Paper Vote Canada

In my understanding, Australia does a review of election processes and possible improvements after every election.

Canada should be so lucky as to have a process as comprehensive as Australia's last review in 2013, where "The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters held 20 hearings and reviewed more than 200 submissions, before deciding Australia should stick to its largely paper based system."[1]

The foreward of this Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) report is worth quoting extensively, as it is clear and compelling.  Any emphasis (bolding) below is mine.

advocates argue that [electronic voting computers and Internet voting] offer faster and potentially more accurate results. With the close of polls the results are known within minutes rather than hours, days and weeks and arguably without the human error that occurs in the long paper ballot count.

Many think it sounds like a good idea for the next federal election.

No matter your view, this is not feasible.

Even the most ardent electronic voting advocates must recognise that in logistical terms it would be impossible for our electoral authorities to roll it out next polling day which is less than two years away – at the latest.

But what about future elections?

I once simply assumed so, but that was before I had really given it a lot of thought.

After hearing from a range of experts, and surveying the international electoral landscapes it is clear to me that Australia is not in a position to introduce any large-scale system of electronic voting in the near future without catastrophically compromising our electoral integrity.

Machine electronic voting at a polling place is vulnerable to hacking to some degree. This can be mitigated by a system that not only records your vote electronically, but also produces a printed ballot for physical counting and later verification. In other words, a lot of expense to still visit the polling booth, queue up and complete your vote on a machine rather than a paper ballot.

For this reason, internet voting seems to be naturally the most attractive to many voters. As an election expert from the USA recently said to me: ‘when it comes to voting, folks would rather be online than in line.’

But the weight of evidence tells us that at present [Internet voting] is highly vulnerable to hacking. While internet voting occurs in Estonia, it does not mean that system cannot be hacked.

With all the internet security architecture available, the academic experts swear they can, and have proved they can, hack such systems.

...

Given we complete so many transactions online, I am often asked why voting should be any different. My answer to that is that voting once every three years to determine our democratic destiny is not an everyday transaction.

Not only do we have the right to a ballot; we have rightly enshrined within our system the right to a secret vote. Voting at a booth in a polling place guarantees this; voting over the internet threatens this.

Internet voting would expose some voters to family and peer pressure by removing the individual isolation of voting at a secluded booth and replacing it with voting in a home, a workplace or a public place. It also potentially opens up a market for votes where disengaged or financially desperate voters could be offered money to vote a certain way, which could be verified in a way not possible at a polling place.

...

Over the course of the twenty hearings to date and in reviewing the 207 submissions received, the Committee has worked collaboratively and in an impartial manner to ensure that the best outcomes have been met.

Technology is moving at a rapid pace. The Committee believes that we should be utilising it to ensure that the systems underpinning how we vote are sound and that persons with disabilities have easy access to the vote. In doing so, we will harness [technology] which enhances our electoral integrity, not that which endangers it.

I extend my thanks once again to the Honourable Tony Smith for such a clear and compelling summary of the evidence.

[1] ABC - Curious Campaign: Why have voters not had access to electronic voting? - 26 May 2016

Labels: australia, electronic voting, internet voting, online voting, report

Your post advocates a

( ) technical ( ) legislative ( ) vigilante

approach to improving voting. Your idea will not work. Here is why it won't
work. (One or more of the following may apply to your particular idea.)

( ) It will not increase turnout.  Only public interest increases turnout.  Yes, even for the kids today.
( ) It will not save money
( ) It will not be secure
( ) The ballot will not be secret
( ) Any increase in vote counting speed is irrelevant when weighed against the greatly increased risks of hacking
( ) By enabling the voter to verify their vote after it has been cast, you have opened the door to coercion
( ) By issuing user, password, personal info credentials you have made the voter's identity something that can be sold or stolen
( ) Every eligible voter cannot meaningfully understand and inspect it
( ) The requirement to have a printed ballot for verification means you have invented a very expensive pencil

