happen here, completely different, hey, look, is that a pony?"
a computer is a computer is a computer
Go take a computer science course and learn about Mr. Turing, if you don't understand that. Any computer can be hacked. You can change the software, you can alter the firmware, you can compromise the hardware. Plus which, you can't tell through external inspection whether a machine has been altered. Which means you need a perfect chain of custody for the machine, 24x7x365.
Now of course, auditing every single machine down to the assembly code level, and securing them in an e-voting machine Fort Knox for the thousands of days when they're NOT being used, just to ensure that they work for about 12 hours on one day, would be enormously, prohibitively expensive. This would also be the actual cost of voting machines.
But that would interfere with the bulls--t about voting machines being modern and efficient and cost-saving. So no one actually does it. At best, some machines are sort of checked by someone, and we sort of trust the people who are handling them on election day, and then they go to some warehouse somewhere and we forget about them.
With that in mind, read the incorrectly cheerful Ottawa Citizen editorial comment City of Ottawa Technology gets my vote, November 6, 2006, page A14 (not available online)
David Reevely, The Ottawa Citizen
Sometimes the old ways are the best, and that's never been truer about anything than it is about voting.
Tick a paper ballot, drop it in a box, wait for it to be counted. Simple. It's worked for as long as we've had democracies. Efforts to update it have largely been failures.
Correct.
Under its old name [Global Election Systems, now part of Diebold], the company made the machines that Ottawa uses to count ballots in municipal elections. Ottawa's elections manager Shane Kennedy, who has overseen civic elections since 1994, is on his third using a tabulator called the Accu-Vote OS.
"We've used the same equipment all that time and it's been entirely successful," Kennedy says.
The machine looks a little like a fax: you slide your ballot in and it gets scanned and counted and spat out again. When the polls close, results are available in minutes, not the hours it used to take to count several hundred thousand pieces of paper. For the candidates, one way or the other, the drinking can begin immediately.
Although they're from the same manufacturer, Ottawa's machines bear none of the weaknesses the American critics point out.
"The hacking relates to touch-screen technology, primarily," Kennedy says in defence of Ottawa's machines. "It's a totally different animal."
None of the weaknesses? NONE OF THE WEAKNESSES? Wrong.
Did I mention that any system running computer code can be hacked?
Maybe not as easily as the crappy Windows touch-screens, but it's still possible.
Quebec's director-general of elections, Marcel Blanchet, examined Diebold's ES 2000, an updated version of the machines Ottawa uses, when he reviewed the province's municipal elections last year. Those elections saw an unprecedented deployment of e-voting machines across Quebec, and an unprecedented number of problems with them.
Things weren't bad enough to nullify any elections, Blanchet concluded, but he still advised that Quebec's cities stop using e-voting machines at least until the province sets standards of accuracy and security.
This is almost certainly overkill, especially for the simple tabulating machines. They need electricity and memory chips and they can jam, which ballot boxes don't, but other than that they're just fancy counting machines -- they don't replace the ballot itself, as touch-screen machines do.
Oh I see, they're just "simple tabulating machines". Sure, they have memory chips, but they're just "fancy counting machines".
FANCY COUNTING MACHINES?
What the f--k do you think a computer is?
If they're so simple, why not have humans count the votes? Why do we need simple technology to replace humans? But wait, they're fancy? If they're so complicated, aren't they vulnerable?
Machines have gears and levers and you have to be a mechanical engineer to compromise them, if you can alter their behavior at all. COMPUTERS have code. Any code can be changed.
In Ottawa's elections, the machines sit on tables out in the open, guarded by clerks and scrutineers. Before the machines could be hacked all the overseers would have to go bad together, and if that happened, the technology would be the least of our problems.
Another criticism of Diebold's touch-screen machines is that they don't make a paper trail. The only record that a voter has been in the booth is in the ephemeral form of electrons on a microchip: if somebody did crack open a machine and go to work on it, there'd be no other record to check the machine's results against. In Ottawa, Kennedy's returning officers at each poll keep the ballots in traditional boxes. If every tabulator failed, each ballot could still be counted by hand.
So, they machines are out in the open... during election day. And the other THOUSANDS OF DAYS they are unused? Where are they exactly? Are there clerks and scrutineers and overseers watching them, 24x7x365?
