Paper Vote Canada

UPDATE 2016-10-16: The commission hasn't yet been formed, but they are already asking for comments by November 30, 2016.  You can submit comments e.g. by email to Consultations.ECO-BCE@gnb.ca

If you want to be on the committee itself, the deadline to apply is October 19, 2016.

ENDUPDATE 

CBC News - Voting reform ideas put forward by Liberals - July 5, 2016

A consultation process on overhauling the province's electoral system is being launched by Premier Brian Gallant's Liberal government in time for the 2018 election.

The Liberals tabled a 49-page discussion paper in the legislature Tuesday [July 5, 2016], hoping it will serve as a guide for a committee of MLAs that it plans to appoint later this week.

The document includes ideas such as online voting, lowering the voting age to 16 years of age from its current 18 years, and changing the way MLAs are elected, including options such as a preferential ballot or a proportional-representation system.

The discussion paper is called "Strengthening New Brunswick’s Democracy" and is available from the Government of New Brunswick website (GNB.ca) at

http://www.gnb.ca/legis/business/currentsession/58/58-2/LegDoc/Eng/58-2July/SNBD.pdf

The Internet voting section is pages 18-19.  I haven't had time to review it.

UPDATE 2016-07-15: I have reviewed the Internet voting section and it is good.  It makes it clear there are still lots of risks and unsolved problems.  ENDUPDATE

It is also available in print bilingual and in a French PDF, here are the ISBNs

ISBN 978-1- 4605-1033-9 (Print Bilingual)
ISBN 978-1- 4605-1034-6 (PDF English)
ISBN 978-1- 4605-1035-3 (PDF French)

I don't know what the mechanisms for participation will be.  I will update this post when I have more information.

UPDATE 2016-07-15:

I found the news releases

The provincial government has tabled the discussion paper and will ask the legislature to strike a select committee to consider its contents.

It is expected that hearings will take place in the fall [2016] with a report due by early 2017. The plan is to allow for any changes to be implemented in advance of the 2018 general election.

Government of New Brunswick - Government submits electoral reform options to legislative assembly - July 5, 2016

Le gouvernement soumet des options de réforme électorale à l’Assemblée législative - 05 juillet 2016

As of July 15, 2016 there is no electoral reform committee listed under Legislative Committees - Select Committees.

For the French version of the discussion paper, see

Vote par Internet - de la page 20 à la page 21 dans « Renforcer la démocratie au Nouveau-Brunswick » (PDF)

Labels: canada, consultation, internet voting, new brunswick, online voting

Here is the comment I posted on The Australian article Election cliffhanger prompts e-Voting rethink by Supratim Adhikari on July 5, 2016.  The comment has not (yet?) been accepted.

COMMENT

While the counting of paper ballots is slow, all of the complexity is visible to everyone.  With an Internet voting system, you would be greatly increasing the complexity and all of the associated possibilities for very complex systems to fail, but hiding all of that increased complexity from voters.  This simply distances the voting system even further from citizens.  To quote the 2013 Parliamentary inquiry: “It is important that in embracing technology, the secret ballot is not undermined, voter behaviour is not negatively impacted, and confidence in the electoral process and electoral outcomes is not damaged. At a time of debate about community disengagement with political processes, it would be greatly concerning if the method of voting—the one act of participatory democracy that all Australian citizens will definitely engage in—was to further disengage the community from these processes.” [1]

That is not to mention the risk of the election being hacked, including by other nation states.  This is a reality already - China was blamed for a massive hack on a Bureau of Meterology computer [2] resulting in the government spending an additional $230 million on cybersecurity [3] .

This leads to the last point, about claimed cost savings.  The current paper-based system can be used again and again, year after year, with at most minor modifications.  That is not at all the case for any kind of universal electronic voting system.  Technology and cyberattacks are constantly changing, which means that any electronic voting system is obsolete the day that it launches.  Such a system would have to be continuously and expensively updated for every election, to reflect technology changes and to defend against new types of attacks.  That kind of continuous expenditure on information technology is great for the Information Industry, but terrible for government budgets.

[1] http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Electoral_Matters/2013_General_Election/Second_Interim_Report/Chapter_4#comment section 4.80
[2] http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-02/china-blamed-for-cyber-attack-on-bureau-of-meteorology/6993278
[3] http://phys.org/news/2016-04-australia-hack-boosts-cyber.html

ENDCOMMENT

With the slow paper-based count, there has been a flood of articles about Australian e-voting.  Unfortunately I'm not able to respond to them all, but the above comment applies generally.

Labels: australia, comment, electronic voting, internet voting, newspaper comment, online voting

I have to provide a response to this article because it puts forth remarkably weak arguments.

there are the “experts” who claim that we shouldn’t implement electronic voting

Ok, here's the thing: when people are actual experts, you don't put "experts" in quotes. Dr. Vanessa Teague, one of the experts referred to, has written extensively about the topic, including peer-reviewed papers about voting systems and computer security. One can see that from her University of Melbourne faculty page and her Google Scholar profile. To dismiss someone whom Google Scholar reports as having been cited 1064 times by other academics as an "expert" is at best completely misleading.

This style continues in this muddle of a paragraph

All of these things “might” be true but they don’t “necessarily” have to be true and don’t in the end serve as justification for not implementing electronic voting.

