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Sunday, November 27, 2005

Montreal's electronic vote: what went wrong


Delays, equipment breakdowns and erroneous results marred the IT systems used to handle the recent municipal election of Montreal and several cities in Quebec.

The voting box IT infrastructure was supplied by PG Elections, an affiliate of PG Mensys, which has helped to run several elections since 1999. PG Elections deployed some 1,400 electronic ballot boxes and voting terminals in 604 sites, providing an electronic voting system in a majority of municipalities in the province of Québec (a number of others cities also voted electronically using systems deployed by another service provider). Some of the machines failed to count properly and a mayoral contender in Montréal called for a legal recount in several districts after noting a number of problems in the voting process.

A voting terminal is a completely electronic device that registers votes using a touchscreen display, but the systems that failed during these municipal elections across the province were electronic ballot boxes used to scan paper ballots, which are then digitized and compiled. Some 900 of those voting terminals were deployed, of which 450 were rented from an American supplier. Thomas Gagnon, president of PG Elections, refused to name the partner who supplied the electronic voting systems.

“Everything worked well in the testing, but when we deployed them in the field, there were a series of important problems: if someone voted too quickly, they broke down, but if you voted slowly enough they worked well,” said. “We had what you could call lemons.”

Poor Internet connections also induced delays in the transmission of the electoral results to the political parties and to the media, who had to resort to more manual methods by telephones. “That was a major irritant,” Gagnon admitted.

Gagnon said about 45,000 ballots were counted twice, but that they were corrected before the end results were announced.

PG Elections attributed the catastrophe to an excess of optimism and for providing a team of only 300 technicians to handle all of Quebec.

Emphasis mine. "An excess of optimism"? How about a shortage of caution.
from IT Business / Computing Canada - Montreal's electronic voting debacle: What went wrong - November 22, 2005

Translated (by IT Business) from the original French on their sister site
Direction Informatique - Histoire d'une catastrophe informatique - November 11, 2005

11/11/2005 - Au-delà de la compétence de la firme impliquée, PG Elections, les ratés informatiques des dernières élections municipales au Québec ont fourni la preuve que la loi de Murphy existe

Il y a peu de chances que Thomas Gagnon, président et chef de la direction de PG Mensys Systèmes d’Information, garde un bon souvenir du 6 novembre 2005, journée d’élections municipales généralisée pour la première fois à l’ensemble des villes du Québec, ou presque. Une journée qui devait selon toute probabilité se dérouler sans accrocs, du moins d’un point de vue informatique, l’infrastructure de vote électronique fournie par PG Elections, une filiale de PG Mensys, ayant été testée et utilisée à plusieurs reprises depuis 1999.

Oh baloney. Murphy's Law? "selon toute probabilité se dérouler sans accrocs"?

You know how you succeed with stuff? You PLAN. You MANAGE THE RISKS.

Or, apparently if you're PG Elections, you think "Hey, what could possibly go wrong? To the Vote Machine!"

And then you say "sorry we screwed up your elections, hey, guess what, turns out we didn't know what we were doing, we were optimistic without reason!"

You know what machines do?
They break.
They fail.
They malfunction.
They're misprogrammed.
The network goes down.
They overheat.
etc. etc. etc.

You know what a paper ballot does?
Err, it just sits there, working fine.
Other than setting it on fire, it's pretty hard for a paper ballot to malfunction.

Which one is better suited to a task that must work perfectly in a single, specific day?

And I don't want to rag on PG specifically.
Voting using machines is very hard to do well, even if you're not "optimistic".
It's a fundamentally flawed concept.

Voting happens rarely, the entire complex system has to work perfectly for millions of people in numerous locations... this is not a set of requirements that computer technology and business planning processes are well-suited to solve.

Businesses are suited to making lots of money by doing frequently repeatable transactional things as "efficiently" (e.g. as cheaply and poorly as they can get away with). That is not a great model to apply to elections.

And even if you had teams of computer scientists working very hard, it wouldn't work well.

The fact that the actual voting machines, systems and processes are generally hacked together with the minimal possible investment of time, thought, risk assessment and computer security expertise just makes things all the worse.

Saturday, November 26, 2005

PG Elections - who are these people?

Paper is simple.
Electronic voting systems are complex.
This complexity leads to the idea: let's outsource all this complexity to a private company.

In the Quebec municipal elections, this was apparently PG Elections and a few other players. Did any of them actually MAKE any machines? I suspect not. I suspect all the machines are from our friends in the US, where the elections work so well.
(You can judge the listed PG Elections technology solutions for yourself.)

