Tuesday, October 19, 2004
Edmonton municipal election
Here is what they say
Marking the Ballot
You will take the ballot into the voting booth, remove the ballot from the secrecy sleeve and mark the ballot beside the name of the candidates you wish to vote for.
...
After the Ballot is Marked
You will return the marked ballot, inside the secrecy sleeve, to the Ballot Box Clerk . The Ballot Box Clerk will insert the ballot into the voting machine without looking at it. It is very important that each person's vote remains secret.
If you choose too many candidates, the ballot will be returned by the voting machine and you will be given the option of either completing a new ballot or having the existing ballot accepted by the machine. Where votes have been cast for too many candidates, votes will not be counted. All other votes on the ballot will be accepted.
from www.edmonton.ca - Voting on Election Day
While optical mark-sense are among the least-worst electronic voting systems, since the original data is on the marked ballot, they are still worse than a paper ballot.
Why? Because the machine counts.
Any time the machine is counting, there are opportunities for error, either due to malfunction, incorrect programming, or malicious action.
As I reported earlier they also had
audio-electronictouch screen machines at the advance polls.
Florida - vote early, crash often
The Sun-Sentinel is reporting on computer glitches already affecting the election in - you guessed it - Florida. Of the 14 early voting sites that opened in Broward County on Monday morning, 9 were reporting problems.
Slashdot - Computer Problems Already Affecting Florida Voters
Wednesday, October 13, 2004
SiliconValley.com E-voting roundtable
Slashdot describes it thusly
A group of computer scientists, journalists, voting activists, and county registrars are discussing the e-voting mess in an online forum that runs all this week. The panel is a who's who of e-voting: Avi Rubin, David Dill, David Jefferson, and registrars from San Bernadino and Riverside, CA. They've even got Scott Ritchie from the Open Vote Foundation.
Tuesday, October 12, 2004
Canada paper ballot
Here's an example on a pretty good site that walks through the process of voting in Canada.
I Can Vote! : A user-friendly guide to voting in Canada - page 17
Friday, October 08, 2004
Hawaii e-vote boycott
A coalition of concerned residents is urging voters to boycott using the state's new electronic voting machines and to stick to the standard paper ballot option when they go to the ballot booth for the general election.
Members of Safe Vote Hawai'i, which describes itself as "a coalition of Hawai'i's leading technology professionals, community activists and official election observers," said they have concerns about the integrity of the electronic machines because they do not produce an immediate "paper copy" for each vote cast.
"We feel that paper audit trails are mandatory for a safe e-voting election and we don't have any way of getting that for this election," said Jason Forrester, spokesman for the group and a senior systems analyst for SAVVIS, formerly Digital Island.
Honolulu Advertiser - October 8, 2004
Integrity of e-vote machines questioned
Atomz searching
It had forgotten about this entire search index, for some reason.
Tuesday, October 05, 2004
who shall counter the counters?
computer scientists focused on thoroughly evaluating the technical aspects of e-voting machines. This task will be left to more than 1,400 techies participating in a domestic monitoring project of the Election Protection coalition, organized by almost 60 U.S. groups.
The coalition will disperse 25,000 monitors to voting sites in 17 states around the country. One of the coalition's projects is TechWatch, run by the Verified Voting Foundation. TechWatch has recruited technology professionals to observe the operation of voting technology during tests before the election and on Election Day itself.
The Verified Voting Foundation has also developed a web-based software application that will allow coalition volunteers to respond to voting incidents in real time. The coalition runs a hot line that voters can call to report problems. When they do, hot-line operators enter the details into the Election Incident Reporting System. The system maps the problems and sends an alert to a monitoring team leader in the area, who can then dispatch a mobile response team of volunteer lawyers, techies or others to observe how the problem is handled.
The groups tested the system during the Florida primary election, when 296 hot-line calls were entered into the system, of which 18 were voting machine problems.
Another group, Votewatch, will collect statistical data on the election. Among other things, Votewatch will compare the vote tallies posted in polling places at the end of the day with cumulative unofficial counts for an entire area reported later that night. If the numbers differ, it would indicate that the counting software at individual polling places failed to count some votes. Volunteers would make note of the technology that was used at those polling places to gather statistics on the accuracy of systems.
The Election Protection coalition also includes groups that will monitor issues besides voting technology, including voter intimidation and disenfranchisement.
Does that sound to you like an improved, less-expensive voting system that people trust?
Wired News - Oct. 05, 2004
U.S. Elections Under a Microscope
visiting dignitaries try American democracy
Kwesi Addae, a fifty-three-year-old former political-science professor from Ghana and the founder of Pollwatch Africa, has monitored elections in half a dozen shenanigan-prone countries, including Togo, Nigeria, and Guinea-Bissau.
...
Addae, as one of twenty foreign election observers brought here this month by the left-leaning human-rights group Global Exchange, is inspecting the creaky mechanics of American democracy at close hand. He signed up for the two-week mission, he said, “out of fascination.”
In Africa, Addae had seen phantom polling stations, ruling-party rent-a-mobs, ballots bought with beer. But nothing in his experience had prepared him for the iVotronic touch-screen voting system. The iVotronic is the latest in electoral technology, a light, flat-screen computer that will be used this November in parts of Florida, among other places. ...
The observers crowded around. “You’re quite fortunate to be able to touch and feel the same thing that those voters will be using on Election Day,” a salesman from Election Systems & Software, the machine’s manufacturer, said. ...
“Let’s vote,” Addae said. ... Addae was next. He bellied up to the machine and poked at the screen. Nothing happened. Someone handed him a small cartridge—a “personalized electronic ballot,” or P.E.B. Addae examined the cartridge quizzically, then fumbled as he tried to insert it into the machine. “Put it back in for just a second,” an observer named David MacDonald, a former member of Canada’s parliament, said. “Now remove it.”
A ballot appeared on the screen. For the purposes of this demonstration, the election was a local one, and the candidates for mayor were all actors; for city council, hockey players; and for school board, musicians. For some reason, they were also all Canadians. “O.K.,” Addae said, peering over his glasses. “I want Michael J. Fox.” Passing over Neve Campbell, John Candy, and Dan Aykroyd, he touched Fox’s name, and a little green check mark appeared. Addae ran his finger down the list of candidates in other races: Gordie Howe, Ken Dryden, Bryan Adams, Shania Twain, Gordon Lightfoot. “I want Bobby Orr. I want Neil Young,” he said. When he was done, Addae punched a flashing red button marked “ vote .” The machine beeped twice, and a message appeared on the screen: “Your ballot has been cast. Thank you for voting.”
Addae shook his head. “It’s not very easy,” he said. Back home, Ghanaians still vote the old-fashioned way, by writing an “X” on a paper ballot and dropping it into a box. “Thereafter, they are counted one by one, and the figures are written down and announced,” he said.
...
After he was finished with the computer demonstration, he ambled across the room, where some observers were voting with paper ballots. He grabbed a ballot and filled in the bubbles next to his choices. The salesman collected twelve ballots and loaded them into a optical scanner. Whoosh —the ballots shot through. But there was a problem. The machine rejected five of the ballots, including Addae’s. The observers had used a pen instead of a No. 2 pencil. This election observer was ready to deliver his verdict: “I am not impressed at all!”
The New Yorker - 2004-10-04
The Talk of the Town - Visiting Dignitaries - Dry Run
Monday, October 04, 2004
e-voting enables the disabled
This November, Eileen Rivera Ley, 41, will vote by herself for the first time. Blind voters in Maryland and several other states will use electronic voting machines equipped with technology that allows the disabled to vote independently.
It used to get crowded whenever Rivera Ley voted. Blind, Rivera Ley had to rely on someone else to read the ballot aloud, then vote for her. That meant as many as four people -- Rivera Ley, the person who pulled the levers and election judges from both major parties as witnesses -- huddled in the voting booth.
In Canada, only one person assists you (if needed) in the voting booth; I don't think anyone observes.
