Sunday, October 24, 2004
counting countdown
In the US, the system is very complex.
We shall see how smoothly the next election goes.
Remember, elections are processes by which the electorate convinces itself that their votes were fairly translated into the resulting selected candidates, thus conferring legitimacy from a very large group of voters to a very small group of elected officials.
If people lose faith in the process, it undermines the entire legitimacy of the political system.
Think about this system: millions of people give billions of dollars to be spent by a few hundred people. How long do you think that is sustainable if the millions don't trust that the few hundred were legitimately chosen?
I predict the aftermath of the US election will be a storm of legal challenges.
Keep in mind, this should also be used in calculating the cost of non-transparent election systems like electronic voting machines.
The number of angles from which a paper-based system can be challenged is few and fairly easily resolved. The number of angles from which an electronic system can be challenged is almost limitless.
Many elections officials, party activists and media executives believe the final outcome of the Nov. 2 presidential election may not be known that night, or even the next morning. In fact, the public may not have a clear and declared winner for days because of possible glitches in voting and counting, and subsequent legal challenges.
Palm Beach Post - October 23, 2004
Outcome likely to require patience
So electronic voting systems, whose sole benefit appears to be "fast counts" for very complex ballots, end up leading to... slower results.
Saturday, October 23, 2004
Ontario e-voting 2003
As voters across Ontario were preparing to head to the polls today to elect their municipal leaders, a technological first was quietly taking place in the easternmost reaches of the province. About 100,000 voters the counties of Prescott-Russell and Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry were registered to cast their ballots online.
Under a new system developed by CanVote Inc., an eastern Ontario startup company, registered voters in 11 area municipalities had the option of voting via the Internet or telephone.
"I believe we're the first to do a real full Internet election in North America," said Joe Church, president of CanVote Inc.
London Free Press - 2003-11-10
100,000 ballots to be cast online
e-Jack 2001
E-voting and electric citizenship is fast and convenient. (If controversial - my own web poll suggested people did not like the idea.)
...
e-democracy should enable citizens to fully participate in the democratic process through the Internet and other digital means. Examples of e-democracy include online voting, conducting online town halls, and mobilizing groups
The E-Polity (PowerPoint)
The Pew Charitable Trusts: Advancing Policy Solutions: Election Reform Briefing: the Business of Elections
The once-overlooked election industry has become the focus of intense scrutiny in recent years with the passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and the promise of nearly $4 billion in funds from Washington to purchase new voting machines, software and databases.
In the past two years, as concerns over the security and reliability of direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines have increased, so too has the public wariness over the political activity of companies that design, manufacture and maintain them.
Electionline.org’s latest election reform briefing, The Business of Elections (PDF), provides the first nonpartisan and non-advocacy look at the political campaign contributions and lobbying activities of the largest producers of e-voting machines, including Diebold, Inc., Election Systems & Software, Sequoia Voting Sytems and Hart InterCivic.
The Pew Charitable Trusts - electionline.org - August 2004
Election Reform Briefing: the Business of Elections
virtual voting, real election
Edward Bitet fought in World War II, built affordable housing for veterans and taught sixth grade. When the Long Island native retired to Florida, he fulfilled another civic duty by becoming a poll worker. But Bitet, 77, isn't volunteering this year he says he doesn't trust Palm Beach County's electronic voting machines. He walked out of a county demonstration of touch-screen terminals convinced that software bugs could wreak havoc on Nov. 2.
"We lost an election four years ago because they fooled around with the paper ballots and couldn't recount them," said Bitet, a Democrat. "Now we're moving to a system without paper, and they won't even have the ballots to recount. I can't be a part of this."
With polls showing nearly equal numbers of Florida voters for President Bush and Sen. John Kerry, the election's outcome may again hinge on a Florida recount.
And the more that Floridians learn about how voting machines work, the more they question whether the 15 counties with paperless voting systems can accurately count and recount votes.
ABC News - AP - Oct 22, 2004
Integrity of Fla. Virtual Vote in Doubt
e-voting e-hubris
On November 2, hundreds of thousands of Americans will step into electronic voting booths, many of them for the first time. They'll likely be confronted with a touch screen that steps them through the local and national candidates, as well as the local propositions that are usually stuffed onto the ballot.
This is not, as we all know, just any election year. We're choosing our next president—the incumbent or a new one. As a result, the performance of these electronic voting systems will be watched with keen eyes and worried minds. Will they be accurate? Are they secure? Can you have such a thing as a virtual hanging chad? My gut tells me that these systems will work flawlessly next month, but the concern is well founded.
An exhaustive 2003 report from the Johns Hopkins University (Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, July 23, 2003 [avirubin.com/vote.pdf]) outlines more than half a dozen key ways in which the security, accuracy, and overall functionality of an electronic voting system—a Diebold AccuVote-TS, to be precise—could be compromised.
ABC News - PC Magazine - October 13, 2004
Is E-Voting Fundamentally Flawed?
necessary physical security for e-voting machines
If you actually put in place the necessary security measures, they cost way more than some humans and paper ballots.
Check it out:
Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Jesse Durazo is not taking any chances with this year's presidential election.
After weathering months of criticism of the county's new touch-screen voting system, Durazo in July installed 24-hour surveillance cameras in the warehouse where the voting machines are stored and are being tested this week.
``Voters deserve to know we have done our best to maintain security,'' Durazo said.
Durazo also tightened an internal badge system that limits access to the warehouse. And expensive bar-coded tamper tape will protect the machines during the days leading up to the Nov. 2 election, an upgrade from the primary election, when flimsy plastic tags were used.
The steps taken by Durazo and his staff have won praise from critics of electronic voting, like David Dill, a professor of computer science at Stanford University, whose warnings about the reliability and security of touch-screen voting helped galvanize a national movement of voters demanding modifications to the machines.
``They are bending over backwards to be responsive,'' Dill said.
The Mercury News - Oct. 22, 2004
E-vote security is tight
International Observer Team Urges Reforms in US Electoral Process
Among the most-important changes called for in the group’s report is to assure a ’’paper trail’’ for touch-screen voting which is being introduced in a number of states across the country.
"Transparency at the polls is critical and cannot be readily established without voter verification," the group said, adding that, where touch-screen voting is used, an independent agency and a parallel monitoring process should be adopted to achieve "optimum transparency."
...
The group also called for the enfranchisement of former felons who have served their time in prison and strongly criticized laws of the kind that disenfranchised tens of thousands of Floridians in the 2000 election and still exist in Florida, Virginia, Nebraska, Mississippi, Kentucky, Iowa, Arizona, and Alabama.
"This practice falls outside of international or even U.S. norms and is an unreasonable restriction that creates subcategories of citizenship," the group said.
In Florida, the group expressed special concern about possible challenges by election monitors, the lack of independent review of electronic voting machines that created so much havoc in 2004, and the continued felony-related disenfranchisement of minority voters.
emphasis mine
bellaciao - 22nd October 2004
International Observer Team Urges Reforms in US Electoral Process
same story from Rabble.ca: U.S. electoral process affected by 'dirty tricks'
judging the counters
A federal judge said Wednesday he would rule as quickly as possible on U.S. Rep. Robert Wexler's attempt to force the state to create a paper trail for any needed recounts with touch-screen voting machines.
After hearing three days of testimony with regular reminders of the flawed 2000 presidential vote, U.S. District Judge James Cohn said the "case is of great public importance" and promised a written order, which would be subject to quick appeal by the losing side.
The state issued a new rule Friday for manual recounts in extremely tight elections to replace one thrown out by a state judge. But Wexler maintains recounts aren't possible with the paperless machines because there is nothing to review by hand. Their end product is a form showing votes and instances where no votes were recorded.
The judge said the question of whether manual recounts are possible with touch-screen machines is one "the court has to grapple with."
tuscaloosanews.com Dateline Alabama | APP - October 20, 2004
Judge: Will rule quickly in suit seeking e-vote paper trail
almost as popular as Paper Vote Canada
Two weeks before the presidential election, an event billed as a forum on electronic voting drew a handful of people to UC Riverside on Tuesday night.
Organizers urged voters to beware of electronic voting, saying the system is unreliable and that voters should vote by paper.