So... err... who the heck is PG Elections? It's a "division" of PGMensys.
"PG Systèmes d'Information inc. lance une nouvelle filiale, PG Elections inc. " (19 avril 2001)


Quebec city, February 23, 2005 - For twenty-five years, PG Mensys Information Systems has been developing innovative management systems aiming to serve municipalities all over Quebec. Constantly growing, PG Mensys Information Systems always goes forward, and still, remains close to its clients and in tune with their needs.

Mr. Thomas Gagnon, the President and CEO of PG Mensys Information Systems has just been honoured with the Microsoft Gold Certified Partner certification.

...

The PG Mensys Information Systems sales have reached $13 M in 2004, a 37% rise copared to 2003. The sales turnover, for the current year, was anticipated at $18 M, and that is a 39% rise compared to 2004 and almost 100% rise compared to 2003.

Let us recall that the year 2004 began with PG Information Systems acquiring Mensys, and therefore giving more competitiveness to PG Mensys Information Systems, for the medium and large city markets.

...

Elections

Another division of PG Mensys Information Systems, PG Elections, has been chosen by the Montreal and Longueuil transition committees to establish an electronic voting mechanism device for the upcoming 2005 general elections, for the nineteen municipalities being reconstituted. The mandate includes the preparation of electoral lists, computerized management of votes and electronic compilation of results. Let us recall that PG Elections detained more than 80% of the market share in 2004.

Oh good, it appears to be some tiny (relatively speaking) technology consulting company. That's where you want to go when every vote counts.

Here's what's in Archive.org
http://web.archive.org/web/20040924110036/http://pgmensys.com/

Apparently they have forgotten to put anything at the root of their server.
You have to do e.g.
http://www.pgmensys.com/pages/PgMensys/Entreprise/Engagement.aspx?Lang=EN-CA
http://www.pgsystem.com/pages/PgMensys/Entreprise/Engagement.aspx?Lang=EN-CA

There is also a site
http://www.pgelections.com/
which is also
http://www.quattra.qc.ca/
I found a blog which says Quattra Design Inc. Quattra Design est le propriétaire du site web de PG Elections.

This blog, Hors des lieux communs has been doing some good work digging into who the heck these people are, check the info in the Démocratie category.
Let's look into Qui sont les actionnaires de PG Elections ?

PG Elections

PG Elections est la compagnie qui a fournie l'urne électronique ainsi que les listes électorales.

PG Elections appartient à PG MENSYS SYSTÈMES D'INFORMATION INC. qui appartient à Thomas gagnon (actionnaire majoritaire), Fonds d'investissement Desjardins du Bas-St-Laurent (deuxième actionnaire) et Mario Brisson (troisième actionnaire). Thomas Gagnon est administrateur-président-secrétaire.

On apprend également que PG Election a déjà porté 3 autres noms:
1-Programmation Gagnon inc. (1985-2000)
2-PG systèmes d'information inc. (2000-2004)
3-PG MENSYS SYSTÈMES D'INFORMATION INC. (en vigueur)

Un scoop : Le PG de PG Elections voudrait donc dire Programmation Gagnon!

Quattra Design Inc.

Quattra Design est le propriétaire du site web de PG Elections, site web sur lequel les hyperliens internes menaient parfois (voir le premier billet de cette série).

Quatra Design Inc. appartient à PG Elections et Thomas Gagnon est administrateur-président-secrétaire.

PQM Inc.

PQM inc. est la compagnie qui détient le site web sur lequel les résultats du vote était présenté: http://www.resultatduvote.qc.ca/

PQM veut dire Production Québec Multimédia et est la propriété de Jacques Landry, mais est à la même adresse que les 3 autres compagnies, c'est-à-dire au 217, LÉONIDAS à Rimouski.

Thomas Gagnon

J'en conclue que toutes les compagnies que j'ai identifiées jusqu'à présent comme acteurs, sauf probablement PQM, appartiennent en majorité à 1 seul homme: Thomas Gagnon.

That's right. Thomas Gagnon all the way through.

Let's see, make a bunch of websites and companies, and on the web, a small enterprise can seem big...

Après avoir débuté sa carrière en 1973 comme programmeur chez STS à Montréal, M. Gagnon a fondé en 1980 Programmation Gagnon, devenue aujourd'hui PG Mensys Systèmes d'Information. Cette entreprise se consacre à la conception et à l'intégration de solutions de gestion pour les secteurs municipal et forestier. Il en est aujourd'hui le président et le responsable du développement des affaires.