Wired News - AP - Oct. 03, 2004
E-Voting Fans: The Disabled
e-voting unease
Imagine your bank teller accepting a deposit and then saying, "Oh, you don't need a receipt. It's all in the computer." On Nov. 2, that's essentially what millions of citizens will be told when they cast ballots on new electronic voting machines. Forty-two states are poised to use this latest technology, but with only 28 days left until the presidential election, some states are still debating whether to provide a paper confirmation of each voter's choices.
Potential problems with electronic voting — and very real mishaps — have gained more public attention in recent months, and manufacturers and election officials have tried to play down concerns. But some state officials have also chosen to build in more safeguards to ensure that the electronic vote data, if corrupted either accidentally or maliciously, have a backup. That means one thing: a paper record.
USA Today - Christian Science Monitor - October 3, 2004
Observers remain uneasy over e-vote machines
Edmonton e-voting
this year, the City of Edmonton has rented 21 audio-electronic voting machines, which will allow citizens who can't see well to cast their ballots without help. And everyone else who votes in advance will do so electronically, too -- traditional paper ballots will be available only on election day, Oct. 18.
...
Electronic voting machines have been severely criticized in the U.S., where they were used for the first time in 2002. In July 2003, professors at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore released a scathing report that said the machines were open to tampering and made meaningful recounts impossible because they leave no paper trail.
But operations manager Steve Thompson, who led the project, is confident the electronic voting terminals the city is renting will perform without a hitch. He points out that the machines are independent of one another and store voting records in three separate places, including on a removable pack that can be taken from a broken machine and read in another.
"We don't believe that the failure of a single or even two or three machines would in any way jeopardize the ability to count the votes that had been cast on that machine," Thompson said.
...
There are no plans, however, to make electronic voting the norm. He estimates the cost of mainstream electronic voting would be about $1.25 million, a price tag he thinks council and taxpayers will find prohibitive.
For heaven's sake, the point isn't whether the votes can be read, the point is whether the votes are accurately recorded.
Edmonton Journal - September 22, 2004
Ballot machine boon for blind voters
This story points out another trend which I saw in the reports from Toronto.
In order to "save money" they like this idea of renting machines, whether it's loaning their own machines out, or using someone else's machines.
So that's great. As if the security problem wasn't hard enough, they're letting the machines change hands repeatedly.
Saturday, October 02, 2004
US techno-voting troubles
Can high-tech voting machines prevent a repeat of America's 2000 electoral fiasco—or will they make things worse?
IT IS not often that the dry subject of voting technology makes the headlines. It famously happened in America's presidential election in 2000, when the previously obscure differences between hanging, pregnant and dimpled “chads”—the small flakes of paper punched out of cards by mechanical voting machines—suddenly became a national crisis.
...
Touch-screen machines have problems of their own, as another Florida election vividly illustrated last January. In a local election held on January 6th in parts of Broward and Palm Beach counties, 10,844 votes were cast, and Ellyn Bogdanoff won by 12 votes. Under Florida state law, a result this close triggers a manual recount. But no recount was possible, because there was nothing to count: the voting machines' only paper output is the final tally.
The lack of a paper trail has made new touch-screen voting machines hugely controversial. As Robert Wexler, a Democratic congressman, likes to point out, “a reprint is not a recount”. Critics also complain that there is no way to tell if the machines are faulty, insecure or rigged.
The Economist - Sep 16th 2004
Electronic voting: The trouble with technology
Link from crisispapers.org - Electoral Integrity.
Toronto City Clerk Report - 1999 - Voting and Vote-counting System - Municipal Elections
I love this analysis.
4.0 Direct Recording Electronic (Touch Screen)
...
Recounts using these machines have proven to be one of the closest systems to 100%.
ha ha ha ha ha
That's hilarious.
Of course the recounts are always the same. THERE'S NOTHING TO RECOUNT.
They are saying, roughly "every time I ask this machine to produce its vote count total, it produces the same numbers".
Hmm, when I store a number in my pocket calculator's memory, it produces the same number each time too. Maybe we should replace our paper voting with pocket calculators.
Plus which, "closest to 100%"?
Are you saying sometimes the machines report different results from their memory banks?
(Sorry, in sarcastic mood today.)
Anyway, the report is
May 6, 1999
To: Corporate Services Committee
Budget Committee
From: City Clerk
Subject: Voting and Vote-counting System - Municipal Elections
www.city.toronto.on.ca/legdocs/1999/agendas/committees/cs/cs990520/it005.htm
It examines the following types of voting systems:
1.0 Mechanical Lever Machines
2.0 Punchcards
3.0 Optical Mark Reading (Optical Scan)
4.0 Direct Recording Electronic (Touch Screen)
5.0 Telephone
6.0 Mail
7.0 Automated Terminals or Kiosks
8.0 Internet
Conclusion:
After reviewing all of the current voting/vote-counting systems available to the City and examining them in relationship to the principles established, it is recommended that the best voting/vote-counting system for the City of Toronto would be a combination of optical scan - voting place tabulator and direct recording electronic (touch screen). The optical scan - voting place tabulator provides the best practice available given its reliability, integrity and similarity to paper ballot. The electorates' familiarity and acceptance with this type of vote-counting equipment ensures the greatest likelihood of continued success utilizing this type of system.
The advancement in technology makes direct recording electronic (touch screen) a viable alternative in a limited variety. Its portability provides greater flexibility to employ these units for specialized needs (i.e. institutional voting, physically challenged voting and an advance voting program). By employing the use of these units the advance voting program could support an additional 500 potential advance voting locations.
Request for Proposal:
In order to comply with Council's request to provide updated costs of a recommended voting and vote tabulation system, and to ensure sufficient lead time for the delivery of the system in time for Election 2000, a Request for Proposal (RFP No. 3412-99-01464) was issued for an Optical Scan Voting System and Touch Screen Voting System in February 1999. The purpose of this Request For Proposal was to provide updated figures for the Capital Works Program and determine the most effective Optical Scan Voting System and Touch Screen Voting System in the marketplace.
Subject to the approval by Council of this report, the results of the Request For Proposal together with recommendations on the award of contract will be forwarded to the Administration Committee for consideration in July, 1999.
This is the analysis they provide for DRE machines
Advantages:
a) easiest of all voting systems for the voter;
b) results are quickly available;
c) no extra costs for materials (i.e., ballots);
d) recounts have proven to be extremely accurate; and
e) most technologically advanced form of voting in the marketplace.
Disadvantages:
a) notable large capital investment required; and
b) new voting method for voters - could result in long lineups.
I don't even know where to begin.
What difference does it make how "technologically advanced" it is?
Two disadvantages? How about
c) Massive possibility for incorrect results due to fraud or incorrect programming
d) Complete loss of transparency in elections process
Who wrote this analysis, a high school student?
Sorry, that's an insult to high school students.
Earlier on in the report, there is a very telling presentation of background
Historically, composite paper ballot elections have been prone to human error, particularly:
a) subjective discretion applied when deciding valid votes;
b) tallying votes when the deputy returning officer is communicating votes to the poll clerk orally; and
c) transposition errors when carrying figures from tally sheets to final statements.
In addition, the operating costs associated with composite paper ballot elections is as much as three times that of an automated election. The increase in costs include;
a) the requirement for more voting subdivisions with fewer voters to ensure the manageability of the counting process;
b) the employment of staff at the voting places and additional staff to count ballots at the close of voting; and
c) the associated recount costs.
Summary: Humans and paper are unreliable and expensive. Computers are better. Subjectivity is eliminated, all is perfect objective computer logic. All hail our robot king!
There's only one problem with this presentation.
It's wrong.
I would rather trust humans than machines.
Voting is not about achieving the maximum cost-effective calculational efficiency.
It's about having a system that people can understand and trust, so that they have faith that the election reflects the will of the people.
A paper system with humans counting has explicit, obvious workings and checks and balances.
An electronic system has nothing. Invisible electronic pulses. Silent hidden programs.