The Riverside chapter of Democracy for America, a group inspired by failed Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean, and the California College Democrats at UCR, co-sponsored the event in a university lecture hall.
Three people, including two UCR students and one lecturer, made up the audience. Sponsors attributed the low turnout to the rain.
The Press-Enterprise - October 19, 2004
Anti-e-vote forum draws three people
2004 Ontario Public Library Service Awards shortlist
Minister's Award for Innovation ...
Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry County Library (large library
category) - for providing unique access to electronic and
telephone voting to six townships during the 2003 municipal
elections - one of the first libraries in North America to use
online voting.
More like Public Disservice Award.
CNW Telbec - October 18, 2004
Ontario Ministry of Culture PR
space e-vote
CAPE CANAVERAL, Florida (AP) -- The space station's newest astronaut will cast his ballot in the presidential election from 225 miles (360 kilometers) up, with NASA's help.
Leroy Chiao said Monday that the space agency has worked hard with local and federal authorities to make it possible for him to vote from the orbiting complex, his home until spring.
He plans to cast his ballot via a secure e-mail connection, much the same way that astronaut David Wolf used a new computer software developed by NASA to cast his ballot from the Russian space station Mir in a 1997 vote on 14 amendments to the state constitution.
U.S. astronauts, most of whom live around Houston, won the right to vote from space under a Texas bill signed into law by then-Gov. George W. Bush.
CNN.com - AP - October 20, 2004
Astronaut to e-vote from space
risk e-voting
This November, as many as 50 million Americans could vote for president using some form of electronic touch-screen system, the vast majority of which have been designed by McKinney, Texas-based Diebold Election Systems. That has some IT and security researchers holding their breath because of the faulty track record of Diebold's technology and a government-endorsed testing and certification process that they say is deeply flawed.
Those critics say that direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems remain vulnerable to manipulation and malfunction, particularly in states that have ignored some recommendations of independent researchers, like Maryland has.
State election officials, on the other hand, say they are confident that appropriate safeguards are in place to ensure the security and accuracy of the 2004 vote.
Among the most pressing issues cited by critics are a lack of technical standards governing DRE software development, the failure of the government to impose transparency on the software testing and certification process, and the lack of technical security knowledge throughout the many state and local jurisdictions that oversee elections where DREs will be used.
...
Mystery Tests
One of the most critical aspects of the voting system development process is the testing and certification of hardware and software to ensure that they meet voluntary federal voting standards for security and reliability. Three vendors act as so-called independent testing authorities (ITA). However, IT experts are highly critical of the testing process because of its secrecy.
"Election officials are buying a software package, and there's not a lot of transparency," says Rudisin. "With voting software, you pretty much buy a pig in a poke."
Ciber Inc. in Greenwood Village, Colo., and SysTest Labs LLC in Denver act as the two software ITAs. Wyle Laboratories Inc. in El Segundo, Calif., is the hardware ITA. All of them refuse to provide details on how they test the voting equipment or on their findings.
"The ITAs that test these machines are hired by the vendors, so they are not independent and not neutral," says [Avi] Rubin
a fairly long article from
Computer World - October 18, 2004
E-vote at Risk
They also have a Sidebar: Where E-voting Went Wrong
featuring such gems as
5. Orange County, 2004: Hart InterCivic Inc. DREs trip circuit breaker and shut down when batteries die; voters are turned away from the polls.
6. Orange County, 2004: Hart access-code confusion causes 7,000 voters to receive the wrong ballots.
7. San Diego County, 2004: Diebold DREs lose votes; control modules fail to start up properly.
8. Bernalillo County, 2002: Insufficient memory results in failure to count 12,000 of 48,000 votes.
San Bernardino County e-vote testing
After weeks of testing, San Bernardino County's top election official declared its voting machines trustworthy after a final exam in which his office cast hundreds of test ballots.
"We nailed 100 percent, just the way we're supposed to," said Scott Konopasek, the county's Registrar of Voters.
State law requires counties to conduct a public "logic and accuracy" test of their voting systems. On Friday, before an audience of news cameras, the public and local officials, Konopasek and his team tested both the electronic touch-screen and the paper absentee-voting systems and also assessed how the two worked together.
They used a test deck of ballots with predetermined votes on them and checked that the results matched the input, he said. They also allowed observers to cast unscripted votes from unscripted precincts on unscripted machines "to verify those unscripted votes are being reported and verified correctly," Konopasek said.
Three members of the county's grand jury certified the results, he said.
The Press-Enterprise - October 17, 2004
San Bernardino County scores '100 percent' on e-vote dry run
voting machine crash in Florida
WEST PALM BEACH, Fla. A pre-election test of electronic voting machines in Florida has been postponed after heat caused the crash of a server that tabulates the data.
Critics were quick to say the episode underscores the need for touch-screens to be backed up with paper records. The glitch happened in Palm Beach County, home of the infamous hanging and pregnant chads from the 2000 election dispute.
Nearly one in three U-S voters will use touch-screen voting machines to cast their ballots Election Day.
A former senior testing engineer says heat is a serious problem for touch-screens, especially in locales like Florida and Louisiana.
KRON4 - AP - October 14, 2004 or earlier
Computer crash linked to excessive heat deepens concerns about electronic voting
Submitted by George Wiman.
Wired News reported it as
Tuesday's public dry run had to be postponed until Friday because a computer server that tabulates data from the touch-screen machines crashed, said county elections supervisor Theresa LePore. Such "logic and accuracy" tests are required by law.
She said she suspected Hurricane Jeanne, which struck in September, may have zapped electricity and air conditioning to the room where the server was stored, causing temperatures to soar to 90 degrees or more and possibly causing the crash. The storm wiped out power to nearly 1.3 million homes and businesses throughout Florida.
The incident raised questions in the minds of computer hardware and software engineers about the reliability of other computers on which Floridians will depend for an accurate vote count on Nov. 2 — especially touch-screen machines.
An Achilles' heel of electronic voting equipment, just like any machines whose circuits get hot with colliding electrons, is its inability to tolerate extreme conditions, many experts say.
Wired News - AP - Oct. 14, 2004
E-Vote Snafu in Florida
Slashdot reported it as Florida Electronic Voting Machines Crash /.
e-voting in New Westminster, BC
For the 2002 election, Election Systems & Software Model 100 machines were leased from the City of Toronto.
The firmware in the machines has been tested in the US to meet the US Federal Elections Commission's standards.
ES&S programmed the software for this specific election.
I asked about the possibility of the count getting reset to zero partway through the day, and was told that very few people knew how to zero the machines. The Presiding Election Officials were told to call Election Headquarters if they had any problems. There was a technician there would could deal with such problems (I wasn't told whether the technician was somebody from ES&S).
I asked about power outages and was told that the data is stored on a smart card so no information can be lost. There is a way to separate uncounted ballots cast while the power is out, which can then be fed through the machine once power has been restored.
This election happened to be very close, so there was a judicial recount which showed the machines to be very accurate.
From my own memory of the election, the ballot reminded me of the answer sheet for a multiple-choice test to be marked by a computer. We had to fill in the appropriate ovals with a pencil. The completed ballot was fed into the machine, which incremented a counter on its face. I did see it reject a ballot where the wrong number of ovals had been filled in. The completed ballots were stored inside the machine ... and were available for a hand recount.
Related stories:
The Royal City Record
City goes for lease on voting machines
In February, city council approved a staff recommendation to proceed to a Request For Proposals to purchase electronic vote counting equipment. Staff continued to look at alternatives and have now determined that leasing the machines is a viable option.
"I am glad to see this happen. We have had concerns about technology change," said Coun. Bob Osterman about purchasing electronic equipment. "This is good."
Tuesday, October 19, 2004
Edmonton municipal election
Here is what they say
Marking the Ballot
You will take the ballot into the voting booth, remove the ballot from the secrecy sleeve and mark the ballot beside the name of the candidates you wish to vote for.
...
After the Ballot is Marked
You will return the marked ballot, inside the secrecy sleeve, to the Ballot Box Clerk . The Ballot Box Clerk will insert the ballot into the voting machine without looking at it. It is very important that each person's vote remains secret.