M. Gagnon dirige les activités reliées au développement des affaires et à l'expansion de l'entreprise : établissement d'alliances stratégiques, acquisitions et développement des marchés nationaux et internationaux.

M. Gagnon s'est vu nommer « Personnalité du mois d'août 2004 en TI au Québec » par la FIQ.

En plus d'avoir obtenu plusieurs prix dans le Bas-St-Laurent, dont le titre d'entreprise de l'année en 1991 et en 2000, PG Mensys s'est également illustrée sur la scène provinciale en étant lauréate d'un OCTAS en 2002 (affaires électroniques - intranets d'entreprises). Sur la scène canadienne, il s'est mérité la même année un prix CIPA (Canadian Information Productivity Awards) dans la catégorie «Petite entreprise».

Thomas Gagnon : nouveau membre du CRIM

Here's some good info with a great quote, English translation by me, if you don't like mixed English and French, get over it

Not less than 4 of 5 million Quebeckers called to vote in the November 6 [2005] municipal elections will be able to make their selection using an electronic method / technology, une technologie principalement dévelopée ... par la division PG Élections.

If they actually developed anything themselves rather than just repackaging stuff from the States, I will be very surprised.

PG Elections dominates this market with nearly two thirds of the 179 municipalities using electronic voting, the biggest being Montreal and Quebec City. Two other firms, Bell Business Solutions and TM Technologies also have some clients.

...

« Je crois que Québec [City] sera la première grande ville en Amérique du Nord à procéder par un vote électronique, sans utilisation de papier » affirme Thomas Gagnon

from L'interface technologique du vote démocratique au Québec

Yes, you read that right, he's was PROUD that Quebec City would be using electronic voting machines with no paper records.

The article also says that PG Mensys has 140 employees.

Anyway, I don't have time to track down all the details, I'm no investigative reporter.

Here's a last tidbit to ponder.

We are pleased to announce the creation of PG Elections North America, a subsidiary of PG Mensys Information Systems.
PG Elections NA is entirely dedicated to outsourcing election services throughout North America, and is represented by Mr. Jonathon Hollins, Vice President, International Elections Services.

PG Elections North America, a subsidiary of PG Mensys Information Systems (same news as New subsidiary: PG Elections North America 2005-07-28)

Jonathon Hollins... the former head of the Canadian branch of US elections giant ES&S.

Any relation to John Hollins, the Chief Election Officer of Ontario (Elections Ontario), one may legitimately wonder.

Here's some of what it says on BBV for PG Elections NA

Here is a poorly translated list of key contacts at the parent company PGMensys:
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL: Thomas Gagnon
HEAD OF THE DIRECTION: Thomas Gagnon
GENERAL President-director: Thomas Gagnon
FINANCES: Daniel Desaulniers
MARKETING: Sylvain Gauthier
SALES: Sylvain Gauthier
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESSES: Thomas Gagnon
PUBLIC RELATIONS: Thomas Gagnon
DATA PROCESSING DEPARTMENT: Jean-Guy Renaud
HUMAN RESOURCES: Mario Brisson
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: Jean-Guy Renaud

One also wonders what is happening with the Ontario pilot application plan for "alternative voting technologies" (i.e. electronic voting).

And on a final note it seems appropriate to close with
VOTATION ÉLECTRONIQUE: PG ELECTIONS FAIT LE BILAN

Québec, le 7 novembre 2005 - À la suite de la votation électronique qui a eu lieu hier dans plusieurs municipalités du Québec, dont Québec et Montréal, et bien que l'ensemble du système soit présentement sous analyse, PG Elections tient à apporter les précisions suivantes sur ce qui sest passé.

* Quelque cinq réseaux informatiques ont cessé de fonctionner mais ont été rétablis dans de courts délais;
* Tous les votes ont été reçus et compilés même si des terminaux de votation ont cessé de fonctionner à Québec;
* Certaines urnes électroniques se sont avérées défectueuses;
* Les problèmes informatiques ont causé des retards dans la transmission des résultats électoraux aux partis politiques et aux médias;
* Le personnel des élections étant temporaire et moins habitué il semble y avoir eu certains problèmes au niveau du soutien technique et dans l'utilisation des terminaux dans les bureaux de vote.

more on call for new Montreal election


Pierre Bourque, who was defeated in his bid to become mayor of Montreal again, wants a judge to cancel last Sunday's municipal vote and order a new election.