I really don't know what to say.  The statements made by experts are evidence that can be challenged by doing tests.  That's science.  Putting things in quotes to disparage them is not.

And then we get to the latest bit of technology magic, Blockchain

Blockchain-based voting has the benefit that voting can be done online anonymously

Really.  Anonymously.  The Blockchain public ledger, in which every transaction has a user ID attached, enables anonymous voting?  How does it do that exactly?  How does one ensure that only eligible voters vote, and that the vote that they cast (presumably by posting the vote to the Blockchain) is both verifiable and anonymous, when the user ID must be traceable?

The reality of a vote using the Blockchain is you're posting a traceable vote to a public ledger, which is to say, you're undermining anonymity and enabling coercion.

But Blockchain is in any case the kind of sleight of hand distraction a magician would perform, to distract you from other key activities.  In system security, you must ensure that every component of the system is secure, not just one component.  Even if Blockchain were somehow a magic crypto solution for storing and checking the vote (which it isn't) you still have to cast the vote.  From an actual computer in the real world, not a theoretical computer.  And actual computers in the real world, whether they be desktops or mobile devices, are hacked and compromised all the time.  In fact the exact same author who just wrote the above quote about Blockchain-based voting's benefits wrote in the article just previous to the voting one that even antivirus security companies can't get security right.

Antivirus software is very complicated. It has to understand the nature of a very large number of different types of files and the different ways in which these files can be altered to escape detection. In order to efficiently process files that may be being written to a disk or arriving via a web link or email, antivirus software usually runs on the computer with extra privileges. This makes the consequence of attacks on this type of software particularly serious. The counter-intuitive result of this is that antivirus software gives malware writers even greater opportunities for attack on a computer than if the software hadn’t been installed in the first place. In security jargon, it actually increases the “attack surface”.

That is exactly correct. But if you think antivirus software is very complicated, Internet voting software is vastly more complicated than that.  You've got the entire attack surface of the client computer used to cast the votes, and the entire attack surface of the network used to transmit the votes, and the entire attack surface of the servers used to store and count the votes (including Blockchain, which doesn't run on some abstract cloud, but on actual servers or desktops that can be compromised in many ways, including simply capturing enough mining computers to outvote any other writes to the chain).

Recording votes on the blockchain could be combined with two-factor authentication such as that employed by a system used in Utah recently. This system allowed online voting for the Republican Party’s presidential nominee during the recent US primaries.

Like the system used in Utah?  The one The Guardian reports was "plagued by glitches" where "as many as 13,000 people had tried to sign up but could not because of a variety of technical problems" and "The state party disregarded warnings from prominent computer scientists and from the National Institute for Standards and Technology, which oversees federal certification of voting equipment, that online voting systems are dangerously vulnerable to malware, putting both the integrity and the secrecy of the vote at risk."  That system is the one you want to hold up as a model?

I don't know how one can reconcile understanding not increasing attack surface in one article with advocating vastly increasing attack surface in the following one; I'm going to assume it is associated with frustration with what is admittedly a very complex and slow paper-based election process in Australia.

If you want to read some actual thoughtful analysis of online voting in Australia, in addition to Dr. Teague's article and extensive submissions on the topic, I also recommend that there be an extensive examination of the risks and benefits associated with electronic voting in Australia.  Oh wait, there already was, by the Australian Parliament in 2013, and they concluded that the benefits don't outweigh the risks.  It's an excellent, comprehensive, clear report.  And it only puts things in quotes when it is actually quoting people and statements.

Parliament of Australia -  Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2013 Federal Election and matters related thereto -

Second interim report on the inquiry into the conduct of the 2013 federal election: An assessment of electronic voting options

Labels: australia, e-voting, electronic voting, internet voting, online voting

The committee will:

• identify and study viable alternatives to the current federal electoral system, including preferential ballots and proportional representation, as well as mandatory and online voting;

On June 30 the ERRE Special Committee on Electoral Reform posted information about how to participate.  There's information on the main page, on the Participate page, in the News Release and in the June 29 minutes.  I have consolidated this information below.

If you are interested in presenting or providing evidence about the risks associated with Internet voting, and believe I could be of assistance, please don't hesitate to contact me.

There are several options for participating in the committee.

Submit a brief

Canadians who choose to submit a brief to the Committee must meet the following criteria/conditions:

• only one (1) brief can be submitted per person;
• the deadline for the submission of briefs is 11:59 p.m. (EST) on Friday, October 7, 2016;
• briefs must not exceed 3,000 words (including the summary page and footnotes);
• briefs that are longer than 1,500 words must be accompanied by a summary; and,
• it is recommended that within the brief the author present a list of recommendations and their relationship with the principles set out in the motion adopted by the House of Commons on Tuesday, June 7, 2016, outlining the mandate of the Committee. 

Briefs may be sent to the Committee by email (ERRE@parl.gc.ca) or by using [this link] https://survey-sondage-hoc.parl.gc.ca/n/ERRESubmitBrief.aspx?c=en-CA&studyId=9011649&study=Committee%20Business

Once they are translated, briefs will be distributed to the Committee members and posted on the Committee’s website.