If you choose too many candidates, the ballot will be returned by the voting machine and you will be given the option of either completing a new ballot or having the existing ballot accepted by the machine. Where votes have been cast for too many candidates, votes will not be counted. All other votes on the ballot will be accepted.
from www.edmonton.ca - Voting on Election Day
While optical mark-sense are among the least-worst electronic voting systems, since the original data is on the marked ballot, they are still worse than a paper ballot.
Why? Because the machine counts.
Any time the machine is counting, there are opportunities for error, either due to malfunction, incorrect programming, or malicious action.
As I reported earlier they also had
audio-electronictouch screen machines at the advance polls.
Florida - vote early, crash often
The Sun-Sentinel is reporting on computer glitches already affecting the election in - you guessed it - Florida. Of the 14 early voting sites that opened in Broward County on Monday morning, 9 were reporting problems.
Slashdot - Computer Problems Already Affecting Florida Voters
Wednesday, October 13, 2004
SiliconValley.com E-voting roundtable
Slashdot describes it thusly
A group of computer scientists, journalists, voting activists, and county registrars are discussing the e-voting mess in an online forum that runs all this week. The panel is a who's who of e-voting: Avi Rubin, David Dill, David Jefferson, and registrars from San Bernadino and Riverside, CA. They've even got Scott Ritchie from the Open Vote Foundation.
Tuesday, October 12, 2004
Canada paper ballot
Here's an example on a pretty good site that walks through the process of voting in Canada.
I Can Vote! : A user-friendly guide to voting in Canada - page 17
Friday, October 08, 2004
Hawaii e-vote boycott
A coalition of concerned residents is urging voters to boycott using the state's new electronic voting machines and to stick to the standard paper ballot option when they go to the ballot booth for the general election.
Members of Safe Vote Hawai'i, which describes itself as "a coalition of Hawai'i's leading technology professionals, community activists and official election observers," said they have concerns about the integrity of the electronic machines because they do not produce an immediate "paper copy" for each vote cast.
"We feel that paper audit trails are mandatory for a safe e-voting election and we don't have any way of getting that for this election," said Jason Forrester, spokesman for the group and a senior systems analyst for SAVVIS, formerly Digital Island.
Honolulu Advertiser - October 8, 2004
Integrity of e-vote machines questioned
Atomz searching
It had forgotten about this entire search index, for some reason.
Tuesday, October 05, 2004
who shall counter the counters?
computer scientists focused on thoroughly evaluating the technical aspects of e-voting machines. This task will be left to more than 1,400 techies participating in a domestic monitoring project of the Election Protection coalition, organized by almost 60 U.S. groups.
The coalition will disperse 25,000 monitors to voting sites in 17 states around the country. One of the coalition's projects is TechWatch, run by the Verified Voting Foundation. TechWatch has recruited technology professionals to observe the operation of voting technology during tests before the election and on Election Day itself.
The Verified Voting Foundation has also developed a web-based software application that will allow coalition volunteers to respond to voting incidents in real time. The coalition runs a hot line that voters can call to report problems. When they do, hot-line operators enter the details into the Election Incident Reporting System. The system maps the problems and sends an alert to a monitoring team leader in the area, who can then dispatch a mobile response team of volunteer lawyers, techies or others to observe how the problem is handled.
The groups tested the system during the Florida primary election, when 296 hot-line calls were entered into the system, of which 18 were voting machine problems.
Another group, Votewatch, will collect statistical data on the election. Among other things, Votewatch will compare the vote tallies posted in polling places at the end of the day with cumulative unofficial counts for an entire area reported later that night. If the numbers differ, it would indicate that the counting software at individual polling places failed to count some votes. Volunteers would make note of the technology that was used at those polling places to gather statistics on the accuracy of systems.
The Election Protection coalition also includes groups that will monitor issues besides voting technology, including voter intimidation and disenfranchisement.
Does that sound to you like an improved, less-expensive voting system that people trust?
Wired News - Oct. 05, 2004
U.S. Elections Under a Microscope
visiting dignitaries try American democracy
Kwesi Addae, a fifty-three-year-old former political-science professor from Ghana and the founder of Pollwatch Africa, has monitored elections in half a dozen shenanigan-prone countries, including Togo, Nigeria, and Guinea-Bissau.
...
Addae, as one of twenty foreign election observers brought here this month by the left-leaning human-rights group Global Exchange, is inspecting the creaky mechanics of American democracy at close hand. He signed up for the two-week mission, he said, “out of fascination.”
In Africa, Addae had seen phantom polling stations, ruling-party rent-a-mobs, ballots bought with beer. But nothing in his experience had prepared him for the iVotronic touch-screen voting system. The iVotronic is the latest in electoral technology, a light, flat-screen computer that will be used this November in parts of Florida, among other places. ...
The observers crowded around. “You’re quite fortunate to be able to touch and feel the same thing that those voters will be using on Election Day,” a salesman from Election Systems & Software, the machine’s manufacturer, said. ...
“Let’s vote,” Addae said. ... Addae was next. He bellied up to the machine and poked at the screen. Nothing happened. Someone handed him a small cartridge—a “personalized electronic ballot,” or P.E.B. Addae examined the cartridge quizzically, then fumbled as he tried to insert it into the machine. “Put it back in for just a second,” an observer named David MacDonald, a former member of Canada’s parliament, said. “Now remove it.”
A ballot appeared on the screen. For the purposes of this demonstration, the election was a local one, and the candidates for mayor were all actors; for city council, hockey players; and for school board, musicians. For some reason, they were also all Canadians. “O.K.,” Addae said, peering over his glasses. “I want Michael J. Fox.” Passing over Neve Campbell, John Candy, and Dan Aykroyd, he touched Fox’s name, and a little green check mark appeared. Addae ran his finger down the list of candidates in other races: Gordie Howe, Ken Dryden, Bryan Adams, Shania Twain, Gordon Lightfoot. “I want Bobby Orr. I want Neil Young,” he said. When he was done, Addae punched a flashing red button marked “ vote .” The machine beeped twice, and a message appeared on the screen: “Your ballot has been cast. Thank you for voting.”
Addae shook his head. “It’s not very easy,” he said. Back home, Ghanaians still vote the old-fashioned way, by writing an “X” on a paper ballot and dropping it into a box. “Thereafter, they are counted one by one, and the figures are written down and announced,” he said.
...
After he was finished with the computer demonstration, he ambled across the room, where some observers were voting with paper ballots. He grabbed a ballot and filled in the bubbles next to his choices. The salesman collected twelve ballots and loaded them into a optical scanner. Whoosh —the ballots shot through. But there was a problem. The machine rejected five of the ballots, including Addae’s. The observers had used a pen instead of a No. 2 pencil. This election observer was ready to deliver his verdict: “I am not impressed at all!”
The New Yorker - 2004-10-04
The Talk of the Town - Visiting Dignitaries - Dry Run
Monday, October 04, 2004
e-voting enables the disabled
This November, Eileen Rivera Ley, 41, will vote by herself for the first time. Blind voters in Maryland and several other states will use electronic voting machines equipped with technology that allows the disabled to vote independently.
It used to get crowded whenever Rivera Ley voted. Blind, Rivera Ley had to rely on someone else to read the ballot aloud, then vote for her. That meant as many as four people -- Rivera Ley, the person who pulled the levers and election judges from both major parties as witnesses -- huddled in the voting booth.
In Canada, only one person assists you (if needed) in the voting booth; I don't think anyone observes.
Wired News - AP - Oct. 03, 2004
E-Voting Fans: The Disabled
e-voting unease
Imagine your bank teller accepting a deposit and then saying, "Oh, you don't need a receipt. It's all in the computer." On Nov. 2, that's essentially what millions of citizens will be told when they cast ballots on new electronic voting machines. Forty-two states are poised to use this latest technology, but with only 28 days left until the presidential election, some states are still debating whether to provide a paper confirmation of each voter's choices.
Potential problems with electronic voting — and very real mishaps — have gained more public attention in recent months, and manufacturers and election officials have tried to play down concerns. But some state officials have also chosen to build in more safeguards to ensure that the electronic vote data, if corrupted either accidentally or maliciously, have a backup. That means one thing: a paper record.