Specifically, your plan fails to account for

( ) The fact that computers can lie; computers will do whatever they're programmed to do
( ) Nation-state attackers
( ) Armies of worm riddled broadband-connected Windows boxes
( ) Coding errors
( ) Malware
( ) Banking has completely different security requirements from voting; when hacked the transaction is reversed at the bank's expense
( ) The online system you think is analogous is not
( ) The need to cast an anonymous vote on a smartphone, the least anonymous device ever invented
( ) The need to cast a secure vote on a system that has components built or coded by other nation-states
( ) The corporation you have outsourced your voting system to is malicious and/or incompetent
( ) The fact the voting machines (computers) will not be patched as new vulnerabilities are discovered
( ) Tendency of users to click on anything received by email
( ) Lack of technical expertise in individuals overseeing and running the election
( ) Power failure
( ) Denial of service
( ) USB keys
( ) Wifi / Bluetooth
( ) Inevitable technology obsolescence
( ) Encrypting the communication over the network doesn't matter when the client and server aren't secure
( ) Blockchain doesn't work the way you think it does, and even if it did, it wouldn't solve the problem you think it does

and the following philosophical objections may also apply:

( ) Ideas similar to yours are easy to come up with, yet none have ever been shown practical
( ) Why should we have to trust you and your servers?
( ) Voting for your democratic representatives should require more thought and effort than ordering a pizza

Copyright © 2016 Richard Akerman
Licensed in the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication
Free to reuse and modify without attribution.

These are the positions of witnesses before the Special Committee on Electoral Reform (ERRE) about online voting, based on their testimony.
Only witnesses with testimony posted online are listed in the table; more will be added as testimony is made available.