Bourque had initially called for a complete recount of the election won by incumbent Mayor Gérald Tremblay. But he now says there were too many problems with the voting process.

CBC - Bourque wants new Montreal civic election - November 11, 2005

See my posting of a Montreal Gazette article for more recent info.

PG Elections in Quebec: "sorry"


La firme PG Élections était responsable des systèmes électroniques de votation de 83 municipalités québécoises, dont Montréal et Québec, dimanche dernier. Toutefois, la gestion du vote a tourné au fiasco: serveurs surchargés, résultats instables, retards dans le processus.

Mercredi, la firme est sortie de son mutisme et a avoué qu'elle avait sous-estimé l'ampleur de la tâche. Le PDG Thomas Gagnon a précisé que sa compagnie était mal préparée et qu'aucun « scénario catastrophe » n'avait été mis sur pied.

Radio Canada - PG Élections fait son mea culpa - 9 novembre 2005

Emphasis in above quote mine.

The thing with an election is you don't get to do a trial run. Everything must work perfectly, under full load, on the day of the election.

e-voting in Quebec: we are jammin'


Electronic voting machines that jammed in several municipal elections in the province last week and spewed out contradictory results have robbed Quebecers of their confidence in the voting system, former mayoral candidate Pierre Bourque says.

That's why he's banding together with other failed candidates from Quebec City and Trois Rivieres to mount a constitutional challenge against electronic voting in the hopes of having new elections ordered in the three cities, Bourque said at a press conference at his Vision Montreal party headquarters.

"Anyone has the right to have a vote," Bourque said, joined by candidates from the other cities. "And this was not the case."

The candidates will also write to Quebec's chief electoral officer to demand an investigation.

This week, a judge ordered a manual recount for 15 of Montreal's 105 council positions. The recounts are to begin Tuesday.

Hugo Lepine, who lost a bid for a council seat in Quebec City, said candidates in his municipality who want recounts are stymied because the city used an entirely electronic voting system. There are no paper ballots to recount, Lepine said. (Montreal had paper ballots fed into a vote-counting machine.)

Bourque and his Quebec City and Trois Rivieres counterparts say their constitutional challenge would be based on the principle that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Quebec's charter of rights provide every citizen a vote. That right is eroded when election results are riddled with errors because of failed equipment, Bourque said.

from Montreal Gazette - Machines let us down - November 17, 2005

An entirely predictable fiasco. The machines didn't let us down, they behaved as expected. Emphasis in above quoted text is mine.
Remember as I have said before: elections are not about counting votes efficiently, they are about building consensus that the will of the voters was fairly represented. When you have many people (thousands, millions) who willingly consent to be governed by a tiny number of people (a few hundred) then they must have confidence in the system that selects those who will govern.

Nigerian e-voting


Many have been criticising Nigeria as a funny nations where policies are adopted without the knowledge of the populace; Many alarming questions have been raised on why Electronic voting, popularly known as E-voting should really be adopted in the 2007 elections in a country where almost 60% of the population are illiterate.

Personally, the introduction of E-voting system in the country will amount to introduction of unacceptable risk of error and manipulation. Electronic voting entails several means of determining people's collective intent electronically, but in the dearth. Nigeria's electoral body which wants to embark on electronic voting should sit back and recall the fact that Nigeria's major problem lies mostly in unstable electricity supply which is a sinqua non for e-voting. We cannot dream of climbing higher by remaining where and what we are in Nigeria.

from AllAfrica.com - E-Voting: a Risk for 2007 Election November 21, 2005

INDEPENDENT National Electoral Commission (INEC) said yesterday that it would test run the controversial Electronic Voting System (EVS) in the planned revalidation of voters register next January.

Chairman of the commission Prof. Maurice Iwu, announced the new date for the revalidation of voters registrar at meeting with the Resident Electoral Commissioners (REC).

The INEC chairman who slammed critics of the EVS, however denied importation of "any specific equipment for any of the components of EVs for the 2007 general election.

Although he admitted that the commission "had studied many types of instrument for each aspect of the EVs, the chairman insisted that the Commission was yet to select any of the components.

from AllAfrica.com - INEC to Test Run E-Voting Jan - November 23, 2005

Sunday, November 13, 2005

articles about the Quebec election / articles concernant l'élection au Québec

All three articles are by Claude Côté.