USA Today - Christian Science Monitor - October 3, 2004
Observers remain uneasy over e-vote machines
Edmonton e-voting
this year, the City of Edmonton has rented 21 audio-electronic voting machines, which will allow citizens who can't see well to cast their ballots without help. And everyone else who votes in advance will do so electronically, too -- traditional paper ballots will be available only on election day, Oct. 18.
...
Electronic voting machines have been severely criticized in the U.S., where they were used for the first time in 2002. In July 2003, professors at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore released a scathing report that said the machines were open to tampering and made meaningful recounts impossible because they leave no paper trail.
But operations manager Steve Thompson, who led the project, is confident the electronic voting terminals the city is renting will perform without a hitch. He points out that the machines are independent of one another and store voting records in three separate places, including on a removable pack that can be taken from a broken machine and read in another.
"We don't believe that the failure of a single or even two or three machines would in any way jeopardize the ability to count the votes that had been cast on that machine," Thompson said.
...
There are no plans, however, to make electronic voting the norm. He estimates the cost of mainstream electronic voting would be about $1.25 million, a price tag he thinks council and taxpayers will find prohibitive.
For heaven's sake, the point isn't whether the votes can be read, the point is whether the votes are accurately recorded.
Edmonton Journal - September 22, 2004
Ballot machine boon for blind voters
This story points out another trend which I saw in the reports from Toronto.
In order to "save money" they like this idea of renting machines, whether it's loaning their own machines out, or using someone else's machines.
So that's great. As if the security problem wasn't hard enough, they're letting the machines change hands repeatedly.
Saturday, October 02, 2004
US techno-voting troubles
Can high-tech voting machines prevent a repeat of America's 2000 electoral fiasco—or will they make things worse?
IT IS not often that the dry subject of voting technology makes the headlines. It famously happened in America's presidential election in 2000, when the previously obscure differences between hanging, pregnant and dimpled “chads”—the small flakes of paper punched out of cards by mechanical voting machines—suddenly became a national crisis.
...
Touch-screen machines have problems of their own, as another Florida election vividly illustrated last January. In a local election held on January 6th in parts of Broward and Palm Beach counties, 10,844 votes were cast, and Ellyn Bogdanoff won by 12 votes. Under Florida state law, a result this close triggers a manual recount. But no recount was possible, because there was nothing to count: the voting machines' only paper output is the final tally.
The lack of a paper trail has made new touch-screen voting machines hugely controversial. As Robert Wexler, a Democratic congressman, likes to point out, “a reprint is not a recount”. Critics also complain that there is no way to tell if the machines are faulty, insecure or rigged.
The Economist - Sep 16th 2004
Electronic voting: The trouble with technology
Link from crisispapers.org - Electoral Integrity.
Toronto City Clerk Report - 1999 - Voting and Vote-counting System - Municipal Elections
I love this analysis.
4.0 Direct Recording Electronic (Touch Screen)
...
Recounts using these machines have proven to be one of the closest systems to 100%.
ha ha ha ha ha
That's hilarious.
Of course the recounts are always the same. THERE'S NOTHING TO RECOUNT.
They are saying, roughly "every time I ask this machine to produce its vote count total, it produces the same numbers".
Hmm, when I store a number in my pocket calculator's memory, it produces the same number each time too. Maybe we should replace our paper voting with pocket calculators.
Plus which, "closest to 100%"?
Are you saying sometimes the machines report different results from their memory banks?
(Sorry, in sarcastic mood today.)
Anyway, the report is
May 6, 1999
To: Corporate Services Committee
Budget Committee
From: City Clerk
Subject: Voting and Vote-counting System - Municipal Elections
www.city.toronto.on.ca/legdocs/1999/agendas/committees/cs/cs990520/it005.htm
It examines the following types of voting systems:
1.0 Mechanical Lever Machines
2.0 Punchcards
3.0 Optical Mark Reading (Optical Scan)
4.0 Direct Recording Electronic (Touch Screen)
5.0 Telephone
6.0 Mail
7.0 Automated Terminals or Kiosks
8.0 Internet
Conclusion:
After reviewing all of the current voting/vote-counting systems available to the City and examining them in relationship to the principles established, it is recommended that the best voting/vote-counting system for the City of Toronto would be a combination of optical scan - voting place tabulator and direct recording electronic (touch screen). The optical scan - voting place tabulator provides the best practice available given its reliability, integrity and similarity to paper ballot. The electorates' familiarity and acceptance with this type of vote-counting equipment ensures the greatest likelihood of continued success utilizing this type of system.
The advancement in technology makes direct recording electronic (touch screen) a viable alternative in a limited variety. Its portability provides greater flexibility to employ these units for specialized needs (i.e. institutional voting, physically challenged voting and an advance voting program). By employing the use of these units the advance voting program could support an additional 500 potential advance voting locations.
Request for Proposal:
In order to comply with Council's request to provide updated costs of a recommended voting and vote tabulation system, and to ensure sufficient lead time for the delivery of the system in time for Election 2000, a Request for Proposal (RFP No. 3412-99-01464) was issued for an Optical Scan Voting System and Touch Screen Voting System in February 1999. The purpose of this Request For Proposal was to provide updated figures for the Capital Works Program and determine the most effective Optical Scan Voting System and Touch Screen Voting System in the marketplace.
Subject to the approval by Council of this report, the results of the Request For Proposal together with recommendations on the award of contract will be forwarded to the Administration Committee for consideration in July, 1999.
This is the analysis they provide for DRE machines
Advantages:
a) easiest of all voting systems for the voter;
b) results are quickly available;
c) no extra costs for materials (i.e., ballots);
d) recounts have proven to be extremely accurate; and
e) most technologically advanced form of voting in the marketplace.
Disadvantages:
a) notable large capital investment required; and
b) new voting method for voters - could result in long lineups.
I don't even know where to begin.
What difference does it make how "technologically advanced" it is?
Two disadvantages? How about
c) Massive possibility for incorrect results due to fraud or incorrect programming
d) Complete loss of transparency in elections process
Who wrote this analysis, a high school student?
Sorry, that's an insult to high school students.
Earlier on in the report, there is a very telling presentation of background
Historically, composite paper ballot elections have been prone to human error, particularly:
a) subjective discretion applied when deciding valid votes;
b) tallying votes when the deputy returning officer is communicating votes to the poll clerk orally; and
c) transposition errors when carrying figures from tally sheets to final statements.
In addition, the operating costs associated with composite paper ballot elections is as much as three times that of an automated election. The increase in costs include;
a) the requirement for more voting subdivisions with fewer voters to ensure the manageability of the counting process;
b) the employment of staff at the voting places and additional staff to count ballots at the close of voting; and
c) the associated recount costs.
Summary: Humans and paper are unreliable and expensive. Computers are better. Subjectivity is eliminated, all is perfect objective computer logic. All hail our robot king!
There's only one problem with this presentation.
It's wrong.
I would rather trust humans than machines.
Voting is not about achieving the maximum cost-effective calculational efficiency.
It's about having a system that people can understand and trust, so that they have faith that the election reflects the will of the people.
A paper system with humans counting has explicit, obvious workings and checks and balances.
An electronic system has nothing. Invisible electronic pulses. Silent hidden programs.
You might as well take all the paper ballots into a locked room and say "trust us, we have a wonderful machine in this magic room that will count everything, sorry, you can't see it, we'll tell you the results in a moment".
Toronto parties like it's 1999
And in case you're wondering,
1) yes, the John Hollins who was the Director of Elections for Toronto has now moved on to be Chief Electorial Officer for Ontario.
2) Election Systems and Software is a US voting equipment vendor
I wonder if they promoted this as "$13 million Canadian taxpayer dollars go to US vendor, to help our elections work as well as they do in the USA".
I'm guessing not.