Request to appear before the committee

• Requests to appear must be submitted to the Committee no later than October 7, 2016, at 11:59 p.m. (EDT)
• Please note that the Committee clerks will contact only those who are selected by the Committee members to appear.

Requests to appear may be sent to the Committee by email (erre@parl.gc.ca) or by using [this link] https://survey-sondage-hoc.parl.gc.ca/n/ERRERequestToAppear.aspx?c=en-CA&studyId=9011649&study=Committee%20Business

UPDATE 2016-07-05: I recommend sending your submission by email.  The web form limits input to 1000 characters (characters, not words) and you will not receive a confirmation code or email confirmation.  ENDUPDATE

You will get at least ten minutes for opening remarks and (as you can see in the next section) you may get asked questions that were submitted over Twitter.

"Time for Opening Remarks and Questioning of Witnesses —That witnesses be given a minimum of 10 minutes or more, at the discretion of the Chair to make their opening statements; and that during the questioning of witnesses all members of the Committee be allocated equal time to pose questions in the following order: Liberal Party, Conservative Party, New Democratic Party, Bloc Québécois, Green Party, Liberal Party, Conservative Party, Liberal Party, New Democratic Party, Conservative Party and Liberal Party."

Tweet questions to the committee (during a meeting)

• The Committee members will monitor Twitter (#ERRE #Q) for comments and questions from Canadians
• Members may relay these questions to the witnesses in real time.

It appears they intend this to be used for live input of questions during meetings, not for general questions.  The use of two hashtags together rather than one is not optimal.  #QERREQ would have been better.  To query two hashtags together in Twitter search I think the best approach is to use #ERRE AND #Q

The use of Twitter alone is also an odd choice; it's a much more niche social media service for the general Canadian public than Facebook.

Submitting recommended witnesses

There does not appear to be a formal mechanism to suggest a witness, other than proposing yourself as a witness.  You can always email the committee members directly with suggestions I suppose.

UPDATE 2016-08-05: Minister Monsef indicates that witness recommendations can be submitted directly to the committee by emailing ERRE@parl.gc.ca (also see other ERRE contact info).  ENDUPDATE

Meetings and context

• July 6, 7, 25, 26, 27, 28
• August 22, 23, 29, 30, 31
• September 1

NOTE: The Committee must present its report to the House no later than December 1, 2016.

Reminder of remit:  identify and conduct a study of viable alternate voting systems to replace the first-past-the-post system, as well as to examine mandatory voting and online voting (see About - Mandate for details of principles that should apply).

Be aware that the vast majority of witnesses and discussion will be around various types of approaches for choosing representatives ("various voting systems") such as preferential voting and proportional representation.  Only a small amount of the committee's attention is likely to be available for discussing online voting.

UPDATE 2016-07-30: The committee has asked a lot more questions about online voting than I expected (so far to witnesses who are entirely non-technical).  ENDUPDATE

If you are interested in presenting or providing evidence about the risks associated with Internet voting, and believe I could be of assistance, please don't hesitate to contact me.

UPDATE 2016-07-06:

Conversations about electoral reform

Minister Monsef has announced additional resources in support of conversations about electoral reform.  The short link is Canada.ca/Democracy but I will also highlight individual resources

• list of events about electoral reform (including ability to submit your own event)
• guidance on how to Host a Canadian electoral reform dialogue in your community including Sample template for submitting the results of your Canadian federal electoral reform event to the Special Committee on Electoral Reform
• a variety of learning materials

The potential dialogue topics do include online voting, but the learning materials do not explain these topics:

3. How do you feel about electronic voting? Why?
4. How do you feel about online voting? Why?
5. How do you feel about mandatory voting? Why?

Typically electronic voting means the use of voting machines of some type in the polling station.  These can range from mark-sense ballot counting (scanners) to touchscreen machines.  I will have to do a separate blog post to explain why electronic voting is not needed for and could be detrimental to Canadian federal elections.  In any case, it's interesting to see this raised as a possibility as I don't see it in the language of the committee mandate.  And I don't see how anyone who isn't an expert will know the distinction between electronic voting and online voting.

What the learning materials (Changing Canada's federal electoral system) say in their totality about the above topics at the moment:

How you vote

Today, most of us vote in person by pencil and paper, either on election day itself or in the advance polls in the days beforehand. Many people also use special ballots, which are mailed in. Introducing new technologies at the polls could pave the way for online voting in the future.

Who votes

Voting could be made compulsory, like in Australia.

Implicit in the language above is the idea of experimenting with electronic voting technology at the polls as a precursor to online voting, which I also don't see in the language of the committee mandate.

I don't want to minimize the huge amount of work it was to prepare all of these "how to" materials, but without a substantial amount of background material for context, it will be challenging to have informed discussions about online voting.

Democratic Institutions press release - Minister Monsef Announces Launch of Federal Electoral Reform Dialogue Guide, Tools and Resources - July 6, 2016 - also available from GC Newsroom

ENDUPDATE

Labels: #CdnDemocracy, #ERRE, Electoral Reform, Special Committee on Electoral Reform

Eric Geller has written the Internet voting article I have always wanted to see - long and extensively researched, with quotes from all of the key experts.