If every tabulator failed?
And how, exactly, are we going to know if the tabulator failed?
Will there be a flashing red light indicating "tabulator now failing to count ballots correctly"?
No. In fact, these "simple machines" betray no evidence of their internal workings.
Their only, ONLY saving merit is that IF YOU CHALLENGED THE COUNT, you could count the paper.
But if counting the paper is the last word in confidence, then
JUST USE PAPER AND HAND COUNT
But wait, there's more
CFRA - City Defends Voting System - November 8, 2006
The City of Ottawa insists the electronic voting system for Monday's Municipal Election is safe.
Ottawa's Elections Office has issued a memo to all councillors and candidates after a recent documentary into the electronic tabulation system used in the United States.
The HBO documentary raises the possibility that an election system could be accessed with intent to alter the outcome of the vote tabulation.
The City Clerk says Ottawa's preparations for the municipal election by electronic vote have met the standards imposed by an independent third party auditor in the past and those standards are in place for this year's election.
The clerk adds security standards put in place by the municipal election administration make it impossible to hack into the system to access memory cards.
1. What standards? What auditor? Who decided the auditor was qualified and trustworthy? For this election? What about previous ones?
2. "impossible to hack"? hahah ahahahahahahaaha
I challenge the City of Ottawa to invite teams of actual computer security experts, using actual computer security standards, to openly do a threat-risk assessment on the voting system. I can guarantee it is not "impossible to hack".
Plus which, an auditor is a lot of extra expense, then re-assuring citizens reduces confidence in the elections, gee, this is a lot of hassle and money.
You know what would be cheaper and easier?
JUST USE HAND-COUNTED PAPER
I will be writing to both the Ottawa Citizen, CFRA and to my city councilor (before and after the election).
Wednesday, November 08, 2006
close races and recounts
The electronic voting perspective on recounts seems to be
1) they will be easy
2) (perhaps) they happen rarely
But what's important recounts is not how quickly they happen (in fact, "speed" is an odd thing to make paramount in vote counting). What is important is how confident the people are in the result.
Anyone can understand a paper ballot recount, and the routes for challenge are quite limited. This is important, because elections ultimately transfer power from many people, to one. There are over 400 House seats in the US, and about 300 million citizens. That's a huge transfer of power, from hundreds of millions, to hundreds.
The routes of challenge for electronic vote counts are almost limitless.
You could challenge:
1) the manufacturer
2) the programmers
3) the software
4) individual machines
5) the people managing the machines on voting day
6) voters - potential hacking by individual voters
7) chain of custody on the machines or the memory cards
And probably more I haven't though of.
And even worse, many of those challenges are almost impossible to resolve.
This is bad, because close elections requiring recounts actually happen ALL THE TIME.
1) they will be easy
2) (perhaps) they happen rarely
But what's important recounts is not how quickly they happen (in fact, "speed" is an odd thing to make paramount in vote counting). What is important is how confident the people are in the result.
Anyone can understand a paper ballot recount, and the routes for challenge are quite limited. This is important, because elections ultimately transfer power from many people, to one. There are over 400 House seats in the US, and about 300 million citizens. That's a huge transfer of power, from hundreds of millions, to hundreds.
The routes of challenge for electronic vote counts are almost limitless.
You could challenge:
1) the manufacturer
2) the programmers
3) the software
4) individual machines
5) the people managing the machines on voting day
6) voters - potential hacking by individual voters
7) chain of custody on the machines or the memory cards
And probably more I haven't though of.
And even worse, many of those challenges are almost impossible to resolve.
This is bad, because close elections requiring recounts actually happen ALL THE TIME.
Tuesday, November 07, 2006
e-voting debacle
Gosh, if only this could have been predicted.
Oh wait, everyone who understands e-voting did predict this.
CBC News - Electronic voting shapes up as election debacle - November 7, 2006
Oh wait, everyone who understands e-voting did predict this.
After warnings that electronic voting could cause trouble in Tuesday's U.S. elections, there are signs of "what now appears to be a growing debacle," the CBC's Henry Champ reports from Washington.
By mid-afternoon, officials in at least three jurisdictions — Denver, Colo., Muncie, Ind., and Davidson County, Tenn. — were asking federal judges for extended voting hours because, they said, voting machines in their areas have not functioned and they cannot handle the numbers of voters at the polls without more time.
