Sunday, January 31, 2010

tweet archive

This is the raw text of my @papervote tweets from the Elections Canada Internet Voting dialogue. (I'm archiving here because these will disappear from Twitter eventually, and also because I realise many of you prefer to get the text here rather than following in real-time or trying to page through Twitter.)

I have flipped the order so it is more readable - it's oldest first.

First tweet is at 8:54 AM Jan 26th 2010 and last one was at 4:56 PM Jan 26th 2010.
There are a total of 276 tweets.


am set up on tethering and will be liveblogging under hashtag #ivotecan - there is a media section here but I only see one person so far

Elections Canada communications has very graciously allowed me to sit at the media table and get power for my netbook. #ivotecan

event is being opened #ivotecan - Elections Canada speaker up next

2/3 of Canadians likely to vote online according to recent survey - Elections Canada #ivotecan

lessons Canada can learn from other jurisdictions within Canada and outside Canada #ivotecan

Elections Canada pilot project will test secure voting via Internet for selected groups eg disabled, Canadians in other countries #ivotecan

Elections Canada emphasizing convenience of Internet voting - but "must maintain level of integrity that Canadians expect" #ivotecan

"Internet voting as an online service" #ivotecan - Elections Canada

Group is working on consistent cross-level standards (provincial, national etc.) #ivotecan

members of parliament and other experts reported to be in audience #ivotecan

Prof. Alvarez up next #ivotecan

Prof Alvarez and audience #ivotecan http://twitpic.com/zuo00

Alvarez will talk about American experience, upsides and downsides #ivotecan

Rationale for Internet Voting: evolution in US from handcounted to optiscan to paperless (nonnetworked and networked systems) #ivotecan

electronic technologies also used throughout the elections process in the United States #ivotecan

defining Internet voting: transmission of ballot over network - references his book One Click One Vote #ivotecan - public elections context

EDITORIAL NOTE: I misheard Alvarez, the book is actually Point, Click and Vote: The Future of Internet Voting. He has also written other books on the topic. END EDITORIAL NOTE

both home computer as well as kiosk Internet voting #ivotecan

Why innovate election tech? - turnout, accessibility, security (!), accuracy (!), efficiency, international access, cost #ivotecan

"How can these technologies improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of election administration?" #ivotecan

American experience - elections have vastly decentralised administration - run at the county level - not national #ivotecan

American experience - "complexity of ballots, regulations and procedures" #ivotecan - may be "dozens and dozens" of items

American experience - multiplicity of ballots, in different languages, covering huge number of items to vote upon #ivotecan

American experience - 2000 Presidential election - controversies have continued about use of electronic voting tech #ivotecan

American experience - California Internet Voting Task Force (2000) - has shaped a lot of US thinking #ivotecan

American experience - Internet voting - Alaska Republican party (Jan 2000) - Arizona Democratic party (March 2000) #ivotecan

Internet voting in 2000 Presidential election - 6 million Americans overseas (military, gov etc.) - special voting rights #ivotecan

international voting - mail transit time to and from e.g. Iraq is a big concern - Internet voting reduces transit time #ivotecan

2000 experiment was a proof of concept - focus on feasibility - electronic version of mail voting system #ivotecan - limited # participants

US international Internet voting used PKI credentials for authentication #ivotecan

not a lot of data - 91 registered, 84 voted using international Internet voting system for US in 2000 #ivotecan

"no security breaches found" for 2000 international Internet vote for US #ivotecan

followup: SERVE - Secure Electronic Voting Registration and Voting Experiment - planned to involve as many as 100,000 #ivotecan

SERVE wasn't implemented because in early 2004 study by computer security experts caused it to be cancelled #ivotecan

in early 2004 Michigan Democratic Party allowed online voting - 28.57% online votes of 162,000 votes total #ivotecan

"Controversies regarding electronic voting machines in 2004 and 2006 elections" #ivotecan

"Election admins and stakeholders reluctant to take on risks associated with voting pilots experiments or transitions to new tech" #ivotecan