You might as well take all the paper ballots into a locked room and say "trust us, we have a wonderful machine in this magic room that will count everything, sorry, you can't see it, we'll tell you the results in a moment".
Toronto parties like it's 1999
And in case you're wondering,
1) yes, the John Hollins who was the Director of Elections for Toronto has now moved on to be Chief Electorial Officer for Ontario.
2) Election Systems and Software is a US voting equipment vendor
I wonder if they promoted this as "$13 million Canadian taxpayer dollars go to US vendor, to help our elections work as well as they do in the USA".
I'm guessing not.
How good is ES&S? Well, I think this article from Black Box Voting sums it up:
ES&S Trying to Compete With Diebold In Race for Crappiest Voting Machines
Anyway,
THE CITY OF TORONTO
City Clerk's Division
Minutes of the Administration Committee
Meeting No. 3
Tuesday, July 13, 1999
www.city.toronto.on.ca/legdocs/1999/minutes/committees/adm/ad990713.htm
-6. Request for Proposal No. 3412-99-01464 for the Acquisition of 2000 Optical Scan Vote Tabulators and 100 Touch Screen Voting Units. The Administration Committee had before it the following:
(i) joint report (June 15, 1999) from the Chief Administrative Officer and Acting Commissioner, Corporate Services, the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer and the City Clerk recommending that:
(1) the City Clerk be given authority to enter into a contract with Election Systems and Software Inc., being the proponent with the highest evaluated score, for the acquisition of the necessary optical scan vote tabulators and touch screen voting units, including all necessary support and service agreements, at a capital cost not to exceed $13.05 million ($1.0 million in 1999 and $12.05 in 2000), such contract to be in accordance with the Request for Proposal and the Proposal submitted, and on terms and conditions satisfactory to the City Clerk, and in a form satisfactory to the City Solicitor; and
(2) the appropriate City officials be authorized to take the necessary action to give effect thereto; and
(ii) report (June 28, 1999) from the City Clerk responding to a request by the Administration Committee on the possibility of Elections Ontario and Elections Canada cost sharing the purchase of the City of Toronto s vote tabulators and touch screen voting units; advising that at this time there is no interest at either Elections Ontario or Elections Canada to cost share the purchase of vote counting equipment with the City of Toronto; that Federal election legislation does not permit the use of equipment and Ontario's provincial election legislation currently only permits equipment to be used in by-elections; that should either of these jurisdictions choose in the future to use vote counting equipment, the City of Toronto could contract with the jurisdiction to rent the City's equipment; and recommending that this report be received for information.
(iii) communication (July 9, 1999) from Mr. Clinton H. Rickards, Director, Canadian Sales Global Election Systems Inc., expressing disappointment that his request to participate in the presentation of electronic voting machines to the Administration Committee has been refused.
__
______
The City Clerk, and the following officials from the Clerk s Division, gave a presentation to the Administration Committee during the lunch recess respecting the foregoing matter, and filed a copy of their presentation material:
- Mr. John Hollins, Director of Elections;
- Ms. Janet Andrews, Senior Elections Consultant and Co-Chair of the Evaluation Committee;
- Mr. Stephen Miller, Senior Elections Consultant; and
- Mr. Greg Essensa, Senior Elections Consultant.
________
The following persons appeared before the Administration Committee in connection with the foregoing matter:
- Mr. Jamie Aiello, t.e.s.t.;
- Mr. John Meraglia, Co-Chair of the Evaluation Committee;
- Mr. Bob Urosevich and Mr. Clint Rickards, Global Election Systems Inc.;
- Mr. Dan McGinnis, Vice President of Sales, Election Systems and Software;
- Councillor Michael Walker; North Toronto;
- Councillor Mario Silva, Trinity Niagara;
- Councillor Mario Giansante, Kingsway Humber; and
- Councillor Bob Davis, York Eglinton.
A. Councillor Minnan-Wong moved on behalf of Councillor Davis that the Administration Committee refer the foregoing joint report (June 15, 1999) from the Chief Administrative Officer, the Acting Commissioner of Corporate Services, the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer and the City Clerk, to the Chief Administrative Officer for report to the September 7, 1999, meeting of the Administration Committee:
(i) on the various other options, including leasing and rental, in consultation with the proponents who submitted this as part of their proposal, such report to include financial comparisons to the purchasing options; and
(ii) including information on the feasibility of borrowing this equipment from other jurisdictions. (Carried) B. Councillor Moeser moved that the foregoing motion by Councillor Minnan-Wong be amended to provide that the Chief Administrative Officer also report on the ongoing cost of maintenance of the batteries used for these voting units. (Carried)
C. Councillor Bussin moved that:
(1) the City Auditor be requested to:
(i) review the business case and the financial and technical evaluation of the proposals, including a rent-to-buy option, where included as part of the proposals;
(ii) review and evaluate the systems used in Vancouver, Ottawa, Chicago, Cook County, Philadelphia and Seattle,
and submit a report thereon to the aforementioned meeting of the Administration Committee;
(2) the appropriate staff be requested to provide to the Members of the Committee and Councillors, this week on a confidential basis, additional information on the evaluation criteria, weighting and ranking, including copies of the resultant independent testing authority for compliance with the standards of the U.S. and Federal Elections Commission;
and
(3) the City Clerk be requested to:
(i) give consideration to and report on providing orientation sessions for candidates, agents and scrutineers; and
(ii) report to the aforementioned meeting of the Administration Committee on the option of using a non-composite ballot, and on the option of requesting a change in Provincial legislation to allow a ballot design based upon the Provincial ballot. (Carried)
D. Councillor Mahood moved that the report (June 28, 1999) from the City Clerk be received. (Carried)
The decision of the Administration Committee, therefore, is as follows: The Administration Committee:
(1) referred the foregoing joint report (June 15, 1999) from the Chief Administrative Officer, the Acting Commissioner of Corporate Services, the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer and the City Clerk, to the Chief Administrative Officer for report to the September 7, 1999, meeting of the Administration Committee:
(i) on the various other options, including leasing and rental, in consultation with the proponents who submitted this as part of their proposal, such report to include financial comparisons to the purchasing options;
(ii) including information on the feasibility of borrowing this equipment from other jurisdictions; and
(iii) on the ongoing cost of maintenance of the batteries used for these voting units;
(2) requested the City Auditor to:
(i) review the business case and the financial and technical evaluation of the proposals, including a rent-to-buy option, where included as part of the proposals;
(ii) review and evaluate the systems used in Vancouver, Ottawa, Chicago, Cook County, Philadelphia and Seattle,
and submit a report thereon to the aforementioned meeting of the Administration Committee;
(3) requested the appropriate staff to provide to the Members of the Committee and Councillors, this week on a confidential basis, additional information on the evaluation criteria, weighting and ranking, including copies of the resultant independent testing authority for compliance with the standards of the U.S. and Federal Elections Commission;
(4) requested the City Clerk to:
(i) give consideration to and report on providing orientation sessions for candidates, agents and scrutineers; and
(ii) report to the aforementioned meeting of the Administration Committee on the option of using a non-composite ballot, and on the option of requesting a change in Provincial legislation to allow a ballot design based upon the Provincial ballot; and
(5) received the report (June 28, 1999) from the City Clerk.
(Chief Administrative Officer; City Clerk; City Auditor - July 13, 1999) (Clause No. 26(e) - Report No. 2)
the future begins again
Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the paper ballot: An idea whose time has come again.
from Tech Central Station - 11/05/2002 (probably US date notation)
by Glenn Harlan Reynolds
seen on c2.com wiki - Voting Machine Discussion
UK event
[New Media Knowledge]/IPPR are hosting 'E-Voting: Policy and Practice' in London [England] on 4th November.
Canadian locations using e-voting
Feel free to provide any updates/links you may have.