First name	Last name	Role / Position	Credentials	Position on online voting	Quote(s)	Date
Maryam	Monsef	Minister of Democratic Institutions		Supportive but concerned about security	Online voting and similar reforms that embrace the technological advances we have today should be seen as ways to increase participation by removing barriers that may exist for some Canadians. At all times, though, there should always be a balance between the security and the integrity of the voting process.	July 6, 2016
Marc	Mayrand	Chief Electoral Officer of Canada		more research needs to be done	I have no plans to introduce online voting for 2019. ... I think there's still a lot of research to be done, and there are many considerations... social acceptability, security, and vulnerability	July 7, 2016
Jean-Pierre	Kingsley	Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 1990-2007		Supportive but concerned about security	The analogy with online purchasing and banking—and I heard the arguments this morning—is flawed. The argument is flawed, and Marc Mayrand answered that question. Banks and other institutions hedge the risk and they remove the risk, at least most of the time, from the individual. A margin of error is acceptable, against which they successfully hedge, but what margin of error is acceptable to us with the electoral system? one issue about security of voting. The other one is is the security attached to the transmittal of the vote and then the transmittal of the results.	July 7, 2016
R. Kenneth	Carty	Professor Emeritus, University of British Colombia	PhD in Comparative Politics, Queen's University	not an expert, perhaps online voting is something for the future	I know nothing about the technicalities. I heard both the current and the past Chief Electoral Officer say they don't believe that the security concerns have been dealt with yet. I think this is an issue probably for the future.	July 25, 2016
Brian	Tanguay	Professor, Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University	PhD in Political Science from Carleton University	not an expert, concerned about security but cautiously interested	This isn't something that I have done research on, but like Professor Wiseman I would be worried about the security aspects of online voting. However, nonetheless I am intrigued by the prospect and believe that a number of studies at the municipal level here in Ontario are being conducted or will be conducted in the future, and ought to continue to be conducted. I think it's definitely something that should be explored. All the while we should keep in mind that the Internet is not necessarily a secure environment for this kind of thing.	July 25, 2016
Nelson	Wiseman	Director, Canadian Studies Program, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto	Ph.D., University of Toronto (area of specialisation unknown)	not in favour of Internet voting, not an expert, very concerned about security	You've also discussed Internet voting. I don't favour that either, but if it is going to be used, I think it should only be for the housebound and the disabled. In my limited reading in this area I've seen that the preponderance of experts are opposed to it because it's easy...well, not easy, but you can hack the system. A few years ago three federal government departments were hacked. We have no idea of how extensive the information was that was lifted. Also, we just had the Democratic Party, the DNC, hacked. At the University of Toronto the students decided—students are ahead of me, I don't even have a cellphone—that by having Internet voting it would increase participation because turnout was only 15% when students went to vote. They introduced Internet voting and turnout was 15%. Two or three years ago, the University of Western Ontario had an election for their student council and president and it was hacked. The NDP had a convention to select the leader and snafus appeared. Can you imagine what will happen on election night? The Internet is convenient, but incidentally it's not a social activity. It's social when you show up at the polls, you meet your neighbours, you get in line, and you talk to other people. Pressing these buttons at home is cocooning.	July 25, 2016
Michael	Marsh	Emeritus Professor, Trinity College Dublin (Department of Political Science)	PhD (university and specalisation unknown)	online voting is a long way away	In simple terms, we [Ireland] don't have online voting. Postal voting is very difficult here, and I think online voting is a long way away. There is research on postal voting. In some jurisdictions, I think Sweden, most people vote long before the election takes place. The hope was that postal voting would make it easier to vote, and therefore would raise turnout. Most of the research with which I am familiar says that what happens is that those people who would vote anyway find it easier to vote, and those people who wouldn't vote anyway don't vote just because they can vote by post. It facilitates the regular voter, not someone who's turned off from the system.	July 26, 2016
Michael	Gallagher	Professor of Comparative Politics, Trinity College Dublin	PhD, Strathclyde, School of Government & Public Policy	concerned about secrecy of the ballot, no demand in Ireland for online voting	It's hard to envisage an online voting system that has a paper component to it. One concern about online voting here and in a lot of countries would be the secrecy of the ballot, which means in this country not just that you don't have to show anyone else how you voted, but you can't prove to anyone else how you voted even if you want to. The fear, then, is that if there were online voting, how do we know there isn't someone sitting and looking over your shoulder, making you vote in a particular way or bribing you to vote in a particular way? If there were a paper record of how you voted, then clearly the problems would be even greater, so there is really no demand here for online voting. I realize that is one of the terms of reference of the committee, but it's not something that Ireland could really throw much light on.	July 26, 2016
Patrice	Dutil	Professor, Ryerson University (Department of Politics and Public Administration)	PhD in History from York University	more research needed, would support if it was "accurate and foolproof"	The third point is that I do support continued research on online voting and its eventual adoption once we are all assured that it is accurate and foolproof.	July 26, 2016
Peter	Russell	Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto	Rhodes Scholar, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, B.A. with first class honours in 1957 [reference]	no position stated		July 26, 2016
Tom	Rogers	Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission		Australia does not have national online voting; Parliamentary inquiry recommended against it	Electronic voting is a matter for the Australian Parliament, not for the AEC, and it would require a change to our legislation. At the federal level we do not use electronic voting, nor do we use Internet voting. In 2014 our electoral matters committee inquired into the topic of electronic voting, and I will just quote from that for one moment. It found that “irrespective of one's philosophical view about electronic voting, ...there can be no widespread introduction of electronic voting in the near term without massive costs and unacceptable security risks.” At the state and territory level, some commissions have trialed electronic voting. In the Australian Capital Territory, where Canberra is located, electronic voting has been used in early voting centres since 2001. They use a system of personal computers. In New South Wales, Internet voting was trialed in 2011 and 2015 for particular categories of voters... I am aware of significant media commentary surrounding security aspects of this system, but I'm unable to comment further. I don't own that system. ...a 2014 report of the Australian Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, which is our parliamentary oversight committee. They did a comprehensive hearing into this topic and have written a comprehensive report on it. That quote came from that report, in which at that point in 2014 they acknowledged that whilst it may be inevitable at some point, they pointed out the significant risks that might accrue from electronic voting or Internet voting if it weren't done properly. [Note: see blog post Australia concludes electronic voting would catastrophically compromise election integrity]	July 26, 2016
Robert	Peden	Chief Electoral Officer, New Zealand		no position stated	[Note: On slide 25 "Electronic Voting" of the presentation (PDF) provided by the New Zealand Electoral Commission, it states: No current legislative plans to introduce electronic voting for parliamentary elections Trial proposed for 2016 local authority elections not proceeding ]	July 26, 2016