ODBP - Okaloosa Distance Balloting Project, implemented in 2008. Kiosk voting for UOCAVA citizens at 3 international locations #ivotecan

there were a few problems with Okaloosa tech but tiny number (<100) voters #ivotecan

use of kiosks means you can ensure the kiosk is secure, rather than using insecure personal computers #ivotecan

(for tests) "Without better scientific design, most of the important outcome variables are difficult to assess" including security #ivotecan

"insufficient data collected" based on US Internet voting experiments to date #ivotecan

Security: What are the real vulnerabilities? How can you mitigate vulnerabilities? Need real experiments #ivotecan

next up: panel on Canadian experiences with Internet voting #ivotecan

Nicole Goodman of Carleton moderating and introducing the panel, which will discuss Canadian municipal Internet voting #ivotecan

first up: Markham's Online Voting Experience by Kimberly Kitteringham and Andrew Brouwer (Town Clerk & Deputy Town Clerk) #ivotecan

Markham Internet voting: 2006 election and plans for 2010 #ivotecan

80% of Markham residents have high-speed Internet access #ivotecan

Why online voting: electronic service delivery, multichannel service delivery, changing lifestyles, "new electorate", convenience #ivotecan

municipal turnout hovered around 30% - Internet voting a channel to encourage participation in voting process #ivotecan

online voting a way to enhance participation by people with disabilities #ivotecan - equal access to the electoral process

2003 positive Internet voting experience positive, recommended online voting for 2006 #ivotecan

Principles identified: security, accuracy, privacy, authentication/verification #ivotecan

Independent Risk Analsys by Henry Kim of York University; Gartner Group security review of IT platform #ivotecan

Dr. Kim found "similar reasonable risks" with two-step voting to in-person voting, and better characteristics than mail-in voting #ivotecan

Partnered with Election Systems & Software (ES&S) for provision of online voting; security of platform verified by Gartner Group #ivotecan

Comprehensive communications plan about Internet voting / voter awareness provided by Delvinia Interactive #ivotecan

2006 online voting only available during early voting period #ivotecan

reporting positive numbers >75% satisfaction from Delvinia survey #ivotecan found it convenient, voted from home

approx 6000 voted online in 2003, approx 10,000 voted online in 2006 #ivotecan

Change in online voting: earlier campaigning, be clear about ID requirements, change in nature of scrutineer function #ivotecan

scrutineers obviously cannot see voters receive and cast their ballot, unlike in-person voting #ivotecan

2010 Markham issuing RFP for online and tabulator vote systems - 3rd party review of online voting security - access plan #ivotecan

Markham "online voting viewed by staff as continued opportunity for service excellence and civic engagement" #ivotecan

Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM) Internet voting experience next up #ivotecan
Cathy Mellet, Acting Clerk/Manager, HRM #ivotecan

HRM covers large physical area, estimated to have population over 410k by 2012 #ivotecan

4 year "e-voting journey" starting in 2004 - Jan 2007 council approved Internet/phone advance voting with "2 levels of ID verify" #ivotecan

discussing mitigating risks while taking advantage of opportunities #ivotecan

RFP in 2007, selected Intelivote for HRM #ivotecan - had to change Municipal Elections Act and HRM by-law to permit

2008 event demographics 279,000 electors; advance voting: 10% of eligible, 28% of votes cast, 88% used Internet. #ivotecan

"engagement matters to voters" HRM #ivotecan

Principles Balance: accessibility vs scrutiny, engagement vs. integrity, convenience vs security... #ivotecan

objectives: ensure integrity, ensure compliance with regulations... #ivotecan

Partnership with Elections Nova Scotia & vendor #ivotecan

HRM election system & data transfer to vendor #ivotecan - also needed support/help centre and contingency plan

something about firewalls but presentation is going way too fast for me to keep up #ivotecan

voter identification "2 shared secrets" - mailed out password + voter birthdate #ivotecan