Federal
- there is no e-voting at the Federal level
Provincial
- Ontario will be starting pilot projects
- NB is interested
Municipal
* Ontario
- Markham used the Internet
- Ottawa uses optical mark-sense
- City of Greater Sudbury uses optical mark-sense
- Toronto uses ?optical mark-sense?
Friday, October 01, 2004
proportionally electrocuted
Don't take offense, it's just not my thing. Feel free to pursue it if you want.
HOWEVER, do not try to solve proportional calculation problems by electronic expediency.
In A Made-in-Canada Proportional Representation System, Mohamed Elmasry writes
Electronic counting of votes will make the system easily implementable.
Bad idea.
downside to paper voting
Is someone allowed to eat a ballot?
Short answer: No.
e-global vote
CNet looks at a few different e-voting systems from around the world.
Via j-dom.
greater sudbury arrows point the way
Q. Why has Council authorized the use of Optical Scanning Vote Tabulators?
A. Council directed the City Clerk to review alternative voting methods for the 2003 Municipal Election. The City of Greater Sudbury was perhaps the last city its size in Ontario that had continued the use of a paper ballot. As a result of this review, Council authorized the use of optical scan vote tabulators for the November 10, 2003 municipal elections.
While still allowing the voter to mark their choice of candidate on a paper ballot, automated vote counting equipment offers several benefits to both voters and the municipality, some of which include:
* accuracy of vote tabulation
* consistency in vote tabulation
* rejection of overloaded and/or improperly marked ballots at the time of voting, therefore reducing voter disenfranchisement
* quick tabulation of individual voting place results following the close of the voting (results will be sent by modem from each location).
* the requirement for few voting locations and the need to hire smaller number of election staff.
Q. Are there safeguards in the Vote Tally System to Guard Against Fraud?
A. The procedures put in place by Council require the Returning Officer to conduct computer logic and accuracy tests before, during and after the vote on election night.
Prior to the advance vote, the Returning Officer and the Third Party Auditing Firm hired by the City of Greater Sudbury will attend the acceptance testing of the vote tabulation system, which will include:
* reviewing a sample of pre-audited test ballots prepared by the City of Greater Sudbury's equipment vendor;
* reviewing the reports prepared by the vote tabulation system once the preaudited test ballots have been entered into the system; and,
* comparing the results listed on the reports to the sample of pre-audited ballots and identifying any discrepancies.
On election night the City of Greater Sudbury's Third Party Auditing Firm will select at random seven vote tabulators - one for each of the six Wards plus one machine from the advance vote - to:
* compare the election results as listed on the reports prepared by the selected machines to the election results recorded at the City of Greater Sudbury's central election site and report on any discrepancies; and,
* compare the report produced by the selected machines following a re-entry of the votes cast to the original printout obtained at the time of the closing of the polls and report on any discrepancies.
Other security measures to ensure the integrity of the voting process and the security of the vote tabulation equipment and software have been provided by the Returning Officer and the City of Greater Sudbury's equipment vendor.
elections.city.greatersudbury.on.ca - It's as easy as 1-2-3-Vote
So if I understand this, they compare the results from the machine against... new results from the machine. Or they compare the results from the machine with the results transmitted by the machine. Does anyone compare the machine results against a manual ballot count?
Dutch Internet elections - regional water board
The Netherlands is currently holding the election for the Regional Water Management Boards (my translation of "Waterschappen"). One can vote by mail or by Internet. The latter attracted my curiosity, and I poked around the 'net a bit to see what people thought about the idea.
It appears that a test election was held in order to test the procedure and get some feedback from test voters. An often quoted feedback was that "Only 26% of the test voters expressed concern about the possibility of fraud". ONLY 26%?? This response seems to be interpreted as a vote of confidence for the system.
Another nugget: "The secrecy of the vote is guaranteed. The relationship between the voter identity and his login code is removed from the file before the votes are counted".
The FAQ also has an interesting statement. An independent body (TNO) has investigated the security of the voting method. They concluded that "Voting by Internet is not less safe than voting by mail or phone". This formulation implies that the procedure is actually not very safe, and they know it.
from Risks Digest 23.55, 30 September 2004.
Thursday, September 30, 2004
electronic voting in Brazil
Brazil has recently become the world pioneer in electronic voting and registration. When it held national elections in October 2002, 91 million out of its 115 million registered voters turned out – more than 70 percent of those of voting age, and 3 million more than voted in the US elections that same fall. In terms of global electoral history, the number of votes received by the winner, Luis Ignacio de Silva (“Lula”), was second only to Ronald Reagan’s total in 1980.
To handle this heavy turnout, Brazil relied heavily on electronic voting. The Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) had been experimenting with electronic voting systems since the early 1990s, becoming a real pioneer in the use of “DREs” (“direct recording electronic”) voting machines. Brazil first used DREs on a large scale in its 1996 elections, with 354,000 in place by 2002. For that election, it deployed another 52,000 “Urnas Eletronica 2002,” a state-of-the-art DRE that had been designed by Brazilian technicians with the help of three private companies – Unisys and National Semiconductor, two US companies, and ProComp, a Brazilian assembler that has since been acquired by Diebold Systems, the controversial American leader in electronic voting systems.
Because Brazil has been willing to commit to such a large-scale deployment, each Urna costs just $420, less than 15 percent of the cost of the $3000 touch-screen systems that Diebold features in the US. The Brazilian system lacks a touch screen; voters punch in specific numbers for each candidate, calling up his name and image, and then confirm their selections. The numerical system was intended to overcome the problem of illiteracy, which is still a problem in parts of the country. To handle operations in remote areas like the Amazon, the machine runs on batteries up to 12 hours. Initially there were no printed records, but the Electoral Commission decided to retrofit 3 percent with printers, to provide auditable records.
Like any new technology, Brazil’s approach to electronic voting is by no means perfect. Indeed, significant concerns have been voiced about the system’s verifiability and privacy – especially about the TSE’s recent move to eliminate the printers, supposedly because they slowed voting.
Among the most important proposed improvements are a requirement that all voting machines produce both electronic and paper records, in order to leave an audit trail and increase voter confidence in the system; that system software be based on “open” standards and available for audit; and that the system for identifying eligible voters be separated from voting, to insure privacy.
Submerging Markets - September 29, 2004
Democracy in America and Elsewhere: Part IIIB. Campaigns, Voting, and Representation
Wednesday, September 29, 2004
ACM statement on voting systems
... Ensuring the reliability, security, and verifiability of public elections is fundamental to a stable democracy. Convenience and speed of vote counting are no substitute for accuracy of results and trust in the process by the electorate.
from ACM Press Room ACM Recommends Integrity, Security, Usability in E-Voting: Cites Risks of Computer-based Systems.
Via Slashdot ACM on E-Voting.
Tuesday, September 28, 2004
Miami-Dade Reform Coalition
The Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition (MDERC) is a non-partisan grass-roots organization dedicated to election reform. Our mission is to protect the rights of every eligible voter to cast a ballot and to have that ballot accurately recorded and counted.
They have a Yahoo Group
groups.yahoo.com/group/ReformCoalition/
There's a posting there about the Wexler story (pointed out to me by Brent M.P. Beleskey of voterscoalition.com).
paper trail California... 2006
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger signed legislation Monday that will bar the use of electronic voting machines that don't produce paper trails to verify votes.
The requirement, which takes effect in 2006, is a response to concerns that the machines could be tampered with or produce incorrect results.
Secretary of State Kevin Shelley banned the use of 14,000 electronic voting machines in San Diego, Solano, San Joaquin and Kern counties for the November election because the machines weren't federally approved.
He also laid down conditions for the use of the machines in 11 other counties.
Schwarzenegger also signed a bill that will allow the secretary of state, local election officials or the attorney general to file lawsuits against persons or companies suspected of tampering with voting equipment.
MercuryNews.com - Kansas City Star - Sep. 28, 2004
Schwarzenegger signs bill requiring e-vote paper trail
Florida paper voting
U.S. Rep. Robert Wexler yesterday claimed victory after a federal appeals court revived his lawsuit seeking a paper trail for Florida’s new touch-screen voting machines, but said he does not expect to win the case before the Nov. 2 presidential election.