The Daily Dot - Online voting is a cybersecurity nightmare - June 10, 2016

Also available in the Internet archive - https://web.archive.org/web/20160611131517/http://www.dailydot.com/politics/online-voting-cybersecurity-election-fraud-hacking/

“We do not know how to build an internet voting system that has all of the security and privacy and transparency and verifiability properties that a national security application like voting has to have,” said David Jefferson, a researcher at the Center for Applied Scientific Computing at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and vice-chair of the board of directors at Verified Voting.

(You can see Jefferson present at length about Internet voting in one of my videos of the week.)

Internet voting advocates often say things like, “If you can bank online, you should be able to vote online.” But banks provide receipts for transactions, letting every party verify that deposited or withdrawn money went through the system correctly. You can ask your bank to investigate a bad transaction, just as your credit card company might call you to verify a suspicious one, but only because money tied to your identity is tracked through the global financial system.

Unlike in banking, where fraud is detectable because money either lands in the appropriate place or disappears, and in paper voting, where physical evidence must be tampered with to rig the results, technology lets people do things while leaving literally no trace.

(For a further expansion of this theme, see my blog post if I can do X online, then why not voting.)

It’s well known that malware lets thieves pilfer people’s financial and health data and helps hackers lock users’ files until they pay a ransom. But criminals can also use malware to tamper with the process of internet voting—and the more places adopt internet voting, the more enticing it becomes for a hacker to write malware aimed at interfering with specific platforms.

This interference won’t be limited to lone script kiddies, activists flamboyantly trying to highlight the system’s flaws, or anarchist groups like Anonymous. Given what researchers say about the ease of covertly tampering with some online-voting systems, foreign governments are likely to want in on the action too.

(This recognition that Internet voting is a national security issue prompts quotes in other publications such as “We believe that online voting, especially online voting in large scale, introduces great risk into the election system by threatening voters’ expectations of confidentiality, accountability and security of their votes and provides an avenue for malicious actors to manipulate the voting results." by Neil Jenkins of the US Department of Homeland Security, quoted in the Washington Post - More than 30 states offer online voting, but experts warn it isn’t secure - May 17, 2016)

For more references about this topic, see my post on Internet voting risks.

Labels: internet voting, online voting

A good, clear report about Internet voting from the City of Mississauga has been posted.

Potential enhancements for the 2018 Municipal Election: Internet Voting, Ranked Choice Elections and Vote Anywhere. (PDF)

It includes both an summary section (pp. 14-17) and an appendix on Internet voting specifically (pp. 18-23).

Some key highlights (selected by me):

Executive Summary (selected items)

• Statistics indicate that internet voting does not increase voter turnout or youth participation.
• The risks to the integrity of an election offering remote internet voting include: electronic security, authentication of elector identity, fraud and equipment failure.
• Internet voting requires a significant financial investment of approximately $1.1 million

Some additional key quotes:

 "there are risks to be considered. Subversive internet activities continuously evolve in frequency, unpredictability and complexity and may threaten the integrity of an Internet Voting system." - page 15

"The academic community generally agree that there is no guarantee that the transmission of ballots through the internet is secure.

Election officials have no control over the security of the internet devices used by electors to vote remotely. An elector may unknowingly be using a device that has been compromised with illicit software that may direct him/her to a fraudulent election site, duplicate his/her personal information, change his/her vote, etc." - page 19

Unfortunately there are no citations, but that is not unusual for a municipal report.

Thanks to Rachael Williams for her article about the report and the Governance Committee debate about it in the Mississauga News - Mississauga won't use ranked ballots until province implements reform: Governance Committee, and for sharing the link to the report with me in response to a question.

Labels: #CdnDemocracy, internet voting, mississauga, online voting, report

There is a Library of Parliament Background Paper - 2016-06-E - Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform in Canada and Elsewhere: An Overview

UPDATE 2020-05-23: New URL for the background paper is https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/201606E END UPDATE

that gives a good sense of the material the Special Committee on Electoral Reform will cover.  Which is to say, a huge amount on electoral systems, and one small section (6.2) with four short paragraphs about online voting.  Most cited is Canada's Nichole Goodman.  Dr. Goodman's degree is in Political Science and Government; she is a social scientist, not a technology expert.  There is no direct citation of computer scientists or computer security experts in the background paper.  There is a false balance statement at the end, as if there should be equal weight on the (unsupported by evidence) increase in turnout and the (repeatedly supported by expert investigation) security concerns.

I would have hoped to see citation of at least one of the reports I link to in my post about Internet voting risks, in particular the Parliament of Australia inquiry (which is excellent) would have been a natural fit.

I very much hope that the committee will hear from a representative sample of academic experts on Internet voting with a particular emphasis on computer security.  Internet voting is not a matter than can be properly analysed purely from a social science perspective.  I encourage you to put forward names of computer science professors with expertise in this area as potential witnesses.

A much better view on online voting, long and extensively-researched, for a non-technical audience, is available in Online voting is a cybersecurity nightmare by Eric Geller.  I will also update this post to cite more academic papers.

Below is the online voting section from the Background Paper, which will be read by all of the committee members.