Sept 2009 special election - "complete internet voting from advance voting to election day" - "realtime voters list", kiosk #ivotecan

"substantially increased turnout" for special election (30% vs. 10% in previous special elections) HRM #ivotecan

e-voting works, well received, cost effective, greener #ivotecan

Jon McKinstry, Sales Manager, Dominion Voting Systems - presenting City of Peterborough story #ivotecan

Peterborough population 75,600. Internet voting 4400 registered, 3500 cast a vote, total 7% of votes were cast over Internet #ivotecan

if you registered for online but didn't vote over Internet, you could still come and vote in person #ivotecan

reasons: leader in delivery of voting systems, embrace tech, increase voter participation, adapt to changing lifestyles #Ivotecan

spike in demographics for Internet voting actually people 40-50, didn't actually have a peak in younger voters #ivotecan

needed realtime strikeout of voters list so that you couldn't vote online and then vote again in person #ivotecan

wanted a system that would consolidate votes from optical scan and internet voting #ivotecan
Principles: ... going too fast for me to keep up #ivotecan

independent security audit of Dominion Voting by Digital Boundary Group (London, Ontario) #ivotecan

again a shared secret system with the secret being the year of birth being the "secret" along with a preselected q/a #ivotecan

PIN number through regular postal mail or encrypted email #ivotecan

audit: password strength, denial of service, injection, ensure intrusion detection in place, system security vulnerability scans #ivotecan

audit reported "Dominion system was a very secure solution" #ivotecan

vote: elector ID + PIN number, separate website, answer preselected question set at reg time, ?enter birthdate? (not mentioned) #ivotecan

Peterborough - ease of use - could cast ballot for 5 days, 24 hours a day #ivotecan

election help desk as well as 1-800 call centre provided by vendor #ivotecan ("about 100 calls came in")

computers also provided at city hall, library, other sites #ivotecan

enhanced features: accessible ballot with zoom, audio, JAWS compatibility #ivotecan

Lessons learned: important for officials to have "complete understanding" of process and technology #ivotecan

Lessons: important to have dedicated marketing, increase number of laptops, run longer (from advance to election day) #ivotecan

approx 15 minutes for questions #ivotecan

am sitting next to @punditsguide

Q to panel from @punditsguide : privacy - 1 destruction of e-ballots? (e-ballot could be
linked back to individual) #ivotecan

Q to panel from @punditsguide : 2 what about voters being coerced at home #ivotecan

Markham: unsupervised voting - one person in a household could do all the voting - part of the risk assessment ... #ivotecan

Markham: unsupervised voting "a risk we were willing to accept" - used education about one person, one vote, secrecy of vote #ivotecan

?Markham? - how are online ballots handled - retained for same duration as paper ballot #ivotecan

?Markham? - paraphrase: no way to connect an individual voter to how they voted in the system #ivotecan

HRM - created substantial penalitys ($10k, 2y in jail) for voter fraud, collusion, or influencing #ivotecan

HRM - asked for certificate of destruction for online ballots from vendor #ivotecan

HRM - "two separate systems" that ensure no connection between voter and votes cast #ivotecan

Q City of Toronto: How do you handle recounts? #ivotecan

Halifax - recount = paraphrase "reopen the encrypted file and look at the data points" #ivotecan

Q City of Toronto: do you capture a (screen) image of the vote as cast? A from HRM: no we just record a data point #ivotecan

A on recount from Markham: "an electronic recount of an electronic vote" #Ivotecan

something about "data as recorded when polls closed and put on memory stick for auditor" ? #ivotecan

Jeremy Clark from Waterloo - privacy question - what kind of data is kept about timing of votes - ... #ivotecan

Jeremy Clark... if you keep timing info you can look at vote time and vote recorded and correlate to figure out who cast what vote #ivotecan

answer from panel: timing is kept, it is a risk but ... someone internal would have to do this attack #ivotecan

Q from Elections Ontario: is a preaudit done - is it possible to test the system before event - and is there postevent test #ivotecan