“It’s a huge victory for people who want a paper trail for their election machines,” Wexler, a Democrat from Boca Raton, told the Boca News yesterday. “It probably won’t happen before Nov. 2, but I’m confident there will be a paper trail in the long run.”
With five weeks left before Florida voters go to the polls, three judges from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta yesterday ruled that a federal judge was wrong to dismiss the case.
“We vacate that decision and remand for a consideration of the merits,” the unsigned ruling reads. A trial date has not yet been set.
Wexler, on a one-man crusade against Florida’s new touch-screen voting machines since the 2000 elections, claims that the machines in 15 of Florida’s 67 counties do not create paper copies. This violates Florida law requiring the option of a manual recount in a close election, his lawsuit argues.
Wexler doesn’t expect paper trail in time for Nov. 2
from the Boca Raton News - September 28, 2004
Monday, September 27, 2004
California e-voting reduced
Counties across California are preparing for another election day, as determined as ever to convert from paper to electronic voting. But because of a series of blunders in the March primary, fewer Californians will cast their ballots on touch-screen voting machines in November.
About 30% of the state's voters — 4.5 million people in 10 counties, including Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino — are expected to use electronic voting machines in November, down from about 40% in the spring.
County election officials say the high-tech machines allow them to collect and count votes more quickly and accurately than older methods by avoiding the shortcomings of paper ballots. But the transition has been rough: In March, the first election in which electronic voting systems were widely used in the state, some voters found touch screens displaying the wrong ballots; others were confronted with malfunctioning machines.
As a result, Secretary of State Kevin Shelley banned the type of machine purchased by four counties, including San Diego — forcing them to return to paper ballots.
Los Angeles Times - September 27, 2004
State's E-Vote Trust Builds Slowly
Swiss national e-voting
Slashdot - September 27, 2004
Swiss e-vote gets thumbs up
SWITZERLAND HAS managed to stage what it thinks is the first legally binding internet vote in a national referendum.
More than 2720 people in four Geneva suburbs, about one in five voters in the region who took part, voted online on questions including naturalisation laws, maternity leave and postal reform.
The vote followed a number of successful online local council elections, and although 90 per cent of voters still used the traditional method of papers and booths the poll is being hailed as a step toward virtual democracy.
Personally I prefer, you know, REAL democracy.
Saturday, September 25, 2004
category error
Our technocratic masters take the idea of e-Government, a lot of which makes great sense, and then add in voting as one of the "services" provided by government.
Voting is not a government service. Voting is the creation of the government by the citizens. It is fundamentally different from the other kinds of services that government provides.
The problem is, when e-voting is merged into e-everything e-else, that you then start applying the same thinking, pilot projects, client satisfaction, etc.
This simply does not make any sense. If I launch a pilot project for citizens to pay their property tax through my municipal e-portal, and it doesn't work the first day, I relaunch it a day or a week later. If it overcharges some people by 10x and undercharges others by 100x, I catch it in my auditing. I electronically shuffle money around.
You cannot have a voting system that doesn't work on the one day it is used.
You cannot have a voting system that dramatically miscounts votes.
You cannot shuffle votes around electronically. Err, well you must not shuffle votes around electronically, anyway.
Voting is in a fundamentally different category from financial services, or any other kind of service that the government provides. It is a different sort of thing. Completely different rules apply. Mashing it in with e-government makes no sense.
Lots of e-government stuff makes sense. Why do I have to fill in bloody paper forms for things? To do my annual charity payroll deduction, I have to, by hand, fill in a form with information that my employer already knows, followed by manually looking up on the web the 14 digit number of the charity I want to support, followed by writing it in and hoping I haven't transposed any digits, and that no errors will be made in the manual transcription process into the payroll system. For all I know, I will end up giving money to the Knights of Satan or something. It's ridiculous.
Making things like that all-electronic makes perfect sense.
Making voting electronic makes absolutely no sense.
CACM: The problems and potentials of voting systems
Unfortunately absolutely none of the content appears to be available free online, you will need to purchase it (or access through university library etc.)
Also see IEEE Security and Privacy Jan/Feb 2004 Special issue on E-voting Security.
standards
(Side note: US standards efforts include ACM Policy Brief and IEEE P1583.)
Anyway, I'm trying to find some sites that might have starting points. There are some links suggested by the document in the previous posting.
Government of Ontario: Information and Technology Standards
Ontario Office of the Corporate Chief Information Officer
So far I have yet to see any standards that apply to e-voting.
On the CIO site I did find more vague language though, that's always good.
In Citizen Engagement
What might this mean?
Electronic citizen engagement may take many forms. ...
* online remote voting for elected officials
* digital voting
I don't even know what they mean by digital voting. Do they mean electronic voting machines?
Friday, September 24, 2004
technophilic municipalities
There's something called MISA, the Municipal Information Systems Association of Ontario.
They published a report in 2002, Progress Report on e-Government Among Ontario Municipalities (PDF)
In Chapter 2: Municipal Progress In e-Government they describe a future that obviously sounds wonderful to them
What will municipalities be like in Ontario within the next decade?
...
Municipalities will be more responsive to citizens.
...
Voting in elections or other special occasions will consist of quick, effortless clicks on computer screens. Voter turnout will no longer plummet when it rains or snows.
Voting is a civic duty. You want to make voting no different than clicking in some online poll? One minute I'm buying a book on Amazon, next I'm answering a Globe poll Does shopping on-line still make you nervous? and with the next click I'm electing the leaders of my country? You really don't think there should be any distinction between those activities?
The new Municipal Elections Act, 1996 opened the door to the use of new technology in the municipal election process. For the first time, Ontario municipalities could explore new voting technologies, including voting by telephone, touch screen voting and the use of optical scanners to speed the counting process.
Ok well at least I know where this foolishness started. Now to see about closing that door.
I don't get this obsession with the speed of the counting. We can't wait a day or two for the results to be counted? Ontario will spiral into chaos if we don't get the election decision seconds after the polls close? Wouldn't you rather have a cheap, accurate and relatively quick system rather than an instantaneous incorrect one?
(Progress report link found in Municipalities move to second-gen portals to provide citizen e-services, Technology in Government, May/June 2004.)
Thursday, September 23, 2004
getting into the swing of e-voting
Wired News - September 23, 2004
Roughly a third of the votes cast in the November presidential election will be made on controversial paperless electronic voting machines, but as any political analyst can tell you, the only votes that will matter a great deal will be cast in a handful of swing states.
Wednesday, September 22, 2004
diebold and de broken
Sunday, September 19, 2004
LawMeme - This Week in [US] E-Voting
uk e-voting
j-dom.org - September 17, 2004
He has a very nicely organized site, tons of e-voting blog entries, articles etc. linked from the bottom of the above posting.
Saturday, September 18, 2004
missing atomz
Representation and Electoral Systems
Canadian e-democracy
Meanwhile, at the federal level, Members of Parliament have yet to decide on electronic voting.
One of them, Reg Alcock, believes certain criteria will have to be met before MPs can accept the introduction of electronic voting at the federal level. In an editorial published earlier this year, Mr. Alcock stated:
There must be a means of authenticating identity and there must be a secure channel for the transmission of the information. Once these conditions are met two important trends are enabled. First the ability to vote online will dramatically reduce the cost of voting. This in turn will allow more frequent use of referenda and will shift the balance of control from Parliament to citizens. Rather than voting once every four years, citizens will be able to express opinions more frequently. The impact will be greater accountability. Second…MPs will no longer have to be present to vote. This in turn will enhance the importance of their individual vote while reducing the importance of the place. The impact will be greater participation. (Canadian Parliamentary Review, Spring 2002, p. 2)
Following the most recent election, Reg Alcock maintains his position as President of the Treasury Board.