Henry	Milner	Senior Researcher, Chair in Electoral Studies, Université de Montréal	unable to determine	not an expert, voting in person is better	This is not an area I've looked at, so I can't talk about research. I'm uncomfortable with it because maybe I'm just an old fogey, but I think too much is happening online for people and not enough is happening in their communities. As long as we can find ways of getting people to actually vote with their neighbours, I would prefer that. I haven't been persuaded that online helps us much.	July 27, 2016
Alex	Himelfarb	Clerk of the Privy Council, 2002-2006	Ph.D in sociology from University of Toronto	would prefer electronic voting—if it increased access and participation—to mandatory voting	In the spirit of old fogeys, I too quite like the idea of elections as a collective experience. I think that's hugely valuable. On the other hand, I would prefer electronic voting—if it increased access and participation—to mandatory voting. To the extent that it might actually increase the voting of young Canadians, I find it somewhat attractive despite my basic fogeyness.	July 27, 2016
André	Blais	Professor, Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal	Ph.D. in Political science from York University	concerned about security, we should move cautiously	I'm certainly open to the idea. The concern, as Mr. Mayrand has mentioned, is whether we can really make sure that the system cannot be hacked. I think we should move very cautiously in that direction.	July 27, 2016
Leslie	Seidle	Research Director, Canada's Changing Federal Community, Institute for Research on Public Policy	DPhil in Politics from the University of Oxford	no position stated		July 27, 2016
Larry	LeDuc	Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Toronto	Ph.D from the University of Michigan (area of specialization unknown)	no position stated		July 27, 2016
Hugo	Cyr	Dean, Faculty of Political Science and Law, Université du Québec à Montréal	LL.D. (Université de Montréal)	be cautious. concerned about the secret ballot and coercion. online voting won't dramatically increase youth turnout.	I would just like to make a comment on online voting. We haven't said much about it. Personally, I would advise you to be cautious about this. We know that ballot secrecy protects the voter, but, above all, it also protects the system against fraud. When the ballot is secret, it cannot be sold easily, because buyers have no way of knowing whether the people trying to sell their vote are telling the truth about how they actually voted. Online voting, which is done remotely over the Internet, basically makes it possible to disclose the information required to vote and makes the vote much more susceptible to horse trading. There is therefore a risk, which is not trivial since we now use social networks a lot more, and so on. I do have reservations about this, and I don't think that simply making it possible to vote online will dramatically increase turnout among younger voters.	July 27, 2016
Dennis	Pilon	Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, York University	PhD from York University (Politics)	no position stated		July 28, 2016
Jonathan	Rose	Associate Professor, Department of Policital Studies, Queen's University	Ph.D. in Political Science from Queen's University	no position stated		July 28, 2016
Maryantonett	Flumian	President, Institute on Governance (speaking on behalf of the Institute)	a Master’s Degree in History and completed comprehensive exams towards a PhD in History at the University of Ottawa	very strongly in favour of online voting, research needed on confidentiality and integrity	...the ability to vote online would make a difference [in voter turnout] as well. A survey commissioned by us at the Institute on Governance—not yet published, but I will make it available to the committee after my appearance—shows that Canadians widely endorse online voting. I believe that technology that could and must ensure both the confidentiality and the integrity of an online voting process must be aggressively explored now, while we still have a few years to go. People live their lives online, do their banking online, and pay their taxes online, but they can't vote online. A younger generation does not understand this, and frankly neither do I. I say let Canada be at the vanguard of piloting, experimenting, and implementing online voting as quickly as possible. [Also see IOG blog post - Democratic Reform in Canada: Online Voting, Referenda, and the Governance Ecosystem #ERRE]	July 28, 2016
Arend	Lijphart	Research Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of California	Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University	no position stated		August 22, 2016
Benoît	Pelletier	Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa	LL.D., Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), France; LL.D., Aix-Marseille III, France	no position stated		August 22, 2016
Nathalie	Des Rosiers	Dean, Faculty of Law, Civil Law, Ottawa University	LL.M., Harvard University	no position stated		August 22, 2016
Harold	Jansen	Professor of Political Science, University of Lethbridge	Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Alberta	any move to online voting should be pursued with some caution not a technical expert; concerned about security, lack of transparency and difficulty of identity verification does not expect online voting would result in increased turnout; youth are less politically involved online than you might think primarily presented results of online survey (results are not statistically representative)	My colleagues at four other Canadian universities and I have been surveying Canadians for the last two and a half years about their online political activities. In our surveys, we've asked a few questions about Canadians' attitudes toward online voting. This research was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and part of what they asked us to do was to try to come up with knowledge that would be useful and inform public debates. We've only begun to start analyzing some of that data, so I'm going to give you some preliminary findings quite briefly at the end. In our survey, 36% of Canadians thought that Internet voting was risky; 42% thought it was safe; and the rest weren't sure one way or the other. What I found very interesting, though, is that a third of the people who said it was risky still said they were very likely to vote online if it were available to them. I think it's because the risk doesn't accrue to them personally; it's a risk to the system, not to them personally. One caution: our survey was done through an online panel. Very high income people were most likely to say they would very likely vote online. any move to online voting should be pursued with some caution. It should be supplementary to what we have. It shouldn't replace the kinds of things Elections Canada always does, because there is a divide in digital skills that could end up disenfranchising voters. Mrs. Sherry Romanado: We talked quickly about online voting, and you had talked about the statistics and the fact that it wasn't statistically sound because the people who participated were online. Prof. Harold Jansen: We have the problem that we're doing it online, and it overrepresents the politically interested. there's a technical side of it—and I'm not a computer scientist and there are other people better qualified to talk about that. The major issue is the lack of transparency in the process. Things disappear into cyberspace and nobody's entirely sure what happens and you can't recreate a paper trail the way you can with a paper ballot. That's a significant issue. There's the issue of identity verification. Are the people casting the ballot actually the people who are supposed to cast it? How do you prevent ballots from being sold or those identities from being traded off? There are all kinds of issues around that, which I think are fairly significant technical challenges. My sense is that technically we've got a way to go yet to have things that are safe and secure enough. I don't think we should expect realistically huge gains in voter turnout. The reality is that people, and youth included, do a lot less politically online than you might expect. Our surveys have shown that very few people follow politicians on Facebook or on Twitter or engage with them online, and those people who do intend to be politically interested. So generally, it tends to just provide another tool for the people who are already engaged.	August 22, 2016
Christian	Dufour	Political scientist, Analyst and Writer; Chercheur, ENAP à Montréal	lawyer (avocat); unable to determine details	concerned about security and identity verification, also concerned that online voting would devalue the vote	Aside from security and verification issues, a vote can very easily be devalued. When we vote now, we always have to go to a physical location. Some effort is required. It is not a survey. So there is always a risk. On one hand, there is a desire to make voting easier and to reach out to people, but I'm not sure how effective that would be. Isn't there a risk that the vote itself would be devalued?	August 22, 2016
Barry	Cooper	Professor (political philosophy and war), University of Calgary	PhD in Political Science from Duke University	no position stated		August 23, 2016