 6.2 Online Voting

As society’s use of the Internet has become commonplace, consideration continues to be given to the possibility of enabling Canadians to vote online. In Canada, Internet voting has been employed at the municipal or regional level, namely in Markham and Peterborough, Ontario, and in Halifax and Truro and in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia.59

A number of jurisdictions internationally, at various levels of government, have studied or implemented online voting systems. For example, Estonia has offered online voting at the national level in some form since 2005.60

Research conducted for Elections Canada found that “a moderate proportion of electors would be likely to vote over the Internet, and that this proportion is increasing from one general election to the next.” 61 Elections Canada’s research also examined the required legal framework to establish online voting,62 as well as consultations with European jurisdictions about their experience with online voting.63

Those in favour of online voting suggest that it may expand the accessibility of elections and, in turn, increase voter turnout. Those against Internet voting cite reliability and security concerns.

59. See, for example, Jon H. Pammett and Nicole Goodman, Consultation and Evaluation Practices in the Implementation of Internet Voting in Canada and Europe  (886 kB, 63 pages), Research study prepared for Elections Canada, November 2013, pp. 25-35;Canada-Europe Transatlantic Dialogue,A Comparative Assessment of Electronic Voting  (324 kB, 64 pages), Report prepared for Elections Canada, February 2010, pp. 23-32; and Leslie MacKinnon, “Elections Canada drops plan for online voting due to cuts,” CBC News, 1 May 2013.
60. R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall and Alexander H. Trechsel, “Internet Voting in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Estonia  (205 kB, 9 pages),” PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 42, July 2009.
61. Pascal Barrette, “Conclusion,” Interest of Canadians in Internet Voting (2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011) - Research Note, Elections Canada, February 2013.
62. Bryan Schwartz and Dan Grice, “Executive Summary,” Establishing a Legal Framework for E-voting in Canada, Report prepared for Elections Canada, September 2013.
63. Jon H. Pammett and Nicole Goodman, Consultation and Evaluation Practices in the Implementation of Internet Voting in Canada and Europe, Report prepared for Elections Canada, November 2013. [this is just an ibid. of 59 above]

Labels: #CdnDemocracy, #ERRE, internet voting, Library of Parliament, online voting

Name	Role	Subcommittee(s)	Email	Twitter	Background	Party
John Aldag			John.Aldag@parl.gc.ca	@jwaldag	Master or Business Administration (Royal Roads University) Bachelor of Business Administration (BC’s Open University) Diploma in Public Sector Management (University of Victoria) long career at Parks Canada from http://www.johnaldagmp.ca/about/#john-aldag	Liberal
Alexandre Boulerice			Alexandre.Boulerice@parl.gc.ca	@alexboulerice	baccalauréat en sociologie à l'Université de Montréal des études en science politique à l'UQAM entame une scolarité de maîtrise à l'Université McGill http://www.boulerice.org/a_propos_d_alexandre	NDP
Nathan Cullen	Vice-Chair (there are two vice-chairs)	Agenda and Procedure	nathan.cullen@parl.gc.ca	@nathancullen	graduate of the Comparative Development Studies Program at Trent University from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nathan_Cullen#Early_life	NDP
Matt DeCourcey			Matt.DeCourcey@parl.gc.ca	@MattDeCourcey	Master of Public Relations from Mount Saint Vincent University Bachelor of Arts from St. Thomas University (STU) from http://mdecourcey.liberal.ca/biography/	Liberal
Gérard Deltell			Gerard.Deltell@parl.gc.ca	@gerarddeltell	studied social science at Cégep de Sainte-Foy, graduating in 1984 majored in history at Université Laval and graduated in 1989 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%A9rard_Deltell#Background	Conservative
Jason Kenney replaced on committee by Blake Richards			jason.kenney@parl.gc.ca	@jkenney	did undergraduate studies in philosophy at the University of San Francisco left university to begin work for the Saskatchewan Liberal Party from http://www.jasonkenney.ca/meet_jason and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jason_Kenney#Early_life_and_career	Conservative
Elizabeth May		Agenda and Procedure	Elizabeth.May@parl.gc.ca	@ElizabethMay	a graduate of Dalhousie Law School was admitted to the Bar in both Nova Scotia and Ontario from http://elizabethmaymp.ca/home/meet-elizabeth-widget/meet-elizabeth-may/	Green
Scott Reid	Vice-Chair (there are two vice-chairs)	Agenda and Procedure	scott.reid@parl.gc.ca	@ScottReidCPC	Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Carleton University Master of Arts degree in Russian History from Carleton University from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Reid_(politician)#Personal_life	Conservative
Blake Richards (replaced Jason Kenney)			blake.richards@parl.gc.ca	@BlakeRichardsMP	Bachelor of Arts degree in political science from the University of Calgary from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blake_Richards#Early_life_and_career	Conservative
Sherry Romanado		Agenda and Procedure	Sherry.Romanado@parl.gc.ca	@SherryRomanado	MBA, Concordia University, 2011 Certificate in Public Relations Management, McGill, 2005 from https://www.mcgill.ca/continuingstudies/instructors/biographies/romanado-sherry and https://ca.linkedin.com/in/sherryromanado	Liberal
Ruby Sahota			Ruby.Sahota@parl.gc.ca	@MPRubySahota	combined Honours Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Peace Studies from McMaster University J.D. with a concentration in Litigation from Thomas M. Cooley Law School from http://rsahota.liberal.ca/biography/	Liberal
Francis Scarpaleggia	Chair	Chair, Agenda and Procedure	francis.scarpaleggia@parl.gc.ca	@ScarpaleggiaLSL	undergraduate [degree] in economics from McGill University master’s degree in economics from Columbia University in New York MBA from Concordia University from http://francisscarpaleggia.parl.liberal.ca/biography/	Liberal
Luc Thériault		Agenda and Procedure	Luc.Theriault@parl.gc.ca	@LucTerjo1	Titulaire d’un baccalauréat et d’une maîtrise de l’UQAM en philosophie http://www.blocquebecois.org/depute-luc-theriault/	Bloc Québécois

Mark Holland, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Democratic Institutions is also present at the committee, but as an observer (does not have a vote).