The guest editorial cited above was Parliament and Democracy in the 21st Century: The Impact of Information and Communication Technologies from Volume 25 no. 1, 2002.
Mr. Alcock is a big fan of technology. Here he is in the Canadian Parliamentary Review in 1994:
At the federal level one a number of projects and studies are underway but as one MP, Reg Alcock, stated, "At the present time, the "hill" does not have a node [on the Internet]. There is a proposal to establish one and I expect that we will be hooked up soon. I don't think it will change much in the near future. At the present time, as far as I can discern, I am the only member who makes use of the Internet; I have a lot of constituents on the Internet as I represent a university in my riding."
(Volume 17, No. 3 Autumn 1994, "E-Mail and Two Way Communication")
Friday, September 17, 2004
electronic voting in the UK - technical report
A Comparison with Other Secure Transactions
It is useful to compare voting with other online transactions for which security is needed.
The most obvious comparison is with banking. Attacking an electronic voting system is unlikely to bring the immediate financial rewards that a successful attack on the banking system would, and thus some types of well-resourced attack are less likely. However, the likelihood of well-resourced attacks is still sufficiently high to be problematic.
The consequences of a successful attack are very different with electronic voting, than with banking, though. Banks can, and do, take a financial analysis of how much loss they can stand and insure against such losses. It may be that a political decision could be taken that the loss of a certain percentage of votes is acceptable, but in the absence of such a decision, security appropriate for banking cannot be considered sufficient for electronic voting. Banks have also maintained confidence in the face of repeated losses through computer crime by covering up the cause of those losses. It is inconceivable that, in the event of a successful attack on electronic voting, such a cover-up would be acceptable to the electorate if subsequently disclosed. In a similar vein, individuals can be, and are, compensated for financial losses due to disruption/failures/hacking of online banking. It is not easy to see how there could be equivalent compensation for disruption/failures/hacking of an individuals vote, even if somehow it was discovered which individuals were affected (which might not be possible with some sorts of disruption).
Another issue is anonymity: electronic voting differs from the aforementioned applications due to the fact that, in addition to the requirements for accuracy and privacy, there is the mandated necessity to provide ... anonymity. In other words, banking applications can (in fact must) allow tracking back to the user of the system, but the [electronic voting system] must ensure that such tracking is impossible. (Mercuri, 2001, pp8-9).
Electronic voting also differs from financial transactions in that the risk that an election delayed by a few days will have a different result is unacceptably high. By contrast substantial financial transactions between two willing partners usually can be conducted a few days later if there are problems with ecommerce applications, since such transactions are rarely conducted on a whim.
CCSR: Electronic Voting
e-voting fiction
Now personally, I am inclined to avoid conspiracy theories.
I think there are some fundamental problems with e-voting that simply can't be fixed no matter how good the technology is,
plus which, the actual implementations of the existing technology are farcically bad, showing a complete lack of interest or complete incompetence when it comes to security, testing, design and so forth.
O'Reilly has an article Behind the Scenes at The Mezonic Agenda: An Electronic Voting Primer
and the book website is
mezonicagenda.com
I just want to let people know, I am inviting collaboration both for this blog and for organizing Canadians to oppose electronic and Internet voting.
If you're interested in either or both of these possibilities, please send me an email.
For the blog, it's mainly locating and posting stories about e-voting issues, particularly any that have a Canadian element.
For organizing, it's basically getting a anti-evote group together that can present compelling arguments drawing both on common sense, technical expertise, and examples of problems encountered with systems in Canada and worldwide. We need to target all levels of Canadian government and make sure that our representatives are aware of the problems with these systems, as well as making the Canadian public aware of what is going on.
We also need to forge alliances with Canadian groups that might be concerned about this area, e.g. Electronic Frontier Canada and IEEE Canada, as well as with the current well-organized US groups that are fighting e-voting there. There is also the possibility of working with groups that have similar, although not completely aligned interests. For example, there is a thing called FairVote Canada which is about proportional representation. I presonally don't think proportional representation is a good idea, but some of their members may also be concerned about e-voting. As well, the independent or alternative media and organizations may be interested in this issue, e.g. ontario.indymedia.org
Now if someone knows of an organization in Canada that is ALREADY working on the e-vote issue, I would be more than happy to join up with them.
I am planning on publishing a story to indymedia today, unless someone else wants to do it first.
UPDATE: I posted the story electronic voting in Ontario Sept-2004 to ontario.indymedia.ca
UPDATE 2016-09-05: As of September 2016 the current most active issues related to online voting in Canada are
- A Parliamentary & Ministerial consultation about having national online voting - See Get informed about online voting
- A consultation in New Brunswick about having provincial online voting
You can read comp.risks in various ways
Google Groups
directly in your USENET newsreader
on the risks.org website (which includes an RSS feed and an AvantGo channel)
One story that caught my eye was
SiliconValley.com - MercuryNews.com - Sep. 14, 2004
Maryland court rejects e-voting safeguards
Maryland's highest court Tuesday rejected demands for additional safeguards for touchscreen voting machines, saying elections officials have done everything necessary to ensure the paperless devices are accurate and secure.
The Court of Appeals also rejected a call to allow citizens who do not trust touchscreen voting to use paper ballots in the Nov. 2 general election.
Incidentally, for better RSS feed usability, I am changing my posting format.
It will now be
headline
source - date
content
Wednesday, September 15, 2004
Voting time warp
ONTARIO'S Election Act is stuck in an era of typewriters and stenographers when it should be open to new ideas such as Web and telephone voting, Ontario's chief election officer says. In a written review of last October's general election, John Hollins said Ontario's legislation hasn't been overhauled since 1969 and is a long way from addressing 21st-century society.
"The Election Act reflects a view of Ontario and its electorate that is locked in time, representing the world of the late 1960s, when the legislation was last overhauled," the report states.
He's recommending that the province examine a variety of initiatives taking place globally, including voting through a cable box.
Election Officer Calls for Ontario to Explore Web Voting
Ontario's chief election officer says the province should be open to new ideas such as web and telephone voting.
In a written review of last October's election John Hollins says the Ontario Election Act is stuck in an era of typewriters and stenographers and is a long way from addressing 21st-century society.
Hollins recommended that the province examine a variety of initiatives taking place globally, including voting through a cable box.
Tuesday, September 14, 2004
Electronic ballots fail to gain vote of confidence
In Nye County, Nev., last week, one of the new, highly touted electronic-voting devices bought to replace discredited old-technology machines malfunctioned. When the polls closed in the state primary election, it refused to display the results, threatening to disenfranchise everyone who'd used it.
Sunday, September 12, 2004
Alternative Voting Methods - Pilot Application
I am quoting the entire thing here since it will probably expire off of MERX soon.
Reference Number 103027
Source ID PV.MN.ON.427751.C55080
Solicitation Number EO-040823-1
Published 24/08/2004
Revised
Closing 10/09/2004 04:00 PM Eastern Daylight Saving Time EDT
Associated Components Yes
Category EDP Hardware and Software
Tender Type Request for Qualification
Region of Delivery WORLD
Region of Opportunity WORLD
Agreement Type
Solicitation Method
Estimated Value
Organization Name Elections Ontario
GSINS N7010 AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
The purpose of this project is for Elections Ontario to identify proponents who have the expertise, resources and appropriate technology to provide alternative voting systems that could be tested in by-elections over the next three years, or that could be tested in other environments that would offer clear measurement of the value, effectiveness and integrity of the alternative approaches.
At present, voters must attend in person at a polling place on election day or on one of the six specific days when advance polls are being held in the Returning Office or at an area location. The only alternative to voting at a polling location under the current legislation is for an elector to designate a proxy to vote on his or her behalf at a polling place. Electors with disabilities, language issues or who are absent during the voting period could benefit from and utilize alternative voting methods when voting.
Conceptually, alternative voting systems could be used to supplement the existing process or could provide a substitute for it, provided that elector access is not in any way limited.