Seventy-five precincts in Indiana — considered a bellwether state — failed to open on schedule because machines malfunctioned. In Cleveland, where there were problems with new machines in September's party primaries, things seemed no better.
"Again the same problem," Champ said. "Machines and machine supervisors unable to get the operations underway. Voters piling up in the doorways."
CBC News - Electronic voting shapes up as election debacle - November 7, 2006
comparing voting methods
DailyKos has a story Vote by mail is the answer.
Umm.
Here's my opinion.
* Internet voting - so many things wrong with this I can't even begin.
* Electronic touchscreen - the absolute worst in-person voting. You have no idea what was recorded for your vote, and neither does anyone else.
* Scanned paper ballot - this is the least-worst electronic option, only because in the event of complaint, the paper could be counted. It still suffers from the other electronic flaws - malicious or accidental error could alter the vote counts. Also if the ballots are stacked one-by-one as they're scanned, you could in theory figure out who voted for whom.
* Vote by mail and Internet voting actually share common flaws:
1) No more secret ballot. Anyone can watch you vote. If they like, they can threaten you until you vote how they want.
2) Weak authentication. Someone got a voting code or ballot and voted. Maybe it was you. Maybe it wasn't.
3) Less connection with the vote gathering, chain-of-custody and counting process. Your votes go somewhere, and are counted by someone. Are they organized? Supervised? You don't get to see, unless you specifically make the effort, and probably you don't get to watch the chain-of-custody, only the final count. Any time chain-of-custody is interrupted, there is potential for fraud - in fact, that's how they tried to steal the paper-ballot, hand-counted Presidential election on Battlestar Galactica.
* Vote using paper secret ballot in public, with hand-count afterwards.
The public secret ballot is actually a remarkably well-tuned voting system.
I can't think of any that is better. No one knows how you vote. Chain of custody is usually right in front of your eyes. Anyone can see the votes counted. A child can understand how the system works.
I have written lots more on this topic previously in this blog.
Umm.
Here's my opinion.
* Internet voting - so many things wrong with this I can't even begin.
* Electronic touchscreen - the absolute worst in-person voting. You have no idea what was recorded for your vote, and neither does anyone else.
* Scanned paper ballot - this is the least-worst electronic option, only because in the event of complaint, the paper could be counted. It still suffers from the other electronic flaws - malicious or accidental error could alter the vote counts. Also if the ballots are stacked one-by-one as they're scanned, you could in theory figure out who voted for whom.
* Vote by mail and Internet voting actually share common flaws:
1) No more secret ballot. Anyone can watch you vote. If they like, they can threaten you until you vote how they want.
2) Weak authentication. Someone got a voting code or ballot and voted. Maybe it was you. Maybe it wasn't.
3) Less connection with the vote gathering, chain-of-custody and counting process. Your votes go somewhere, and are counted by someone. Are they organized? Supervised? You don't get to see, unless you specifically make the effort, and probably you don't get to watch the chain-of-custody, only the final count. Any time chain-of-custody is interrupted, there is potential for fraud - in fact, that's how they tried to steal the paper-ballot, hand-counted Presidential election on Battlestar Galactica.
* Vote using paper secret ballot in public, with hand-count afterwards.
The public secret ballot is actually a remarkably well-tuned voting system.
I can't think of any that is better. No one knows how you vote. Chain of custody is usually right in front of your eyes. Anyone can see the votes counted. A child can understand how the system works.
I have written lots more on this topic previously in this blog.
remember, paper is obsolete
Yet it seems to work when our mighty technology fails.
CNN - AP - Polling places turn to paper ballots after glitches - November 7, 2006
These places spent thousands of dollars on electronic voting machines, only to end up voting on paper anyway. You know what would be dramatically easier and cheaper?
JUST USE PAPER
Programming errors and inexperience dealing with electronic voting machines frustrated poll workers in hundreds of precincts early Tuesday, delaying voters in Indiana, Ohio and Florida and leaving some with little choice but to use paper ballots instead.
In Cleveland, voters rolled their eyes as election workers fumbled with new touchscreen machines that they couldn't get to start properly until about 10 minutes after polls opened.