None of the committee members has a technical background; this is not unusual for Canada's otherwise fairly diverse parliament.

I've made a Twitter list of all members https://twitter.com/papervote/lists/erre

The hashtag for the committee is #ERRE

UPDATE 2016-06-26: I've added membership in the Agenda and Procedure subcommittee, for which the shortcode appears to be SERR.  ENDUPDATE

The committee home page is http://www.parl.gc.ca/Committees/en/ERRE (or short link http://parl.gc.ca/ERRE-e )

You can email the committee directly at ERRE@parl.gc.ca

The committee contact page lists the following additional staff membership

Labels: #CdnDemocracy, #ERRE, Electoral Reform, Special Committee on Electoral Reform

https://youtu.be/_GjmRwfkRXY

Labels: electronic voting, internet voting, links to video, online voting

NOTE: SpeakerDeck disables links in presentations; for clickable links you will have to download the PDF from Share -> Download PDF at https://speakerdeck.com/papervote/questions-to-ask-about-internet-voting

You can also download the PowerPoint presentation (from Google Drive). The PowerPoint includes clickable links as well as slide notes.
To download the slides, click the download link (the downward-pointing arrow) in the upper right of the Google Drive screen.

UPDATE 2016-08-31: I have also made a narrated (audio + slides) version of the presentation.

Labels: elections canada, internet voting, links to presentations

https://youtu.be/v6aUkan3R68

Download the presentation slides. 

Labels: electronic voting, enigma2016, internet voting, links to video, online voting

https://youtu.be/Wv3VuGZzdK8

Labels: electronic voting, internet voting, links to video, online voting

https://youtu.be/abQCqIbBBeM?t=14s

Labels: election history, electronic voting, internet voting, links to video, online voting

https://youtu.be/w3_0x6oaDmI

Labels: electronic voting, internet voting, links to video, online voting

If you are interested in providing evidence about the risks of online voting, you are welcome to contact me @papervote or papervotecanada@gmail.com
 
On May 11, 2016 the Government of Canada gave notice of its proposal to create an All-Party Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reform.

The Government has also asked that the committee consider the issues of mandatory voting and online voting.

The government is proposing that five principles guide the parliamentary committee's study, of which the most relevant for the purposes of this blog is

4. Safeguarding the integrity of our voting process.

The timing is tight to produce a comprehensive report.

The Government is proposing that the special all-party committee issue its final report to Parliament by December 1, 2016.

from News Release - Government of Canada proposes All-Party Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reform and Democratic Institutions - Frequently Asked Questions.

Online and in-person consultation hearings are proposed.  I have asked (through my Twitter account) if there will be a specific hearing on online voting.

@CdnDemocracy Will there be a hearing specifically about online voting?

— Richard Akerman (@papervote) May 11, 2016

UPDATE 2016-06-30: Please see my blog post

How to participate in #ERRE Special Committee on Electoral Reform

for more information.  ENDUPDATE


Sources of information are

• Twitter: @CdnDemocracy
• Web: http://www.DemocraticInstitutions.gc.ca/
• Twitter: Minister of Democratic Institutions @MaryamMonsef

If you are interested in providing evidence about the risks of online voting, you are welcome to contact me @papervote or papervotecanada@gmail.com

UPDATE 2016-06-24: The full committee membership has been announced and they have held their first meeting.  I have listed all of the members with their contact information in #ERRE - Special Committee on Electoral Reform - membership

There has been no commitment to hold a specific hearing about online voting, @CdnDemocracy said only "the all-party parliamentary committee will be studying online voting" in response to my tweeted question.

ENDUPDATE

Labels: #CdnDemocracy, CdnDemocracy, internet voting, online voting

The electronic voting machine, a purely electronic kiosk where you vote, has many challenges.

The code that the machine runs must be correct (without significant bugs or errors), which is difficult (and expensive).

Worse, you must be certain that the code you have validated is actually the code it runs for every vote during the election, which is impossible.  As in, literally impossible.  The problem is, the only way to find out what code the machine is running is to ask it.  Because machines are programmed by humans, machines can lie, just like humans.

Here's how it works:

Computer running the validated code

1. Computer expert queries the computer about what code it is running
2. Computer says "I am running the validated code"

Computer running hacked code

1. Computer is hacked, adding malicious (lying) code to the validated code
2. Computer expert queries the computer about what code it is running
3. The malicious code lies and says "I am running the validated code"

This is not theoretical, this is exactly what a rootkit does.

So if the machine only records votes electronically, you can never be sure if your vote was correctly recorded.  (This is not to mention the possibility of alteration during a long electronic chain of transmission to get to the final election results.)