How good is ES&S? Well, I think this article from Black Box Voting sums it up:
ES&S Trying to Compete With Diebold In Race for Crappiest Voting Machines
Anyway,
THE CITY OF TORONTO
City Clerk's Division
Minutes of the Administration Committee
Meeting No. 3
Tuesday, July 13, 1999
www.city.toronto.on.ca/legdocs/1999/minutes/committees/adm/ad990713.htm
-6. Request for Proposal No. 3412-99-01464 for the Acquisition of 2000 Optical Scan Vote Tabulators and 100 Touch Screen Voting Units. The Administration Committee had before it the following:
(i) joint report (June 15, 1999) from the Chief Administrative Officer and Acting Commissioner, Corporate Services, the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer and the City Clerk recommending that:
(1) the City Clerk be given authority to enter into a contract with Election Systems and Software Inc., being the proponent with the highest evaluated score, for the acquisition of the necessary optical scan vote tabulators and touch screen voting units, including all necessary support and service agreements, at a capital cost not to exceed $13.05 million ($1.0 million in 1999 and $12.05 in 2000), such contract to be in accordance with the Request for Proposal and the Proposal submitted, and on terms and conditions satisfactory to the City Clerk, and in a form satisfactory to the City Solicitor; and
(2) the appropriate City officials be authorized to take the necessary action to give effect thereto; and
(ii) report (June 28, 1999) from the City Clerk responding to a request by the Administration Committee on the possibility of Elections Ontario and Elections Canada cost sharing the purchase of the City of Toronto s vote tabulators and touch screen voting units; advising that at this time there is no interest at either Elections Ontario or Elections Canada to cost share the purchase of vote counting equipment with the City of Toronto; that Federal election legislation does not permit the use of equipment and Ontario's provincial election legislation currently only permits equipment to be used in by-elections; that should either of these jurisdictions choose in the future to use vote counting equipment, the City of Toronto could contract with the jurisdiction to rent the City's equipment; and recommending that this report be received for information.
(iii) communication (July 9, 1999) from Mr. Clinton H. Rickards, Director, Canadian Sales Global Election Systems Inc., expressing disappointment that his request to participate in the presentation of electronic voting machines to the Administration Committee has been refused.
__
______
The City Clerk, and the following officials from the Clerk s Division, gave a presentation to the Administration Committee during the lunch recess respecting the foregoing matter, and filed a copy of their presentation material:
- Mr. John Hollins, Director of Elections;
- Ms. Janet Andrews, Senior Elections Consultant and Co-Chair of the Evaluation Committee;
- Mr. Stephen Miller, Senior Elections Consultant; and
- Mr. Greg Essensa, Senior Elections Consultant.
________
The following persons appeared before the Administration Committee in connection with the foregoing matter:
- Mr. Jamie Aiello, t.e.s.t.;
- Mr. John Meraglia, Co-Chair of the Evaluation Committee;
- Mr. Bob Urosevich and Mr. Clint Rickards, Global Election Systems Inc.;
- Mr. Dan McGinnis, Vice President of Sales, Election Systems and Software;
- Councillor Michael Walker; North Toronto;
- Councillor Mario Silva, Trinity Niagara;
- Councillor Mario Giansante, Kingsway Humber; and
- Councillor Bob Davis, York Eglinton.
A. Councillor Minnan-Wong moved on behalf of Councillor Davis that the Administration Committee refer the foregoing joint report (June 15, 1999) from the Chief Administrative Officer, the Acting Commissioner of Corporate Services, the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer and the City Clerk, to the Chief Administrative Officer for report to the September 7, 1999, meeting of the Administration Committee:
(i) on the various other options, including leasing and rental, in consultation with the proponents who submitted this as part of their proposal, such report to include financial comparisons to the purchasing options; and
(ii) including information on the feasibility of borrowing this equipment from other jurisdictions. (Carried) B. Councillor Moeser moved that the foregoing motion by Councillor Minnan-Wong be amended to provide that the Chief Administrative Officer also report on the ongoing cost of maintenance of the batteries used for these voting units. (Carried)
C. Councillor Bussin moved that:
(1) the City Auditor be requested to:
(i) review the business case and the financial and technical evaluation of the proposals, including a rent-to-buy option, where included as part of the proposals;
(ii) review and evaluate the systems used in Vancouver, Ottawa, Chicago, Cook County, Philadelphia and Seattle,
and submit a report thereon to the aforementioned meeting of the Administration Committee;
(2) the appropriate staff be requested to provide to the Members of the Committee and Councillors, this week on a confidential basis, additional information on the evaluation criteria, weighting and ranking, including copies of the resultant independent testing authority for compliance with the standards of the U.S. and Federal Elections Commission;
and
(3) the City Clerk be requested to:
(i) give consideration to and report on providing orientation sessions for candidates, agents and scrutineers; and
(ii) report to the aforementioned meeting of the Administration Committee on the option of using a non-composite ballot, and on the option of requesting a change in Provincial legislation to allow a ballot design based upon the Provincial ballot. (Carried)
D. Councillor Mahood moved that the report (June 28, 1999) from the City Clerk be received. (Carried)
The decision of the Administration Committee, therefore, is as follows: The Administration Committee:
(1) referred the foregoing joint report (June 15, 1999) from the Chief Administrative Officer, the Acting Commissioner of Corporate Services, the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer and the City Clerk, to the Chief Administrative Officer for report to the September 7, 1999, meeting of the Administration Committee:
(i) on the various other options, including leasing and rental, in consultation with the proponents who submitted this as part of their proposal, such report to include financial comparisons to the purchasing options;
(ii) including information on the feasibility of borrowing this equipment from other jurisdictions; and
(iii) on the ongoing cost of maintenance of the batteries used for these voting units;
(2) requested the City Auditor to:
(i) review the business case and the financial and technical evaluation of the proposals, including a rent-to-buy option, where included as part of the proposals;
(ii) review and evaluate the systems used in Vancouver, Ottawa, Chicago, Cook County, Philadelphia and Seattle,
and submit a report thereon to the aforementioned meeting of the Administration Committee;
(3) requested the appropriate staff to provide to the Members of the Committee and Councillors, this week on a confidential basis, additional information on the evaluation criteria, weighting and ranking, including copies of the resultant independent testing authority for compliance with the standards of the U.S. and Federal Elections Commission;
(4) requested the City Clerk to:
(i) give consideration to and report on providing orientation sessions for candidates, agents and scrutineers; and
(ii) report to the aforementioned meeting of the Administration Committee on the option of using a non-composite ballot, and on the option of requesting a change in Provincial legislation to allow a ballot design based upon the Provincial ballot; and
(5) received the report (June 28, 1999) from the City Clerk.
(Chief Administrative Officer; City Clerk; City Auditor - July 13, 1999) (Clause No. 26(e) - Report No. 2)
the future begins again
Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the paper ballot: An idea whose time has come again.
from Tech Central Station - 11/05/2002 (probably US date notation)
by Glenn Harlan Reynolds
seen on c2.com wiki - Voting Machine Discussion
UK event
[New Media Knowledge]/IPPR are hosting 'E-Voting: Policy and Practice' in London [England] on 4th November.
Canadian locations using e-voting
Feel free to provide any updates/links you may have.
Federal
- there is no e-voting at the Federal level
Provincial
- Ontario will be starting pilot projects
- NB is interested
Municipal
* Ontario
- Markham used the Internet
- Ottawa uses optical mark-sense
- City of Greater Sudbury uses optical mark-sense
- Toronto uses ?optical mark-sense?
Friday, October 01, 2004
proportionally electrocuted
Don't take offense, it's just not my thing. Feel free to pursue it if you want.
HOWEVER, do not try to solve proportional calculation problems by electronic expediency.
In A Made-in-Canada Proportional Representation System, Mohamed Elmasry writes
Electronic counting of votes will make the system easily implementable.
Bad idea.
downside to paper voting
Is someone allowed to eat a ballot?
Short answer: No.
e-global vote
CNet looks at a few different e-voting systems from around the world.
Via j-dom.
greater sudbury arrows point the way
Q. Why has Council authorized the use of Optical Scanning Vote Tabulators?
A. Council directed the City Clerk to review alternative voting methods for the 2003 Municipal Election. The City of Greater Sudbury was perhaps the last city its size in Ontario that had continued the use of a paper ballot. As a result of this review, Council authorized the use of optical scan vote tabulators for the November 10, 2003 municipal elections.