"We got five machines -- one of them's got to work," said Willette Scullank, a troubleshooter from the Cuyahoga County, Ohio, elections board.
In Indiana's Marion County, about 175 of 914 precincts turned to paper ballots because poll workers didn't know how to run the machines, said Marion County Clerk Doris Ann Sadler. She said it could take most of the day to fix all of the machine-related issues.
CNN - AP - Polling places turn to paper ballots after glitches - November 7, 2006
These places spent thousands of dollars on electronic voting machines, only to end up voting on paper anyway. You know what would be dramatically easier and cheaper?
JUST USE PAPER
Thursday, November 02, 2006
HBO documentary: Hacking Democracy
This cautionary documentary exposes the vulnerability of computers - which count approximately 80% of America's votes in county, state and federal elections - suggesting that if our votes aren't safe, then our democracy isn't safe either. Premieres Thursday, November 2 [2006] at 9pm.
http://www.hbo.com/docs/programs/hackingdemocracy/
indirectly via Slashdot Diebold Demands That HBO Cancel Documentary /.
Tuesday, October 31, 2006
Time magazine on electronic voting machines
In one week, more than 80 million Americans will go to the polls, and a record number of them--90%--will either cast their vote on a computer or have it tabulated that way. When that many people collide with that many high-tech devices, there are going to be problems. Some will be machine malfunctions. Some could come from sabotage by poll workers or voters themselves. But in a venture this large, trouble is most likely to come from just plain human error, a fact often overlooked in an environment as charged and conspiratorial as America is in today. Four years after Congress passed a law requiring every state to vote by a method more reliable than the punch-card system that paralyzed Florida and the nation in 2000, the 2006 election is shaping up into a contest not just between Democrats and Republicans but also between people who believe in technology and those who fear machines cannot be trusted to count votes in a closely divided democracy.
Can This Machine Be Trusted? - Time - October 29, 2006
Dutch Minister bans some evoting machines
AMSTERDAM, Netherlands Voters in Amsterdam and 34 other Dutch cities may be using paper and pencil instead of computerized voting machines in national elections next month.
The government on Monday banned the use of one common type of computer voting machine, fearing that secret ballots may not be kept secret. It ordered a review of all electronic machines after the Nov. 22 election.
Government Renewal Minister Atzo Nicolai said the move was necessary after an investigation found the machines made by Sdu NV emitted radio signals that a technology-savvy spy could use to peek at a voters' choices from a distance of up to several dozen meters (yards).
"What can be detected is the image on the screen that's visible to the voter, by which his voting could be monitored," Nicolai said in a letter to parliament.
"In short, the machines made by the company Sdu can now be tapped, and there are no technical measures that can be taken before the upcoming elections that would prevent this tapping and guarantee the secrecy of the ballot."
He said he had revoked the permits for all the machines, about 10 percent of all voting machines used in the country.
A sample of the other machines used in next month's vote will be tested before the results are certified to ensure against fraud, Nicolai said.
The turnabout came after a group called "We Don't Trust Voting Computers" protested the vulnerability of electronic voting to fraud or manipulation.
Dutch government scraps plans to use voting computers in 35 cities including Amsterdam - IHT - AP - October 30, 2006
via Slashdot Voting Machines Banned by Dutch Minister /.
Monday, October 30, 2006
e-lect... ricity?
Daytona Beach -- Early voting was delayed in Volusia County for about an hour and 15 minutes Saturday morning after a transformer blew and knocked out power to the City Island Library in Daytona Beach.
Elections Supervisor Ann McFall said the polling place was closed after the electricity went out about 9:55 a.m. The power didn't come back until about 1:30 p.m. but residents were allowed to vote after about 11 a.m. Elections officials opened windows to let in light and checked voter registrations by calling the elections office in DeLand using cellular telephones. The site remained open later, as well.
Officials discovered another problem Saturday night -- the ballot count was off by 20 votes.
McFall said votes cast during the power outage were stored in one compartment of the vote-collection box, where they were supposed to be held until they could be fed into the electronic-vote counter. Twenty ballots likely spilled into another compartment, where counted votes are kept.
She said she plans to recount those ballots Nov. 5, when she also will recount ballots cast on Thursday at the DeLand elections office because the vote count there was off by one.