A from HRM - "audit ballots" cast before, during and after election #ivotecan - realtime tests of the system

A from Peterborough - security tests in advance, intrusion tests etc. #ivotecan

A from Markham: similar process to Halifax #ivotecan

Q: load testing? A from HRM: yes, Oracle platform not even stressed, a non-event. Markham: similar to Halifax #ivotecan

Q did you survey people who didn't use the system? do you know why people registered to vote online but didn't? #ivotecan

A from Markham: survey appeared online right after you voted online #ivotecan

EDITORIAL NOTE: At this point I hit an unexpected Tweet cap for a new account (128 tweets). For the rest of the morning I had to move to liveblogging on FriendFeed. I will try to integrate that reporting here later, but for now you can see it by paging through http://friendfeed.com/electronic-voting-in-canada (which also includes some of these tweets)

tweeted so much, so fast, from this new account that I got temporary twitter lockout. morning reporting at: http://bit.ly/84ynMb #ivotecan

@kirkschmidt there was a Q "risk of internal staff", the response from HRM was "this is a risk we've always had to deal with" #ivotecan

@pmarchi No one has a good (technical) answer to the coercion issue. HRM made coercion "more illegal" with $10k fine, 2y prison. #ivotecan

Just wanted to mention @punditsguide has been doing a great job of tweeting this very fast-moving event. #ivotecan

@jasonkitcat Yeah and in fact several speakers have said convenience mostly helps save existing voters time, no big turnout boost. #ivotecan

I have blogged a brief summary this this morning's very fast, info-packed set of presentations: http://bit.ly/aqPSjY #ivotecan

Tech considerations session presenters: marketer, vendor, open-source guy, tech guy (Peter Wolf of IDEA, Masters in Computer Eng) #ivotecan

Tech considerations panel: Peter Wolf stuck in snowstorm in Frankfurt or something. #ivotecan Projector also not working (tech irony).

Wolf's notes: trust, transparency, but no external evidence of system's correct operation. Hence systems depend on public trust. #ivotecan

Wolf asserts you must then extend greater trust to the entire electoral system as well as have auditors #ivotecan

Wolf: Internet voting - client computer - "nobody can know if this computer can be trusted" #ivotecan

Wolf: observers would like to get insight into operation of systems, and computer security experts may be fundamentally opposed #ivotecan

It's too bad Wolf isn't here, because his notes raise many excellent points. #ivotecan

Wolf: trade secrets may block trust in system, ability to observe operation, due to black boxes e.g. operating systems, code #ivotecan

Wolf: Opening the Black Box. Norway - public access to source codes. Council of Europe - certification guidelines / standards #ivotecan

My editorial comment: it doesn't matter if your source code is open, you can't prove that's the code that is running. #ivotecan

Wolf: commercial vendors were willing to divulge codes if made a condition of Internet voting contracts #ivotecan

Wolf: lack of common standards for certification - issue recognized by Council of Europe #ivotecan

Wolf: sequoia source code released in USA (editor's note: just google that term to find out the results of analysis of the code) #ivotecan

Adam Froman: Delvinia Interactive - marketer/comms for Markham Internet voting #ivotecan

Adam Froman admits up front he doesn't know or care about the technology. He's going to talk about the voter experience. #ivotecan

Delvinia got CANARIE grant to study the use of broadband tech for municipal services - brought $200k to the table for Markham #ivotecan

@zippyFX it's not hard to write a trojan that sends a response back claiming to be the correct software

Delvinia positioning Internet voting as an option, not a replacement for traditional paper vote #ivotecan

Delvinia studied voter attitudes. And also worked on the voter outreach. Including education about registration changes #ivotecan

Delvinia - 2003 - interactive guides - but there's a general need for voter education, regardless of whether they're voting online #ivotecan

Delvinia - web site satisfaction survey - postpolling, online surveys #ivotecan

[ED COMMENT:] In case people don't know Canadian system: scrutineers from all parties watch the open counting of the paper ballots. Many eyes. #ivotecan

Delvinia - with advanced poll, sometimes politicians would show up at people's doors and discover they had already voted #ivotecan

Delvinia: voter registration process was main barrier to Internet voting #ivotecan

@zippyFX the trojan hides in the query stream and lies. Gives the correct CRC, size, response. See e.g. rootkits.

over 90% of people who voted online in Markham said they would be interested in voting in Federal election #ivotecan

Delvinia guy makes "tech is a part of people's lives" argument #ivotecan My counterargument: educate them about the risks of Internet vote.