Number of witnesses to date with computer science, computer security, or voting technology expertise: 0.
(Note however that the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada is advised by people who have such expertise, as are other electoral officers.)

Kudos to those who are non-experts in online voting who declared so, and who urged caution.

Note that despite Dr. Tanguay's perception, there have been no technical studies of online voting at the municipal level in Ontario. Only non-technical investigations. Also note that Maryantonett Flumian's assertion that online voting would increase turnout is not supported by the evidence.

If you do have expertise in computer science, computer security, or voting technology, I encourage you to participate in the committee (by October 6, 2016 at the latest) as a witness and/or by submitting a brief.

Labels: #ERRE, internet voting, online voting

@kady has written an article in the Ottawa Citizen: Craving a break from the referendum-or-not debate? Why not fight about online voting instead?

I would have to turn on Facebook Platform apps to leave a comment on the Citizen, which isn't going to happen, so I'm putting my comment here instead:

COMMENT

Kudos to Chief Electoral Officer Mayrand for stressing caution.

I'd like to quote part of Mayrand's testimony that illustrates the many challenges with introducing online voting:
"...we have to be careful.  We need to look also at security.  There are certain characteristics of the vote that we want to preserve: it is confidentiality, it is secrecy, the reliability and the integrity."

There is extensive evidence that we do not currently have the technology to meet the security requirements needed for online voting, nor the ability to maintain the confidentiality we currently get with the paper secret ballot.