While still allowing the voter to mark their choice of candidate on a paper ballot, automated vote counting equipment offers several benefits to both voters and the municipality, some of which include:
* accuracy of vote tabulation
* consistency in vote tabulation
* rejection of overloaded and/or improperly marked ballots at the time of voting, therefore reducing voter disenfranchisement
* quick tabulation of individual voting place results following the close of the voting (results will be sent by modem from each location).
* the requirement for few voting locations and the need to hire smaller number of election staff.
Q. Are there safeguards in the Vote Tally System to Guard Against Fraud?
A. The procedures put in place by Council require the Returning Officer to conduct computer logic and accuracy tests before, during and after the vote on election night.
Prior to the advance vote, the Returning Officer and the Third Party Auditing Firm hired by the City of Greater Sudbury will attend the acceptance testing of the vote tabulation system, which will include:
* reviewing a sample of pre-audited test ballots prepared by the City of Greater Sudbury's equipment vendor;
* reviewing the reports prepared by the vote tabulation system once the preaudited test ballots have been entered into the system; and,
* comparing the results listed on the reports to the sample of pre-audited ballots and identifying any discrepancies.
On election night the City of Greater Sudbury's Third Party Auditing Firm will select at random seven vote tabulators - one for each of the six Wards plus one machine from the advance vote - to:
* compare the election results as listed on the reports prepared by the selected machines to the election results recorded at the City of Greater Sudbury's central election site and report on any discrepancies; and,
* compare the report produced by the selected machines following a re-entry of the votes cast to the original printout obtained at the time of the closing of the polls and report on any discrepancies.
Other security measures to ensure the integrity of the voting process and the security of the vote tabulation equipment and software have been provided by the Returning Officer and the City of Greater Sudbury's equipment vendor.
elections.city.greatersudbury.on.ca - It's as easy as 1-2-3-Vote
So if I understand this, they compare the results from the machine against... new results from the machine. Or they compare the results from the machine with the results transmitted by the machine. Does anyone compare the machine results against a manual ballot count?
Dutch Internet elections - regional water board
The Netherlands is currently holding the election for the Regional Water Management Boards (my translation of "Waterschappen"). One can vote by mail or by Internet. The latter attracted my curiosity, and I poked around the 'net a bit to see what people thought about the idea.
It appears that a test election was held in order to test the procedure and get some feedback from test voters. An often quoted feedback was that "Only 26% of the test voters expressed concern about the possibility of fraud". ONLY 26%?? This response seems to be interpreted as a vote of confidence for the system.
Another nugget: "The secrecy of the vote is guaranteed. The relationship between the voter identity and his login code is removed from the file before the votes are counted".
The FAQ also has an interesting statement. An independent body (TNO) has investigated the security of the voting method. They concluded that "Voting by Internet is not less safe than voting by mail or phone". This formulation implies that the procedure is actually not very safe, and they know it.
from Risks Digest 23.55, 30 September 2004.
Thursday, September 30, 2004
electronic voting in Brazil
Brazil has recently become the world pioneer in electronic voting and registration. When it held national elections in October 2002, 91 million out of its 115 million registered voters turned out – more than 70 percent of those of voting age, and 3 million more than voted in the US elections that same fall. In terms of global electoral history, the number of votes received by the winner, Luis Ignacio de Silva (“Lula”), was second only to Ronald Reagan’s total in 1980.
To handle this heavy turnout, Brazil relied heavily on electronic voting. The Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) had been experimenting with electronic voting systems since the early 1990s, becoming a real pioneer in the use of “DREs” (“direct recording electronic”) voting machines. Brazil first used DREs on a large scale in its 1996 elections, with 354,000 in place by 2002. For that election, it deployed another 52,000 “Urnas Eletronica 2002,” a state-of-the-art DRE that had been designed by Brazilian technicians with the help of three private companies – Unisys and National Semiconductor, two US companies, and ProComp, a Brazilian assembler that has since been acquired by Diebold Systems, the controversial American leader in electronic voting systems.
Because Brazil has been willing to commit to such a large-scale deployment, each Urna costs just $420, less than 15 percent of the cost of the $3000 touch-screen systems that Diebold features in the US. The Brazilian system lacks a touch screen; voters punch in specific numbers for each candidate, calling up his name and image, and then confirm their selections. The numerical system was intended to overcome the problem of illiteracy, which is still a problem in parts of the country. To handle operations in remote areas like the Amazon, the machine runs on batteries up to 12 hours. Initially there were no printed records, but the Electoral Commission decided to retrofit 3 percent with printers, to provide auditable records.
Like any new technology, Brazil’s approach to electronic voting is by no means perfect. Indeed, significant concerns have been voiced about the system’s verifiability and privacy – especially about the TSE’s recent move to eliminate the printers, supposedly because they slowed voting.
Among the most important proposed improvements are a requirement that all voting machines produce both electronic and paper records, in order to leave an audit trail and increase voter confidence in the system; that system software be based on “open” standards and available for audit; and that the system for identifying eligible voters be separated from voting, to insure privacy.
Submerging Markets - September 29, 2004
Democracy in America and Elsewhere: Part IIIB. Campaigns, Voting, and Representation
Wednesday, September 29, 2004
ACM statement on voting systems
... Ensuring the reliability, security, and verifiability of public elections is fundamental to a stable democracy. Convenience and speed of vote counting are no substitute for accuracy of results and trust in the process by the electorate.
from ACM Press Room ACM Recommends Integrity, Security, Usability in E-Voting: Cites Risks of Computer-based Systems.
Via Slashdot ACM on E-Voting.
Tuesday, September 28, 2004
Miami-Dade Reform Coalition
The Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition (MDERC) is a non-partisan grass-roots organization dedicated to election reform. Our mission is to protect the rights of every eligible voter to cast a ballot and to have that ballot accurately recorded and counted.
They have a Yahoo Group
groups.yahoo.com/group/ReformCoalition/
There's a posting there about the Wexler story (pointed out to me by Brent M.P. Beleskey of voterscoalition.com).
paper trail California... 2006
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger signed legislation Monday that will bar the use of electronic voting machines that don't produce paper trails to verify votes.
The requirement, which takes effect in 2006, is a response to concerns that the machines could be tampered with or produce incorrect results.
Secretary of State Kevin Shelley banned the use of 14,000 electronic voting machines in San Diego, Solano, San Joaquin and Kern counties for the November election because the machines weren't federally approved.
He also laid down conditions for the use of the machines in 11 other counties.
Schwarzenegger also signed a bill that will allow the secretary of state, local election officials or the attorney general to file lawsuits against persons or companies suspected of tampering with voting equipment.
MercuryNews.com - Kansas City Star - Sep. 28, 2004
Schwarzenegger signs bill requiring e-vote paper trail
Florida paper voting
U.S. Rep. Robert Wexler yesterday claimed victory after a federal appeals court revived his lawsuit seeking a paper trail for Florida’s new touch-screen voting machines, but said he does not expect to win the case before the Nov. 2 presidential election.
“It’s a huge victory for people who want a paper trail for their election machines,” Wexler, a Democrat from Boca Raton, told the Boca News yesterday. “It probably won’t happen before Nov. 2, but I’m confident there will be a paper trail in the long run.”
With five weeks left before Florida voters go to the polls, three judges from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta yesterday ruled that a federal judge was wrong to dismiss the case.
“We vacate that decision and remand for a consideration of the merits,” the unsigned ruling reads. A trial date has not yet been set.
Wexler, on a one-man crusade against Florida’s new touch-screen voting machines since the 2000 elections, claims that the machines in 15 of Florida’s 67 counties do not create paper copies. This violates Florida law requiring the option of a manual recount in a close election, his lawsuit argues.
Wexler doesn’t expect paper trail in time for Nov. 2
from the Boca Raton News - September 28, 2004
Monday, September 27, 2004
California e-voting reduced
Counties across California are preparing for another election day, as determined as ever to convert from paper to electronic voting. But because of a series of blunders in the March primary, fewer Californians will cast their ballots on touch-screen voting machines in November.
About 30% of the state's voters — 4.5 million people in 10 counties, including Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino — are expected to use electronic voting machines in November, down from about 40% in the spring.