The system(s) proposed will supplement an optical scan vote tabulator system being tested for use on Election Day and advance voting. The system(s) we are requesting information on will be used to offer an opportunity to electors to vote between Nomination Day and Election Day. We want to make the voting process as convenient, accessible and easy for voters to exercise their franchise while maintaining the integrity of the election process. The system(s) would be administered anywhere in the province of Ontario where a by-election is called. Currently the province is divided into 103 electoral districts. In each electoral district there are approximately 80,000 electors serviced at approximately 90 voting locations on Election Day.
The other one is Automated Voter Recording System
This project will deliver a method(s) or system(s) to strike off voters (simultaneously) from all electronic Advance Poll Lists of Electors and electronic Election Day List of Electors to reduce the possibility of voter fraud through electors voting more than once during the voting period. The method will utilize bar codes on all NRCs, registration forms and paper versions of the List of Electors.
Dave Barry cracks wise again about electronic voting
The truth is, you don't know WHAT will happen to your ballot, because you might be using one of the new electronic voting machines. ...
So this year many states are switching to electronic voting machines, which use computer technology -- the same reliable, foolproof technology we use in the newspaper industry to wwr _)(%$@!@hkjhou((*7**%$ ERROR ERROR DELETING EVERYTHING FROM DAWN OF TIME
Whoops! It turns out that things CAN go wrong with computer technology. One big concern is that electronic voting machines could be tampered with by ''hackers,'' ...
But aside from that, electronic voting machines are a great idea, according to people who make millions of dollars selling them.
Story spotted on Slashdot /.
March 2003 Electronic Voting Methods: Experiments and Lessons
June 2000 The Feasibility of Electronic Voting in Canada
"a summary of a 1998 KPMG/Sussex Circle report"
The full report from 1998 is called Technology and the Voting Process (PDF).
Or in Français: La technologie et le processus de vote (PDF).
A detailed answer from the CBC to the question
I have been reading about the problems that some areas in the U.S. are having with electronic voting machines. Does anyplace in Canada use these new machines, or are there any plans to do so?
Saturday, September 11, 2004
source - article date
content
I have been getting caught up on a month's backlog of postings, which is why it may look like the next posting is from August 17th.
It's actually the article I was commenting on that was from August 17 2004.
Nevada officials back e-vote systems for primary, general election
Nevada election officials are confident that an electronic voting system being used for the state's Sept. 7 primary will perform well, despite a problem that showed up in a demonstration of the technology this month in California. Nevada also plans to use the system for the general election in November.
...
In the California demonstration, the device worked as designed with a ballot printed in English. But when a Spanish-language ballot was used, votes for a sample proposition weren't printed on paper records.
Techies Praised for E-Vote Work
The new national elections chairman this week praised computer scientists for calling attention to security problems with e-voting machines and for helping develop new standards for building machines that will be more secure in the future.
Secrecy shrouds US e-vote
The three companies that certify the US' voting technologies operate in secrecy, and refuse to discuss flaws in the ATM-like machines to be used by nearly one in three voters in the presidential poll in November.
Despite concerns over whether the touchscreen machines can be trusted, the testing companies will not say publicly if they have encountered shoddy workmanship. They companies said they are committed to secrecy in their contracts with the voting machines' makers - even though tax money ultimately buys or leases the machines.
"I find it grotesque that an organisation charged with such a heavy responsibility feels no obligation to explain to anyone what it is doing," Michael Shamos, a Carnegie Mellon computer scientist and electronic voting expert, told lawmakers in Washington, D.C.
The system for "testing and certifying voting equipment in this country is not only broken, but is virtually nonexistent," Mr Shamos said.
Will computers eat their votes?
A fast-growing anti-electronic movement spearheaded by computer scientists says an electoral train wreck is in the works for Nov. 2.
And it won't be confined to Florida. They say touch screens have repeatedly been tested in various state elections over the past two years with disastrous results.
Machines routinely crashed, effectively disenfranchising thousands who couldn't return to vote later.
In some states, voters touched the screen beside candidate X only to see it indicate a vote for candidate Y. Others were offered incomplete ballots.
Local poll workers, hired for the day, hadn't a clue how to fix or restart the machines. Time and again, votes were lost.
The audit logs in one Florida precinct with several hundred registered voters indicated that not a single one of them had voted.
In a California demonstration put on by one of the machine manufacturers this month, votes on the Spanish-language ballots simply failed to register.
E-Vote Recount Rule in Dispute
Florida officials will not require any recounts of votes cast on touch-screen voting machines during Tuesday's state primary, despite a ruling by an administrative judge that counties using electronic voting are not exempt from laws requiring the re-tabulation of votes in close elections.
LexisNexis: Expatriate Vote Could Play Role in Determining Next President
- The Pentagon dropped a $22 million pilot plan to test Internet voting for 100,000 American military personnel and civilians living overseas after lingering security concerns. A group of security consultants hired by the government to poke holes in its Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE) did just that. Their scathing report concluded that the Net is so fundamentally insecure that using it for voting in the foreseeable future threatens the integrity of the electoral process.
Emphasis mine.
Congressional hopeful seeks seat in 12th District
He supports the new electronic voting machines and said they are similar to electronic banking and bill paying.
"It is moving forward, which is what we need to do," Spadea said.
This is a fundamental misunderstanding of technology.
Electronic banking works because the bank knows ALL ABOUT your money and has a vast auditing process to ensure nothing unusual happens. If there is an error, they roll back the transactions.
There is no way to audit your vote. There is no way to roll back your vote.
Only you know how you intended to vote.
The comparison is completely incorrect.
Bulgarian e-Vote Needs BGN 4 M
Building Bulgaria's online-voting system will cost at least 4 million levs, according to a parliament member.
The MPs have introduced a bill for e-voting in general and presidential elections, as well as in the election of Bulgarian members for the EU Parliament.
According to the bill, those who want to take part in the vote online would have to file applications three weeks earlier. A few days later, they would receive user name and password in a registered letter.
Lawmakers hope that introducing the e-vote can boost polls turnout.
Electronic Voting Questioned In Kazakhstan
In May, representatives of five political parties asked Parliament to amend the electoral law that introduced the electronic voting system. The representatives said the idea could be susceptible to "manipulations." The high cost of the system—around $32 million U.S.—has also raised concerns, as opposition politicians want to invest the funds in social needs such as education and health care.
NewsMax: Even EU wouldn't accept Venezuela's election
Súmate, Venezuela's most important non-governmental election watchdog, also strongly contradicted many of Carter's claims. Carter insists that "international machines were tested in advance" and that "extra care was taken to ensure secrecy and accuracy," the Journal reported, while Súmate says that the original recall rules called for manual voting.
Chávez insisted on importing an electronic system and chose Smartmatic voting machines without a transparent bidding process. One ostensible reason for going with Smartmatic was that its machines also create paper ballots, which could be used to audit the vote. But as it turned out, an impartial audit of those ballots was not allowed.
Súmate also revealed that there was a "severe limitation to participation in the auditing required by any automated voting system: Auditing the software used by the machines was never permitted, the source code was never released, and finally, access was never allowed into the Totalization Room of CNE [National Electoral Council]."
But Carter keeps repeating in the press that Súmate had the same "quick count" as he did. This only creates confusion, because "quick count" totals are merely the sum of totals coming from Chávez-controlled voting software. The Journal says that the only way to have checked the accuracy of the government's claim of "victory" was to count ballots.
Even if an election appears to go well, electronic voting means UNENDING CHALLENGES TO THE ELECTION RESULTS.
Wired News - Aug. 23, 2004
E-Vote Rigging in Venezuela?
Hopeful's e-vote plight raises verification issue
RIVERSIDE -County election officials have been among the staunchest advocates of electronic voting, insisting that computers are as reliable as paper ballots.
But a dispute over a razor-thin election here suggests that important electronic data might not exist, making accurate recounts impossible in many states.
Linda Soubirous, a candidate for the Riverside County board of supervisors, lost a chance to stage a runoff by fewer than 50 votes.