A 2014 report from the BC Independent Panel on Internet Voting ( http://www.internetvotingpanel.ca/ ) indicated that
"Internet voting has some significant inherent risks"
and recommended
"Do not implement universal Internet voting for either local government or provincial government elections at this time."

An extensive investigation conducted by the Parliament of Australia in 2013 ( http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Electoral_Matters/2013_General_Election/Second_Interim_Report/Chapter_4#safety ) indicated that
"Internet voting is considered by experts to be the most risky and difficult mode of electronic voting to implement."
and concluded that any potential benefits do not outweigh the risks.

You can find a lot more information about this topic in my blog "Paper Vote Canada" ( http://blog.papervotecanada.ca/ )

ENDCOMMENT

(The quote from Mayrand is from my manual transcription of his July 7, 2016 testimony, as the official transcript is not yet available.)

You can see previous comments I have left on newspaper articles by selecting the label: newspaper comment.

Labels: comment, internet voting, newspaper comment, online voting

This is a slightly more technical presentation (with tech jokes), presented at Shopify tech talks on July 14, 2016.
I'd like to thank the Shopify audience for asking a lot of good questions.

NOTE: SpeakerDeck disables links in presentations; for clickable links you will have to download the PDF from Share -> Download PDF at https://speakerdeck.com/papervote/questions-to-ask-about-internet-voting-shopify-edition

Previously:
June 2, 2016  Presentation - Questions to ask about Internet Voting

Labels: internet voting, links to presentations, online voting

There seems to be an idea that if we introduced Internet voting, turnout would jump, trending towards 100%.

Endlessly cited for the advantages of Internet voting is Estonia.
It's very Canadian to always assume some other country's system must be better.
But the reality is that after offering Internet voting for national elections starting in 2007, Estonia had lower turnout in 2015 than Canada.

I'll say that again for emphasis

After almost a decade of offering Internet voting, Estonia had a lower turnout in its 2015 Parliamentary election than Canada did.

Country	2011 Turnout	2015 Turnout
Canada	61.1%	68.3%
Estonia	63.5%	64.2%

Note: In order to ensure the numbers are roughly comparable, I am comparing only Parliamentary elections.

Data are from

• Statistics about Internet Voting in Estonia
• Elections Canada - Voter turnout for the 2015, 2011, 2008 and 2006 general elections

In addition to this, an independent analysis of Estonian e-voting indicated that

• there were staggering gaps in procedural and operational security
• the architecture of the system leaves it open to cyberattacks from foreign powers, such as Russia

Previously:
July 6, 2016  evidence about online voting (particularly turnout)

Labels: canada, Estonia, internet voting, online voting, voter turnout

UPDATE 2016-07-19: Official transcripts of Marc Mayrand and ... are available and excerpted below.

Marc Mayrand's opening remarks are also available from Elections Canada.

Also see @kady's liveblog
and her article Why not fight about online voting instead?
in response to which I have posted a comment.

Below are excerpts specific to online voting.  Any emphasis (bold italics) in the text is mine.

TRANSCRIPT START - July 7, 2016 - Chief Electoral Officer Marc Mayrand

Mr. John Aldag:
    ... if we were to look at things like some form of online voting or electronic voting, would the timeline of May 2017 include that kind of introduction, or would it be more of a status quo?

Mr. Marc Mayrand:
    I have no plans to introduce online voting for 2019. I would need, certainly, very clear directions in that regard. I think there's still a lot of research to be done, and there are many considerations. That's what I would like to see the committee doing in its work, addressing some of the key considerations and giving us some direction on where we should go and how should we proceed to explore and test online voting at some point. I doubt very much that this could be done by 2019, given the scope of the reform we're looking at. I think that would be a significant burden on capacity.











    Yes.



    Unfortunately, we'll have to go to the next question, but it's a good thought, and we can pick up on it in a bit.






    I believe so. If we want Canadians to have confidence in the electoral system, we need to make sure it's one they accept.



    Let's just say it doesn't seem too difficult.

    I'd like to know whether you're considering giving Canadians the option between voting online, similar to electronic tax return filing, and going to the polling station and showing identification.


