Delvinia has a point that the new political engagement is a "digital dialogue" with citizens. Engagement beyond vote #ivotecan

Editorial comment: don't mix social media engagement with the need to secure one-time voting experience #ivotecan

Dean Smith of Intelivote also says he will not talk about the tech side of things at all #ivotecan Small Nova Scotia company.

getting sales pitch for Intelivote now #ivotecan

Intelivote assists in writing electronic voting legislation for countries (!) #ivotecan

Intelivote - integrated polling stations, telephone and Internet voting #ivotecan

Intelivote - pitch is "more choice" #ivotecan

talking about components of election system: help center, auditors, Intelivote control, electors, candidates, officials #ivotecan

components of election system diagram shows "Intelivote system" in centre of everything, which kinda freaks me out #ivotecan

Intelivote considers it a benefit that you can vote from anywhere in the world #ivotecan

Intelivote - anecdotal report about first time visually disabled voters were able to cast vote on their own thanks to technology #ivotecan

Intelivote - 2009 by-election "almost 70% voted electronically" is I think what he said #ivotecan

33 municipal elections in Ontario used Internet and/or phone voting #ivotecan "Canada as a leader" rhetoric coming from Intelivote

Speaking of rhetorical questions: Intelivote - "Why are Canadians so open to eVoting?" #ivotecan

Intelivote pitch: choice, flexibility, immediate, auditable results, voter intent clear - no spoiled ballots, enviro friendly #ivotecan

Intelivote pitch (continued): don't have to staff polling stations #ivotecan

Jason Gallagher: open source vs. propriety in 10 minutes or less #ivotecan

err vs. proprietary that is #ivotecan

defines source code #ivotecan

Gallagher explains in proprietary code, you never get to see the source code #ivotecan

looks like @punditsguide has hit a status update limit as well. have directed to http://friendfeed.com/electronic-voting-in-canada

Gallagher explaining open source software - allows peer review of software, no vendor lockin, gives rights to software users #ivotecan

Gallagher: free to modify open source, don't have to rely on vendor #ivotecan

Gallagher: why open source for voting - transparency, not a black box, accountability, auditability, security #ivotecan

Gallagher: how can shared source code be secure? paraphrase "many eyes make bugs shallow" - don't rely on secrets #ivotecan

Gallagher: there will always be hackers, but if your system is open, you also allow people to help you to improve #ivotecan

Gallagher: proprietary advantages - ready made ./ off the shelf, someone to blame if it goes wrong #ivotecan

Q from ? Alex Sussex ? Univ of Ottawa: everyone can witness paper ballot tally. "you can't actually see software occuring" #ivotecan

Q (continued): what role do candidates play in the observability of the tally? #ivotecan

Q (continued): you don't know what's going on inside the system... what role do candidates play to convince the voters #ivotecan

A from Intelivote: candidates want to be involved... the module shows people being struck off the voters list as they vote #ivotecan

A from Intelivote: no equivalent role for scrutineers in electronic world - no recount #ivotecan

A from Delvina: you're asking the wrong question. Should be "What would you need to see equivalent to paper voting?" #ivotecan

Editorial comment: there is no equivalent to observing the internals of the system analogous to scrutineer role #ivotecan

A from computer security researcher who asked original question: "there are new ways that allow voters to engage in the auditing" #ivotecan

Intelivote: system observing itself is "placebo effect" - one electronic process is observing another electronic process #ivotecan