When Soubirous asked to look at the computer disks and other electronic records kept during the election, county officials refused.
Critics of electronic voting say that what happened during the March primary in the sprawling county east of Los Angeles should be a wake-up call for the 50 million Americans eligible to vote electronically in November.
Undocumented software glitches, hackers, mechanical errors or deleted ballots in only a few counties could have huge implications in a presidential election likely to be a cliffhanger.
More than 100,000 paperless terminals have been installed across the nation, particularly in California, Maryland, Georgia and the battleground states of Florida, New Mexico and Nevada.
"This isn't about Riverside -- it's about our nation," said Soubirous, 42, who sued Riverside County and its registrar of voters, Mischelle Townsend, an outspoken booster of electronic voting systems.
Electronic and Internet voting means RECOUNTS ARE IMPOSSIBLE.
I don't think that's progress.
E-vote advocate fights suspension from Maryland post
Lamone has been criticized in recent months over her strong advocacy of moving toward an entirely electronic voting system. The state has bought 16,000 Diebold AccuVote-TS machines, models many computer scientists decry as lacking in integrity because they provide no paper trail and could be susceptible to tampering.
Nev[ada] adds paper trail to e-vote
CARSON CITY, Nev. -In what could become a model for other states, Nevada voters yesterday became the first in the nation to cast ballots in a statewide election on computers that printed paper records of electronic ballots.
As I have said before: you know what's better than a paper trail from electronic machines? Just vote on paper.
Judge to rule on e-vote recount challenge within week
E-Voting: The New Battle Hymn of the Republic
I do not know of any organization in Canada that is presenting a coordinated front opposing electronic/Internet voting. That's one of the reasons I created Paper Vote Canada. If you know of an organization, or you are concerned about this issue, please contact me through the Paper Vote email address or discussion group.
Friday, September 10, 2004
"Access, Integrity and Participation: Towards Responsive Electoral Processes for Ontario" (September 2004)
English (PDF)
Français (PDF)
(Thanks to Bob Bailie for pointing out this report.)
UPDATE 2004-09-12: Mr. Bailie has also pointed me to two Elections Ontario RFQs for electronic voting technology.
I have tried to restrain my comments, not always with success.
There are, however, some areas that could be considered for legislative action; for example: ...
• Permitting different voting access channels and special voting rules, including secure automated processes, and
• Providing for the Chief Election Officer to be able to adopt flexible approaches to elections, including timing adjusted to permit automation.
No.
Secure automated processes?
THERE ARE NO SECURE AUTOMATED PROCESSES.
Slide 41 (page 43)
Automation. The election world is headed toward voting systems that create access opportunities for all electors, without labels and without barriers.
...
many other electors, including those without disabilities, are also seeking innovative approaches to their voting access requirements.
As a tool of 21st-century administration, automated processes can offer increased speed, improved accuracy, greater efficiency and consistency. As a channel for service delivery, automation provides a range of opportunity for innovation in areas that could not be addressed with traditional, manual systems. Looking forward, there may soon come a point where the lack of automation becomes a barrier as a web-enabled generation comprises the majority of the electorate.
Incorrect.
A recent legislative amendment has acknowledged the need to anticipate change. Under Section 4.1 of the Election Act, the CEO now has the authority to propose alternative approaches to voting processes for by-elections. While this statutory authority has offered some opportunities to test innovation, by-elections are unpredictable events and the new processes that can be effectively developed and implemented on short notice are limited in scope.
As we look across the world, election administrators are evaluating various technologies as possible contributors to electoral service improvements. Well-planned pilot projects in the United Kingdom over the past three years have explored a range of voting automation that includes interactive digital television, e-voting kiosks and cellular text messaging, in addition to more simple solutions such as vote-by-mail and telephone and Internet voting.
If you think Internet voting is a "simple solution" then you have no understanding whatsoever of the technical, political and societal issues involved.
THERE IS NO SECURE INTERNET VOTING.
IT IS NOT TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE.
IT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN TERMS OF PROCEDURE.
If your ballot is not cast in public, I can put a gun to your head and make you vote the way I want.
If your ballot is not cast on paper, I can put a program on your computer and make you vote the way I want.
One consistent theme emerges from the reports and analyses: automation covers a much wider range of options than just Internet voting and should not be introduced without undertaking significant and in-depth study.
That is the understatement of the "21st Century".
Ontario’s electors are not averse to automation. They appear to be ready to embrace technologies such as the telephone and the Internet as tools to help them obtain information and possibly to register as an elector. This view is not as strongly held when it comes to electronic remote voting.
One reason people are not interested is because "electronic remote voting" can very easily become electronic remote vote stealing and manipulation.
Our society places few obligations upon its citizens. Going out in public every few years to cast a secret ballot is not a particularly onerous duty.
Slide 47. Page 49.
Any new approach to electoral governance through a reform of the legislation must continue to honour the CEO’s four basic pillars:
• To guarantee the fairness of elections for all participants
• To ensure that all electors have access to a secret ballot
• To ensure that administrative activity enhances the transparency of electoral processes, and
• To achieve maximum accessibility for citizen voters, candidates and citizen monitors.
You CANNOT have a secret ballot and a transparent process if you use Internet or electronic voting. Therefore, these should be excluded. QED.
Missouri vote-by-fax
Missouri's Secretary of State Matt Blunt (who also happens to be a candidate for the Governor of Missouri in the November election) has announced plans to allow Missouri voters in the military to send in their ballots by unencrypted e-mail. A supposedly trusted third party (Omega Technologies) will handle the unencrypted ballots and redistribute them to the appropriate ballot counters. Apparently North Dakota is also contemplating a similar scheme. Those voters will have to sign a waiver acknowledging that their votes need not be kept secret.
I usually avoid much commentary here but:
The secret ballot is key to democracy.
Anyone who proposes that people should vote by non-secret ballot is, at best, an idiot.
Tuesday, September 07, 2004
Tuesday, August 31, 2004
Monday, August 30, 2004
Saturday, August 28, 2004
Friday, August 27, 2004
Bill for e-vote proof revived
The [California] Senate on Wednesday revived an effort to require a paper trail to ensure that electronic voting machines aren't tampered with and accurately record voter preferences.
...
The [California] Senate ... approved a bill by Assemblyman Tony Strickland, R-Westlake Village, that would require all touch-screen voting machines used after Jan. 1, 2006, to give voters paper receipts verifying how they voted.
Wednesday, August 25, 2004
Sunday, August 08, 2004
Cosmic ray hits Brussels election -- really?
To summarise the responses to this item, I have now been able to confirm the story [4100 votes given to candidate in local Brussels election by computer error due to cosmic ray]. It was of course actually 4096 = 2^12 votes, as correspondent Robson and I expected.
...
The event occurred in the election held on 18 May 2003. An expert review determined that as no software defects had been found on inspecting the source code and no test had been able to reproduce the error, it was probably attributable to a spontaneous inversion of a bit in the RAM of the PC (no explicit mention of cosmic rays). However the report concluded that even if the voting system under review was not perfect the totality of controls was sufficient to be confident in the overall result. I wonder.
Wired News - AP - July 30, 2004
Lost Florida Voting Records Found
Miami-Dade County elections officials said Friday they have found detailed electronic voting records from the 2002 gubernatorial primary that were originally believed lost in computer crashes last year.
Seth Kaplan, spokesman for the Elections Supervisor office, said the records were found on a compact disc in the office. "We are very pleased," he said.
Emphasis mine.
Wired News - July 30, 2004
Floridians Demand E-Vote Inquiry
A group of election-reform activists are demanding a Department of Justice investigation into the viability of touch-screen voting machines, after it was discovered that logs of votes cast on the machines in Miami-Dade County in a 2002 election were lost.
Elections supervisors blamed the loss on bad management, not on the machines. But the activists are nevertheless furious that the loss occurred eight months after the 2002 election, but was not publicized until after an audit was requested. Now the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition is demanding an investigation.