Mr. Marc Mayrand:
    It's very difficult for me to really respond clearly and directly to your question.
    I think the one thing that comes to mind first of all is that this committee has a mandate. The other aspect is that these issues require, I think, assessing what the social acceptability of online voting or mandatory voting. I understand that this committee will undertake extensive public consultations over the next short while, looking at these matters and voting systems.
    I'm not aware if the procedure and House affairs committee has by tradition undertaken such broad consultations. That's the one caveat I would put out there. I think it's important to have significant consultation on these matters. They are important and directly affect electors.

Mr. Matt DeCourcey:
    ...
    We observed that students in Fredericton really appreciated being able to vote on campus. That worked out very well.
[English]

     I wonder if maybe you could share some evidence that demonstrates that engaging young Canadians, those below 18 and those entering adulthood, in education around civic affairs, democratic institutions, voting, helps enhance voter turnout and helps encourage long-term participation in the process. We absolutely want to encourage greater numbers of Canadians voting. I'm convinced of that. Is there any direction you can send us?

Mr. Marc Mayrand:
   ...
    We can build all sorts of online services, remove all sorts of barriers, but if people don't have the interest, don't have the knowledge, they may not take advantage of the opportunity. I think these things go hand in hand.

Mr. Luc Thériault:
    I'd like to know whether you've done any studies in the past on online voting. You are aware of the problems Quebec experienced with that in 2005. I imagine that, even under the current voting system, you would be able to further automate the process or offer online voting. That was my understanding.
    Is that correct?

Mr. Marc Mayrand:
    We did a fair number of intensive studies for a few years, at the beginning of the decade, and we do indeed have a solid grasp of the issues, the barriers, the possibilities, and the associated risks. I can share that information with the committee.

Ms. Elizabeth May:
     ... it's an honour again to get to ask a few more questions of you, Mr. Mayrand.
    On the online voting question, I've seen in some commentaries that there's a societal benefit in the social cohesion of people collectively experiencing voting, even the lining up—I think we've all had great experiences as voters before we became candidates—and what happens when you're standing in line. Is there any literature on this? Is this a concern to be weighed against the convenience factor of online voting?

Mr. Marc Mayrand:
    I've certainly heard about it. I don't recall reading about it. That doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. We can see if we can find anything about it.

Mrs. Sherry Romanado:
    ...
    On the flip side, if Canada did want to implement online voting—and now I'm talking about folks who are in rural areas who may not have broadband Internet—what would be some of the barriers for our being able to implement something? Again, I bring up maybe lack of Internet or good Internet access.
    Could you elaborate on some of the other barriers?

Mr. Marc Mayrand:
    Connectivity, even though it's improving all the time, remains an issue in many parts of the country. As I mentioned earlier, electronic tabulation may have its limits for very remote areas for the simple fact that connectivity is not always up to par. I think that's a government as a whole issue that needs to be prioritized. I believe there are various programs to improve broadband access and speedy Internet access across the country and it's an effort that needs to be continued.

TRANSCRIPT END

TRANSCRIPT START

Below is my original unofficial transcription.  Please use the official transcripts above instead.

Unoffical transcription from ParlVu (meeting 4, 10am).

To Chief Electoral Officer Marc Mayrand

John Aldag - Q "If we were to look at something like online voting, electronic voting, would the timeline of May 2017 include that kind of introduction?"

Marc Mayrand - A "I have no plans to introduce online voting for 2019. ... I think there's still a lot of research to be done, and there are many considerations... [committee] should give [Elections] some direction ... how should we proceed to explore and test online voting at some point.  I doubt very much this could be done by 2019 given the scope of the reform we're looking at... would be a significant burden."

Luc Thériault (in translation) - Q "With regards to online voting you said that you would like to have clear guidelines from the committee and I would like to hear a little bit more on this point.  What do you foresee as being problematic on this front? We know that voting is a very solemn process, it takes place in private and how then will we manage such issues with online voting?"