Intelivote does allow peer review of its code #ivotecan

Intelivote uses randomization to avoid matching timestamps to determine who voted for whom #ivotecan

Q: how do panel see Internet voting rolling out across Canada #ivotecan

A from Intelivote: says Canada (and by extension Intelivote) has reputation and experience #ivotecan

Delvinia guy says you can use open source if you have the resources to build the solution #ivotecan

Editorial summary: Intelivote guy argues "reputation and experience", Delvinia guy argues "it's inevitable anyway" #ivotecan

Q from Elections Quebec: is there established, audited open source software available #ivotecan

A: one example in Australia, project has since been cancelled. Professor found error in source code. was fixed. #ivotecan

A from Tarvi: not about open source - about auditability and transparency. Estonia does not publish its source code. #ivotecan

A from Tarvi: Estonia ready "at any second" to sign NDA and provide code for auditing purposes #ivotecan

A from Tarvi about client side code: could be very easy to create malicious client side app - don't give out client side code #ivotecan

A from the audience: more open source - Scantegrity open source system, open voting consortium, ?OSEB? - DRE software #ivotecan

break and then roundtable discussion #ivotecan

observations from Alex Treschel - should do trials, with Canada-specific-research and analysis of the results #ivotecan

Alex Treschel - make sure you are not generalising from very small data sets or experiments #ivotecan

Alex Trechsel - cautions against generalising even from e.g. Halifax to other Canadian municipalities #ivotecan

Tom Hawthorn - when is it right to move? should we lead new tech (in elections) or follow well established technologies? #ivotecan

Tom Hawthorn - experience in UK was that perhaps they hadn't thought things completely through #ivotecan

Tom Hawthorn but if you wait too long, you may miss an opportunity #ivotecan

Tom Hawthorn - need to understand who is driving the process, who is holding the budget - better if electoral admins drive #ivotecan

Tom Hawthorn - place development of voting systems / software in an international context rather than individual countries #ivotecan

Tom Hawthorn - should develop common understanding and set of benchmarks #ivotecan

Tarvi Martens - electoral system is about trust. holds the same for evoting as for paper. #ivotecan

Tarvi Martens - example of failure in Netherlands. example of failure in Lithuania due to suggesting banking credentials #ivotecan

Tarvi Martens - example of failure in ?Finland? - if you screw up deployment, you will be set back a decade or more #ivotecan

Tarvi Martens - if the deployment of your system, including the user part, does not build trust, you will fail #ivotecan

Tarvi Martens - asserts user identity is critical to system (not surprising since he is expert on computer credentials) #ivotecan

Tarvi Martens - password based systems or weak credentials are easy to attack #ivotecan

Tarvi Martens - if people succeed in compromising your system, you will have a huge setback in trust #ivotecan

Jon Pammett: a wide variety of "policy laboratories" in Canada for Internet and other voting systems experimentation #ivotecan

Jon Pammett: not an expert in tech, wondering if Internet voting will increase turnout, but it seems based on today it won't #ivotecan

Jon Pammett: Internet voting doesn't appear to address voter engagement, which is the true driver of turnout #ivotecan

Jon Pammett: concerned about (my words) consequences of Internet voting road not taken #ivotecan

[ED COMMENT:] argument from panel that mixes "tech use" with youth. In my opinion, this is a false mix. Young people are not tech experts. #ivotecan

Editorial comment: I think there needs to be better research into what actually drives voting, rather than speculating #ivotecan

Q from @punditsguide: Canada examples are municipalities which are low turnout, not highly contested elections #ivotecan

Q @punditsguide: how will this work in a much more competitive election where votes are closer #ivotecan

Q (U Calgary): assess evoting based on increased efficiency? (code for saving money) - but if used in advance voting... #ivotecan

Q (U Calgary, contd) will increase cost of elections without noticeable effect on voter turnout? #ivotecan

Q (U Calgary, 2nd question): where research has been done on impact by age, no positive impact in bringing youth vote #ivotecan