Now imagine a power outage say, in the middle of US voting day.
With thousands of people waiting to vote on exciting modern touch-screen electronic machines. None of which, I can pretty much guarantee, have power backup.
Plus which, I'm guessing the machines handle a sudden power outage with all the grace of most computer systems - damaged files, corrupted databases, errors on memory cards.
Power outage delays voting - Orlando Sentinel - October 29, 2006
Rolling Stone on Electronic Voting
as midterm [US] elections approach this November [2006], electronic voting machines are making things worse instead of better. Studies have demonstrated that hackers can easily rig the technology to fix an election - and across the country this year, faulty equipment and lax security have repeatedly undermined election primaries.
from Will The Next Election Be Hacked? by Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. in the October 04, 2006 issue of Rolling Stone (issue #1010).
Report on Quebec's municipal electronic voting disaster
On October 24, 2006 the Chief Electoral Officer of Quebec released a report (in French only) "Report on the Evaluation of New Methods of Voting". In a press release, three root causes of problems with electronic voting machines in the 2005 municipal elections were identified:
* an imprecise legislative and administrative framework
* absence of technical specifications, norms and standards
* poor management of voting systems (especially lack of security measures)
He has recommended that the current moratorium on the use of these systems be maintained, and leaves it up to the provincial legislature to decide whether or not to use electronic voting in future.
(Above information copied from my additions to Wikipedia - Electronic voting in Canada.)
This was reported in the Canadian press starting on the 24th, see e.g.
RDI (French) - Des scrutins à jamais entachés - October 24, 2006 (includes links to videos)
CBC (English) - Electronic voting blamed for Quebec municipal election 'disaster' - October 25, 2006
The full report (French only) is Élections municipales de novembre 2005 - Rapport d’évaluation des nouveaux mécanismes de votation (PDF, 3.2 MB). There are also Appendices (PDF: 3.4 MB / 120 pages).
There are more links at DGEQ News - Report on the Evaluation of New Methods of Voting.
Previously:
November 27, 2005 Montreal's electronic vote: what went wrong
November 13, 2005 articles about the Quebec election / articles concernant l'élection au Québec
November 13, 2005 Electronic counting fails Quebec
* an imprecise legislative and administrative framework
* absence of technical specifications, norms and standards
* poor management of voting systems (especially lack of security measures)
He has recommended that the current moratorium on the use of these systems be maintained, and leaves it up to the provincial legislature to decide whether or not to use electronic voting in future.
(Above information copied from my additions to Wikipedia - Electronic voting in Canada.)
This was reported in the Canadian press starting on the 24th, see e.g.
RDI (French) - Des scrutins à jamais entachés - October 24, 2006 (includes links to videos)
CBC (English) - Electronic voting blamed for Quebec municipal election 'disaster' - October 25, 2006
In a new report on problems with Quebec's 2005 municipal election, chief electoral officer Marcel Blanchet targets the electronic voting system used to collect and count the votes.
The election was an expensive disaster marked by errors, which produced inaccurate numbers and unreliable results, the report said. And the new electronic system is to blame, it adds.
The full report (French only) is Élections municipales de novembre 2005 - Rapport d’évaluation des nouveaux mécanismes de votation (PDF, 3.2 MB). There are also Appendices (PDF: 3.4 MB / 120 pages).
There are more links at DGEQ News - Report on the Evaluation of New Methods of Voting.
Previously:
November 27, 2005 Montreal's electronic vote: what went wrong
November 13, 2005 articles about the Quebec election / articles concernant l'élection au Québec
November 13, 2005 Electronic counting fails Quebec
Lou Dobbs - Democracy at Risk
Lou Dobbs has been doing a great job of reporting on the dangers of electronic voting. Unfortunately it's difficult to find most of the reports on CNN.com, but as luck would have it, the transcript of his one-hour special "Democracy at Risk" is available.
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0610/29/ldt.03.html
He and his team covered all the major angles, exposing the many risks.
I was interested to hear that Montana insists on either hand-counted paper ballots (the best option) or optically-scanned paper ballots (the second best option).
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0610/29/ldt.03.html
He and his team covered all the major angles, exposing the many risks.
I was interested to hear that Montana insists on either hand-counted paper ballots (the best option) or optically-scanned paper ballots (the second best option).