The only way to verify your vote is to get a paper printout, so that you can look at the paper and validate that it shows your vote as cast.  But again, remember the computer can lie.  You can vote for party A, the computer can record the vote for party B and then print a paper receipt saying you voted for party A.

The only way to actually be certain of the vote count is to count the paper...

which means you just spent millions of dollars replacing a pen.

These are just the core issues, in an ideal system.
In reality, there are many more problems with voting machines.  Although some were based on ATMs, ATMs are physically bigger, have a simpler job, have much clearer transactional validation (ask for $100, complain if you don't get $100), and have dedicated maintenance teams.  While some voting machines were build by ATM manufacturers (like Diebold), the coding was rushed (at least we assume so, we don't get to see the coding), the machines are only used once a year at most, and the maintenance is done by amateurs who don't have the bank's monetary motivations for maintaining accuracy.  In such a situation, voting machines can have many errors including:

* touchscreen misalignment
* coding errors
* introduction of malicious code e.g. via USB
* failure due to poor storage or aging out
* existing software vulnerabilities (particularly since most run Windows) that are uncovered during the lifetime of the machine but never patched, opening them to network or USB attack

Labels: electronic voting, security, voting machines

(And risks associated with other types of voting technology.)

I have been tweeting many links about Internet voting risks on the account @papervote
but now it is time to put them together in a blog post.

You can also find links in my bookmarks (which are drawn from many of my accounts, not just @papervote) under tag voting_tech_risks (click link for full list).

Also see extensive materials at http://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/

Statements from Computer Scientist Organisations

Computer scientists are best positioned to understand the risks related to the use of computers for voting.  They have made clear statements against the use of Internet voting at this time.

✭ US Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) - Internet voting

Internet voting adds additional concerns about security, verifiability and auditability to those already known about electronic voting. ...
At the present, paper-based systems provide the best available technology to [preserve the ability to audit and/or recount the votes].

✭ Computer Technologists' Statement on Internet Voting

Several serious, potentially insurmountable, technical challenges must be met if elections conducted by transmitting votes over the internet are to be verifiable.

Government Reports / Tech Reports

✭ US Office of the Director of National Intelligence - Opening Statement to Worldwide Threat Assessment Hearing (PDF) - February 26, 2015

Remarks from the Honorable James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence:

I'll start with cyber threats.  Attacks against us are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication and severity of impact.

✭ Foundation for Information Policy Research - Response to The Speaker’s Commission on Digital Democracy (PDF) - September 27, 2014

this technology still has very significant issues with security, privacy, coercion resistance, auditability and comprehensibility, which preclude its use in high-stakes contests where capable and well-resourced actors (political parties, lobby groups and even foreign governments) may have an incentive to manipulate the system

✭ Parliament of Australia - Inquiry into... 2013 General Election - Second Interim Report: An assessment of electronic voting options

This excellent report, licensed in the Creative Commons for reuse (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 Australia) covers many risks related to Internet voting, with very clear language.

Full report (PDF) can be downloaded; individual sections also available.

✭ NISTIR 7770 - Security Considerations for Remote Electronic UOCAVA Voting (PDF) - February 2011

✭ UK Electoral Commission - Key issues and conclusions: May 2007 electoral pilot schemes (PDF; copy from Archive.org) - August 2007

issues with the security and transparency of the solutions

Expert Analysis

✭ Independent Report on E-voting in Estonia

Audio and Video

✭ Security Analysis of Estonia's Internet Voting System by J. Alex Halderman - published to YouTube Dec 28, 2014

From the Chaos Communication Conference (31c3) in 2014.  You can also see the video on their website.

✭ Why electronic voting is a BAD idea - published to YouTube Dec 18, 2014

The above video is a fantastic clear explanation of why electronic voting machines are a security risk and why Internet voting is even worse.

Presented by Tom Scott for Computerphile, filmed by Sean Riley.

✭ Videos from online course Securing Digital Democracy by J. Alex Halderman

✭ SRI International - Podcast (audio) - Internet voting - October 10, 2010

Interviewing Jeremy Epstein.

Articles, Blog Posts, etc.

✭ Freedom to Tinker - Decertifying the worst voting machine in the US - by Jeremy Epstein - April 15, 2015

✭ Remarkable Virginia IT Agency Report Details Reasons for WinVote Decertification - by Doug Chapin - April 15, 2015

✭ Sydney Morning Herald - International experts warn of the risks of Australian online voting tools - March 24, 2015

✭ Communications of the ACM - Security Risks, Privacy Issues Too Great for Internet Voting - March 12, 2015

Above article reports on a presentation by computer scientist David Jefferson.

✭ CBC - Internet voting isn't a big draw for younger voters, researcher says -  February 11, 2015

Note that Nichole Goodman is a social sciences researcher, not a computer scientist.

✭ Analyst opinion: Don’t take online voting for granted - by Nick Wallace - January 30, 2015

Government should consider alternatives to online voting.  ... Preventing fraud is a tall order. ... An additional challenge is preserving the secret ballot...

✭ USA Today - Online voting rife with hazards - November 4, 2014

Above article by computer scientist Barbara Simons.

Education

Learn more about the issues.