County election officials say the high-tech machines allow them to collect and count votes more quickly and accurately than older methods by avoiding the shortcomings of paper ballots. But the transition has been rough: In March, the first election in which electronic voting systems were widely used in the state, some voters found touch screens displaying the wrong ballots; others were confronted with malfunctioning machines.
As a result, Secretary of State Kevin Shelley banned the type of machine purchased by four counties, including San Diego — forcing them to return to paper ballots.
Los Angeles Times - September 27, 2004
State's E-Vote Trust Builds Slowly
Swiss national e-voting
Slashdot - September 27, 2004
Swiss e-vote gets thumbs up
SWITZERLAND HAS managed to stage what it thinks is the first legally binding internet vote in a national referendum.
More than 2720 people in four Geneva suburbs, about one in five voters in the region who took part, voted online on questions including naturalisation laws, maternity leave and postal reform.
The vote followed a number of successful online local council elections, and although 90 per cent of voters still used the traditional method of papers and booths the poll is being hailed as a step toward virtual democracy.
Personally I prefer, you know, REAL democracy.
Saturday, September 25, 2004
category error
Our technocratic masters take the idea of e-Government, a lot of which makes great sense, and then add in voting as one of the "services" provided by government.
Voting is not a government service. Voting is the creation of the government by the citizens. It is fundamentally different from the other kinds of services that government provides.
The problem is, when e-voting is merged into e-everything e-else, that you then start applying the same thinking, pilot projects, client satisfaction, etc.
This simply does not make any sense. If I launch a pilot project for citizens to pay their property tax through my municipal e-portal, and it doesn't work the first day, I relaunch it a day or a week later. If it overcharges some people by 10x and undercharges others by 100x, I catch it in my auditing. I electronically shuffle money around.
You cannot have a voting system that doesn't work on the one day it is used.
You cannot have a voting system that dramatically miscounts votes.
You cannot shuffle votes around electronically. Err, well you must not shuffle votes around electronically, anyway.
Voting is in a fundamentally different category from financial services, or any other kind of service that the government provides. It is a different sort of thing. Completely different rules apply. Mashing it in with e-government makes no sense.
Lots of e-government stuff makes sense. Why do I have to fill in bloody paper forms for things? To do my annual charity payroll deduction, I have to, by hand, fill in a form with information that my employer already knows, followed by manually looking up on the web the 14 digit number of the charity I want to support, followed by writing it in and hoping I haven't transposed any digits, and that no errors will be made in the manual transcription process into the payroll system. For all I know, I will end up giving money to the Knights of Satan or something. It's ridiculous.
Making things like that all-electronic makes perfect sense.
Making voting electronic makes absolutely no sense.
CACM: The problems and potentials of voting systems
Unfortunately absolutely none of the content appears to be available free online, you will need to purchase it (or access through university library etc.)
Also see IEEE Security and Privacy Jan/Feb 2004 Special issue on E-voting Security.
standards
(Side note: US standards efforts include ACM Policy Brief and IEEE P1583.)
Anyway, I'm trying to find some sites that might have starting points. There are some links suggested by the document in the previous posting.
Government of Ontario: Information and Technology Standards
Ontario Office of the Corporate Chief Information Officer
So far I have yet to see any standards that apply to e-voting.
On the CIO site I did find more vague language though, that's always good.
In Citizen Engagement
What might this mean?
Electronic citizen engagement may take many forms. ...
* online remote voting for elected officials
* digital voting
I don't even know what they mean by digital voting. Do they mean electronic voting machines?
Friday, September 24, 2004
technophilic municipalities
There's something called MISA, the Municipal Information Systems Association of Ontario.
They published a report in 2002, Progress Report on e-Government Among Ontario Municipalities (PDF)
In Chapter 2: Municipal Progress In e-Government they describe a future that obviously sounds wonderful to them
What will municipalities be like in Ontario within the next decade?
...
Municipalities will be more responsive to citizens.
...
Voting in elections or other special occasions will consist of quick, effortless clicks on computer screens. Voter turnout will no longer plummet when it rains or snows.
Voting is a civic duty. You want to make voting no different than clicking in some online poll? One minute I'm buying a book on Amazon, next I'm answering a Globe poll Does shopping on-line still make you nervous? and with the next click I'm electing the leaders of my country? You really don't think there should be any distinction between those activities?
The new Municipal Elections Act, 1996 opened the door to the use of new technology in the municipal election process. For the first time, Ontario municipalities could explore new voting technologies, including voting by telephone, touch screen voting and the use of optical scanners to speed the counting process.
Ok well at least I know where this foolishness started. Now to see about closing that door.
I don't get this obsession with the speed of the counting. We can't wait a day or two for the results to be counted? Ontario will spiral into chaos if we don't get the election decision seconds after the polls close? Wouldn't you rather have a cheap, accurate and relatively quick system rather than an instantaneous incorrect one?
(Progress report link found in Municipalities move to second-gen portals to provide citizen e-services, Technology in Government, May/June 2004.)
Thursday, September 23, 2004
getting into the swing of e-voting
Wired News - September 23, 2004
Roughly a third of the votes cast in the November presidential election will be made on controversial paperless electronic voting machines, but as any political analyst can tell you, the only votes that will matter a great deal will be cast in a handful of swing states.
Wednesday, September 22, 2004
diebold and de broken
Sunday, September 19, 2004
LawMeme - This Week in [US] E-Voting
uk e-voting
j-dom.org - September 17, 2004
He has a very nicely organized site, tons of e-voting blog entries, articles etc. linked from the bottom of the above posting.
Saturday, September 18, 2004
missing atomz
Representation and Electoral Systems
Canadian e-democracy
Meanwhile, at the federal level, Members of Parliament have yet to decide on electronic voting.
One of them, Reg Alcock, believes certain criteria will have to be met before MPs can accept the introduction of electronic voting at the federal level. In an editorial published earlier this year, Mr. Alcock stated:
There must be a means of authenticating identity and there must be a secure channel for the transmission of the information. Once these conditions are met two important trends are enabled. First the ability to vote online will dramatically reduce the cost of voting. This in turn will allow more frequent use of referenda and will shift the balance of control from Parliament to citizens. Rather than voting once every four years, citizens will be able to express opinions more frequently. The impact will be greater accountability. Second…MPs will no longer have to be present to vote. This in turn will enhance the importance of their individual vote while reducing the importance of the place. The impact will be greater participation. (Canadian Parliamentary Review, Spring 2002, p. 2)
Following the most recent election, Reg Alcock maintains his position as President of the Treasury Board.
The guest editorial cited above was Parliament and Democracy in the 21st Century: The Impact of Information and Communication Technologies from Volume 25 no. 1, 2002.
Mr. Alcock is a big fan of technology. Here he is in the Canadian Parliamentary Review in 1994:
At the federal level one a number of projects and studies are underway but as one MP, Reg Alcock, stated, "At the present time, the "hill" does not have a node [on the Internet]. There is a proposal to establish one and I expect that we will be hooked up soon. I don't think it will change much in the near future. At the present time, as far as I can discern, I am the only member who makes use of the Internet; I have a lot of constituents on the Internet as I represent a university in my riding."
(Volume 17, No. 3 Autumn 1994, "E-Mail and Two Way Communication")
Friday, September 17, 2004
electronic voting in the UK - technical report
A Comparison with Other Secure Transactions
It is useful to compare voting with other online transactions for which security is needed.
The most obvious comparison is with banking. Attacking an electronic voting system is unlikely to bring the immediate financial rewards that a successful attack on the banking system would, and thus some types of well-resourced attack are less likely. However, the likelihood of well-resourced attacks is still sufficiently high to be problematic.
The consequences of a successful attack are very different with electronic voting, than with banking, though. Banks can, and do, take a financial analysis of how much loss they can stand and insure against such losses. It may be that a political decision could be taken that the loss of a certain percentage of votes is acceptable, but in the absence of such a decision, security appropriate for banking cannot be considered sufficient for electronic voting. Banks have also maintained confidence in the face of repeated losses through computer crime by covering up the cause of those losses. It is inconceivable that, in the event of a successful attack on electronic voting, such a cover-up would be acceptable to the electorate if subsequently disclosed. In a similar vein, individuals can be, and are, compensated for financial losses due to disruption/failures/hacking of online banking. It is not easy to see how there could be equivalent compensation for disruption/failures/hacking of an individuals vote, even if somehow it was discovered which individuals were affected (which might not be possible with some sorts of disruption).