Marc Mayrand (in translation) - A "Thank you for the question.  Yes we've done some studies on this and I'm delighted to share them with the committee.  Obviously technology is changing quickly and so that is something we have to take into consideration, people have been talking about online voting for some time now, I can share these studies with the committee.  To my mind one thing that's important though is the social acceptability of online voting, these questions related to security, to vulnerability, we would have to define the parameters of where this vote would be used - would you be able to vote from any computer, or would it still be supervised electronic voting, would you have to vote from a specific place.  I think that it would be useful to start to narrow down the focus, narrow down the field.  For example we can have postal voting at the moment and that's not a supervised vote, and so are are there risks related to that... [for online voting] would they be any different, could they be mitigated?  That's the sort of question that we would have to have a look at & I'd like to have some input on that.  If we look at online voting in Canada we see that it is somewhere that progress has been made in the municipalities but it's not something that is done at the provincial level, at the federal level... some studies have been undertaken but we haven't had any new attempts; everyone's had a look at it but everybody seems to be waiting to have some direction from the top to see what it is we should do, where we should go if we want to go ahead with online voting."

Ruby Sahota - Q "What other changes can we make to the Elections Canada Act to ensure that we are inclusive and that we respect all the diversity that we have in Canada."

Marc Mayrand - A "If you want to make a fundamental different in accessibility... you need to really seriously look at online voting.  ... If we really want to make a breakthrough, it would be to explore more aggressively online voting - how make it an option for these electors."

...

Ruby Sahota - Q "You were talking a lot about security and social acceptability, I think that the world is starting to move towards finding it socially acceptable doing online, I mean people make million dollar deals online, and transfer money all the time, so it's hard for me to figure out why we can't figure out a way to vote that's secure online and I think people would come onboard since it would open it up to so many more people."

Chair interjects as Sahota's question time is up.

Sherry Romanado (in translation) - Q "Could you give use a bit more information on ... technology that could be used to improve voting. ..."

Marc Mayrand (in translation) - A "... Rendering this automatic will take a lot of work, however there is no reason for us not to have automated forms and automated voting, this would also guarantee a better compliance, there would be fewer errors, errors would be picked up by the machines used. ..."

...

Sherry Romanado (in translation)  - Q "With regards to online voting, I know that a number of us have already raised the matter, we want there to be a heightened participation amongst Canadians.  Currently we can file our taxes online, or on paper, it's not very difficult ... And so do you think that it would be possible to allow Canadians to vote online if they want to, just as we do with our tax returns - but they would still have the option to go to the polling station if they would wish to?"

Marc Mayrand (in translation) - A "To me that is an issue rather of facts.  I don't think that in any case we would replace paper voting by online voting, all we would do would be to provide another option for voters, and then voters will be able to choose the one that they want. ... With online voting, there would be positive benefits for certain groups, we have to move forward in a progressive and wary way."

Sherry Romanado - Q "Instead of selecting a specific group to pilot online voting, could we not leave it up to the choice of the Canadians, how they would vote?  I can order a pizza online, I can order a Starbucks coffee or charge up my bank account, I can do everything online.  On the day of the vote I may be busy, it may be raining, it may be I don't want to go out that day, if I could do it from home, it gives me that option that I don't lose my opportunity to vote. ... I think it could really change the way we do our electoral process, and I would hate to wait another two, three, four elections before we go that route."

Marc Mayrand - A "Well that's where we start going, we have to be careful.  We need to look also at security.  There are certain characteristics of the vote that we want to preserve: it's confidentiality, it's secrecy, the reliability and the integrity.  When we start looking at moving online, I would point out the big difference currently, ... with any other services you get online, the risk of online services currently is [borne] by the provider - if you go online on the bank, you use your MasterCard, somebody [misuses] it or hacks your account, it will be the provider that will cover that off.  That's one aspect which does not exist in the voting process.  The other aspect is that we lack a universal authentication system in Canada, and without such a thing it's very difficult--you can find some alternatives.  The problem we have is that if you get a code with Revenue Canada or with the bank or your PIN, everybody tells you to keep it secret, and you have an interest in keeping it secret, you have a personal interest - I'm not sure we can say the same when it comes to voting."

Chair interjects as Romanado's question time is up.

Any emphasis (bolding) above is mine.

Thanks to @kady's liveblog, which touches on all these conversations in summary.

Labels: #CdnDemocracy, #ERRE, internet voting, online voting, transcript