Q (U Calgary, 2nd q): seems that Internet vote is mostly middle-aged turnout. #ivotecan

Q (U Calgary): seems like greater cost and no greater turnout - then what is justification for Internet voting? #ivotecan

A (Jon): age profile data is from municipalities - young people not engaged in municipal politics #ivotecan

@jasonkitcat seems to be a dialogue between desire for turnout and issues about trust #ivotecan

A (Jon): in competitive elections - possibly true people would be more likely to attack systems #ivotecan

A (Alex): in competitive elections higher risk - try it out in less competitive contexts too (and remember Swiss cap evote at 10%) #ivotecan

A (Alex): (not exact quote) "doesn't cost that much, comparitively" for "making people happier in democracy" #ivotecan

A (Alex): also remember youth never had high turnout, but it is dramatically low in e.g. Canada #ivotecan Internet voting not a panacea

A (Tarvi): to use Internet voting in Federal election for the first time is a bad idea - start small #ivotecan

A (Tarvi): Estonia formed a group of IT security experts, every step was security, security, security #ivotecan

A (Tarvi): Estonia knew exactly the potential failure points, the risks #ivotecan

A (Tarvi): if you haven't done your security due diligence, hackers can expose issues and destroy trust in your system as in NL #ivotecan

A (Tarvi): if you reuse your system, then over the long term the costs are lower #ivotecan

A (Tarvi): Internet voting not to increase turnout, it's to PRESERVE the turnout #ivotecan

A from Markham: cost for Internet voting were "quite small", "reasonable" #ivotecan

A from Markham: did see increased turnout #ivotecan not enough data to attribute directly to Internet voting

A from Markham: hackers "a cynical argument" against Internet voting, look at opportunities instead #ivotecan

A from HRM: if you can decrease the number of poll locations you decrease cost and "risk" (training / staff risk) #ivotecan

Comment (Nicole Goodman?): We don't know how any particular Internet voting model will work in any jurisdiction, need trials #ivotecan

Comment: yes there will be a large upfront cost, and there should be since it needs to be done right #ivotecan

Comment: cheaper over the long term #ivotecan

Comment: we can't fix turnout with Internet voting but there is no one solution, young people are not homogeneous group #ivotecan

Editorial comment: cheaper over time is hard considering you need 24/7 physical & net security for data centre 365 days/yr #ivotecan

Q: what are the main arguments against Internet voting? #ivotecan (other than security)

Q (Elections Canada): can academics map when a region is "mature" enough to go on an Internet voting route #ivotecan

A (Tom): Germany ruled use of Internet voting unconstitutional as it was inherently un-understandable by avg citizen #ivotecan

A (Tom): no one knows what the cost model is going to be in the future. may see some new kinds of costs #ivotecan

A (Tom): new costs = auditors, consultants, security experts - could be very expensive #ivotecan

A (Tom): most people in elections systems are not experts in electronic systems / security design - maybe they need to be #ivotecan

A (Tarvi): in Estonia Internet voting was challenged about uniformity of voting #ivotecan

A (Tarvi): ruling was that multiple times to vote over-rides privacy concerns (not sure I understand his answer) #ivotecan

A (Alex): groups in Geneva were strongly opposed to Internet voting (computer security experts) #ivotecan

A (Alex): in Geneva they engaged in a dialogue with the computer security experts #ivotecan
http://www.e-voting.cc/ - Internet voting conference, models #ivotecan

A: an argument against Internet voting - voting in person is a communal experience #ivotecan

Editorial comment: first mention today of compulsory voting as a direction for turnout and
engagement #ivotecan

audience comment: 8 million voters in Ontario, 800000 will be voting "electronically" - "it's happening" #ivotecan

I think it's the Intelivote guy: cost savings of electronic voting #ivotecan

aaaand we're done #ivotecan

@jasonkitcat I didn't get a strong sense of a driver other than "seems like a good thing to try"

@punditsguide good to meet you as well


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