Another issue is anonymity: electronic voting differs from the aforementioned applications due to the fact that, in addition to the requirements for accuracy and privacy, there is the mandated necessity to provide ... anonymity. In other words, banking applications can (in fact must) allow tracking back to the user of the system, but the [electronic voting system] must ensure that such tracking is impossible. (Mercuri, 2001, pp8-9).
Electronic voting also differs from financial transactions in that the risk that an election delayed by a few days will have a different result is unacceptably high. By contrast substantial financial transactions between two willing partners usually can be conducted a few days later if there are problems with ecommerce applications, since such transactions are rarely conducted on a whim.
CCSR: Electronic Voting
e-voting fiction
Now personally, I am inclined to avoid conspiracy theories.
I think there are some fundamental problems with e-voting that simply can't be fixed no matter how good the technology is,
plus which, the actual implementations of the existing technology are farcically bad, showing a complete lack of interest or complete incompetence when it comes to security, testing, design and so forth.
O'Reilly has an article Behind the Scenes at The Mezonic Agenda: An Electronic Voting Primer
and the book website is
mezonicagenda.com
I just want to let people know, I am inviting collaboration both for this blog and for organizing Canadians to oppose electronic and Internet voting.
If you're interested in either or both of these possibilities, please send me an email.
For the blog, it's mainly locating and posting stories about e-voting issues, particularly any that have a Canadian element.
For organizing, it's basically getting a anti-evote group together that can present compelling arguments drawing both on common sense, technical expertise, and examples of problems encountered with systems in Canada and worldwide. We need to target all levels of Canadian government and make sure that our representatives are aware of the problems with these systems, as well as making the Canadian public aware of what is going on.
We also need to forge alliances with Canadian groups that might be concerned about this area, e.g. Electronic Frontier Canada and IEEE Canada, as well as with the current well-organized US groups that are fighting e-voting there. There is also the possibility of working with groups that have similar, although not completely aligned interests. For example, there is a thing called FairVote Canada which is about proportional representation. I presonally don't think proportional representation is a good idea, but some of their members may also be concerned about e-voting. As well, the independent or alternative media and organizations may be interested in this issue, e.g. ontario.indymedia.org
Now if someone knows of an organization in Canada that is ALREADY working on the e-vote issue, I would be more than happy to join up with them.
I am planning on publishing a story to indymedia today, unless someone else wants to do it first.
UPDATE: I posted the story electronic voting in Ontario Sept-2004 to ontario.indymedia.ca
UPDATE 2016-09-05: As of September 2016 the current most active issues related to online voting in Canada are
- A Parliamentary & Ministerial consultation about having national online voting - See Get informed about online voting
- A consultation in New Brunswick about having provincial online voting
You can read comp.risks in various ways
Google Groups
directly in your USENET newsreader
on the risks.org website (which includes an RSS feed and an AvantGo channel)
One story that caught my eye was
SiliconValley.com - MercuryNews.com - Sep. 14, 2004
Maryland court rejects e-voting safeguards
Maryland's highest court Tuesday rejected demands for additional safeguards for touchscreen voting machines, saying elections officials have done everything necessary to ensure the paperless devices are accurate and secure.
The Court of Appeals also rejected a call to allow citizens who do not trust touchscreen voting to use paper ballots in the Nov. 2 general election.
Incidentally, for better RSS feed usability, I am changing my posting format.
It will now be
headline
source - date
content
Wednesday, September 15, 2004
Voting time warp
ONTARIO'S Election Act is stuck in an era of typewriters and stenographers when it should be open to new ideas such as Web and telephone voting, Ontario's chief election officer says. In a written review of last October's general election, John Hollins said Ontario's legislation hasn't been overhauled since 1969 and is a long way from addressing 21st-century society.
"The Election Act reflects a view of Ontario and its electorate that is locked in time, representing the world of the late 1960s, when the legislation was last overhauled," the report states.
He's recommending that the province examine a variety of initiatives taking place globally, including voting through a cable box.
Election Officer Calls for Ontario to Explore Web Voting
Ontario's chief election officer says the province should be open to new ideas such as web and telephone voting.
In a written review of last October's election John Hollins says the Ontario Election Act is stuck in an era of typewriters and stenographers and is a long way from addressing 21st-century society.
Hollins recommended that the province examine a variety of initiatives taking place globally, including voting through a cable box.
Tuesday, September 14, 2004
Electronic ballots fail to gain vote of confidence
In Nye County, Nev., last week, one of the new, highly touted electronic-voting devices bought to replace discredited old-technology machines malfunctioned. When the polls closed in the state primary election, it refused to display the results, threatening to disenfranchise everyone who'd used it.
Sunday, September 12, 2004
Alternative Voting Methods - Pilot Application
I am quoting the entire thing here since it will probably expire off of MERX soon.
Reference Number 103027
Source ID PV.MN.ON.427751.C55080
Solicitation Number EO-040823-1
Published 24/08/2004
Revised
Closing 10/09/2004 04:00 PM Eastern Daylight Saving Time EDT
Associated Components Yes
Category EDP Hardware and Software
Tender Type Request for Qualification
Region of Delivery WORLD
Region of Opportunity WORLD
Agreement Type
Solicitation Method
Estimated Value
Organization Name Elections Ontario
GSINS N7010 AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
The purpose of this project is for Elections Ontario to identify proponents who have the expertise, resources and appropriate technology to provide alternative voting systems that could be tested in by-elections over the next three years, or that could be tested in other environments that would offer clear measurement of the value, effectiveness and integrity of the alternative approaches.
At present, voters must attend in person at a polling place on election day or on one of the six specific days when advance polls are being held in the Returning Office or at an area location. The only alternative to voting at a polling location under the current legislation is for an elector to designate a proxy to vote on his or her behalf at a polling place. Electors with disabilities, language issues or who are absent during the voting period could benefit from and utilize alternative voting methods when voting.
Conceptually, alternative voting systems could be used to supplement the existing process or could provide a substitute for it, provided that elector access is not in any way limited.
The system(s) proposed will supplement an optical scan vote tabulator system being tested for use on Election Day and advance voting. The system(s) we are requesting information on will be used to offer an opportunity to electors to vote between Nomination Day and Election Day. We want to make the voting process as convenient, accessible and easy for voters to exercise their franchise while maintaining the integrity of the election process. The system(s) would be administered anywhere in the province of Ontario where a by-election is called. Currently the province is divided into 103 electoral districts. In each electoral district there are approximately 80,000 electors serviced at approximately 90 voting locations on Election Day.
The other one is Automated Voter Recording System
This project will deliver a method(s) or system(s) to strike off voters (simultaneously) from all electronic Advance Poll Lists of Electors and electronic Election Day List of Electors to reduce the possibility of voter fraud through electors voting more than once during the voting period. The method will utilize bar codes on all NRCs, registration forms and paper versions of the List of Electors.
Dave Barry cracks wise again about electronic voting
The truth is, you don't know WHAT will happen to your ballot, because you might be using one of the new electronic voting machines. ...
So this year many states are switching to electronic voting machines, which use computer technology -- the same reliable, foolproof technology we use in the newspaper industry to wwr _)(%$@!@hkjhou((*7**%$ ERROR ERROR DELETING EVERYTHING FROM DAWN OF TIME
Whoops! It turns out that things CAN go wrong with computer technology. One big concern is that electronic voting machines could be tampered with by ''hackers,'' ...
But aside from that, electronic voting machines are a great idea, according to people who make millions of dollars selling them.
Story spotted on Slashdot /.
March 2003 Electronic Voting Methods: Experiments and Lessons
June 2000 The Feasibility of Electronic Voting in Canada
"a summary of a 1998 KPMG/Sussex Circle report"
The full report from 1998 is called Technology and the Voting Process (PDF).
Or in Français: La technologie et le processus de vote (PDF).
A detailed answer from the CBC to the question
I have been reading about the problems that some areas in the U.S. are having with electronic voting machines. Does anyplace in Canada use these new machines, or are there any plans to do so?