... more to come

GTEC conference, October 19, 2011 from 10:00 to 11:00

Using Digital Technology to Connect with Citizens in the Town of Markham

Given the apparent decrease in voter engagement, Canadian governments are faced with seeking innovative ways to connect with the public. When used strategically, digital technologies are an effective means to engage citizens. Through the use of Internet voting and the implementation of multiple interactive online initiatives, the Town of Markham has become a leader in eDemocracy. In this session attendees will hear from the Mayor of Markham, the visionary behind Markham’s innovative use of digital technologies to engage citizens, as well as the CEO of Delvinia, the firm behind the initiatives and the only organization to collect consumer data on Internet voting in three consecutive elections.

Co-presenter - Adam Froman, CEO, Delvinia

from GTEC 2011 Conference Program at a Glace

1) Delvinia releases a report

"Our latest DIG report examines the Town of Markham’s experience with Internet voting in the 2003, 2006 and 2010 municipal election"

http://www.delvinia.com/delvinia-releases-dig-report-on-edemocracy-and-citizen-engagement/

This is good.

In 2010, with the support of Ryerson University, Delvinia secured an Engage Grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) to commission Nicole Goodman, a PhD candidate specializing in Canadian political institutions and alternative voting methods, to provide a scholarly perspective on the data collected following the 2010 election as well as a comparison to the data Delvinia collected in the 2003 and 2006 elections.

It is also excellent to see academic research in this field and a rigorous report.

2) However

The DIG report is available online at www.delvinia.com/dig. The full research report is available for purchase through Delvinia. Please refer to our order form to obtain a copy of the report.

from http://www.delvinia.com/delvinia-releases-dig-report-on-edemocracy-and-citizen-engagement/

So objective fact 1: Delvinia is selling the full report.

3) However

In addition to helping the Town raise awareness of Internet voting in the 2003, 2006 and 2010 municipal elections, Delvinia also conducted in-person and online surveys to collect data regarding public attitudes, feelings and beliefs toward Internet voting in each of those elections.

from http://www.delvinia.com/should-canadians-have-the-opportunity-to-vote-online/

So objective fact 2: Delvinia was paid by the City of Markham to promote Internet voting in 2003, 2006 and 2010 (the same years in the same city concerning the same topic that the newly-released evoting report covers).

4) The correct way to report this, providing the full context, would be

Delvinia, a company paid by the City of Markham to promote Internet voting in 2003, 2006 and 2010, is now selling a detailed report about Internet voting in Markham.  The report concludes Internet voting was a great success.

I am not criticising Delvinia or the report, I am just stating the objective facts of the context of the report.

So I will now help some news reporting organisations.

This is what the Star wrote

Internet voting in advance polls in Markham has helped increase overall voter turnout, engage non-voters to vote and greatly improve overall voter satisfaction, according to a research and public opinion report released Monday.

In the report by Delvinia, a digital strategy firm, voter turnout in Markham has increased by 35 per cent since the introduction of Internet voting in 2003, and much of that is attributed to the advent of online voting.

http://www.thestar.com/news/article/1059558

You may note that neither in this extract nor indeed anywhere in the entire article does it mention the context I provided above.  The article with context would be

Internet voting in advance polls in Markham has helped increase overall voter turnout, engage non-voters to vote and greatly improve overall voter satisfaction, according to a research and public opinion report released Monday.

In the report by Delvinia, a digital strategy firm, voter turnout in Markham has increased by 35 per cent since the introduction of Internet voting in 2003, and much of that is attributed to the advent of online voting.  Delvinia, a company paid by the City of Markham to promote Internet voting in 2003, 2006 and 2010, is now selling a detailed report about Internet voting in Markham.

This is what IT World Canada wrote

New data culled from Markham, Ont. voters could make a case for the introduction of Internet voting across all levels of government in Canada, according to a new report from user experience design firm Delvinia

The Toronto-based digital consultancy released the findings of its eDemocracy and Citizen Engagement report on Monday, which focused on the Town of Markham’s recent online voting initiatives. The municipality has offered online voting for its local elections since 2003.

http://www.itworldcanada.com/news/e-voting-gets-almost-unanimous-praise-study-finds/144015

And here, again, is the article with the actual full context added

New data culled from Markham, Ont. voters could make a case for the introduction of Internet voting across all levels of government in Canada, according to a new report from user experience design firm Delvinia

The Toronto-based digital consultancy released the findings of its eDemocracy and Citizen Engagement report on Monday, which focused on the Town of Markham’s recent online voting initiatives. The municipality has offered online voting for its local elections since 2003.  Delvinia, a company paid by the City of Markham to promote Internet voting in 2003, 2006 and 2010, is now selling a detailed report about Internet voting in Markham.

I want to be completely up-front: I am profoundly disappointed that major Canadian news media are not providing the full context of this report.  I expect the news media to provide context for ANY press release, announcement, speech, interview or think-tank report.  Information without context is no foundation for democracy.

UPDATE: I should also mention, in case you think this is a minor nuance on an obscure story buried in the back pages of the paper, that "Online voting changes the game" was the Toronto Star's front-page, above-the-fold, banner full-width headline story for Monday September 26, 2011.  In newspaper terms, they declared it the single most important story in the world for September 26, 2011.

Go vote, in the assurance that your vote will be accurately counted.

http://elections.ca/

Labels: canada, elections canada