Le Soleil 31 octobre 2005 Les élections municipales du 6 novembre (1)

Le 6 novembre prochain, plusieurs centaines de milliers d'électeurs de Québec et de plusieurs dizaines de municipalités québécoises expérimenteront, la plupart pour la première fois, des machines à voter électroniques. Nul doute que plusieurs électeurs se réjouiront que leur système de votation fasse un saut dans l'ère moderne. Mais s'ils pensent que ces machines sont aussi sûres et fiables qu'on veut bien leur laisser croire, ils auront de mauvaises surprises.

Il ne faut pas confondre les machines à voter électroniques à boutons-poussoirs ou à écran tactile avec les machines à lecteur optique qui seront utilisées à Montréal, comme elles le furent d'ailleurs en 2001. Les Montréalais marqueront alors leur choix avec un crayon feutre sur une feuille de papier qu'ils introduiront dans une machine et qui sera ensuite lue par le lecteur optique de celle-ci.

En cas de recomptage, les bulletins en papier pourront être comptés pour vérifier si les machines n'ont pas fait d'erreurs et pour examiner les véritables intentions des électeurs.

Le Soleil 1 novembre 2005 LES ÉLECTIONS MUNICIPALES DU 6 NOVEMBRE (2)

La Loi sur les référendums et les élections dans les municipalités du Québec prévoit que, conformément à une entente entre la ministre des Affaires municipales et le Directeur général des élections du Québec, une municipalité peut faire l'essai, lors d'un scrutin, de nouveaux mécanismes de votation. Les municipalités qui utiliseront des machines à voter électroniques le 6 novembre prochain, dont la Ville de Québec, ont toutes conclu une telle entente qui a pour effet de remplacer plusieurs articles de la loi.

D'entrée de jeu, notons que peu de mécanismes de sécurité ont été mis en place pour répondre aux préoccupations soulevées hier. Les paragraphes 173,1 à 173,3 ordonnent au président d'élection d'effectuer des tests sur les machines en présence des candidats ou de leurs représentants au plus tard le cinquième jour précédant le vote, de prendre des mesures de sécurité adéquates et de s'assurer qu'aucune communication électronique ne puisse être établie pour perturber l'intégrité du système.

Ces dispositions ne vont pas assez loin et ne sont pas assez précises. D'une part, le président d'élection, à moins d'être informaticien, n'aura pas les compétences nécessaires pour vérifier si le système a été altéré d'une façon ou d'une autre. D'autre part, l'entente ne fait aucune mention du type de scellé qui sera apposé sur les machines une fois qu'elles auront été testées et ne prévoit pas de mesures de sécurité pour les protéger dans l'endroit où on les entreposera jusqu'au jour du scrutin (soit pour une période minimale de cinq jours). Il n'est pas impossible d'imaginer qu'une personne, un employé de l'édifice par exemple, pourrait s'y introduire, modifier le logiciel des machines (pour qu'un vote pour le candidat X se transforme en un vote pour le candidat Y, par exemple) et remettre de nouveaux scellés sans que personne ne s'en rende compte.

L'article 223 de l'entente est également problématique. Il mentionne que, lorsque l'électeur quitte la salle de votation avant d'avoir terminé de voter, le scrutateur en chef ou son adjoint doit peser sur le bouton "Je ne veux pas voter pour..." avant de désactiver sa carte. Or, ni l'un ni l'autre ne peut être considéré comme impartial puisque plusieurs d'entre eux sont recommandés par les partis politiques au président des élections. Et pourtant, dans ce cas-ci, l'un ou l'autre aura le loisir de voter à l'insu de tous.

Le Soleil 10 novembre 2005 Des élections... "made in USA"

Nous venons d'apprendre que la firme à qui l'on a confié le déroulement du vote électronique du 6 novembre a loué ses terminaux à écran tactile d'une firme américaine, MicroVote, de l'Indiana. Nous avons donc confié nos élections municipales aux Américains !

Les responsables des élections étaient-ils au courant de cela et ont-ils approuvé cette sous-traitance ? Savaient-ils que le sous-traitant faisait lui-même de la sous-traitance ? Que les réponses à ces questions soient négatives ou positives, ils ont, semble-t-il, failli à leur devoir. En effet, une simple recherche dans Internet leur aurait appris, entre autres, que son président, James M. Ries Jr, a fait la déclaration suivante à propos des machines de sa compagnie : "Il n'y a vraiment aucune façon de prouver à un électeur que son vote a été enregistré exactement comme il l'entendait. Il doit avoir une foi aveugle dans l'intégrité des responsables locaux de l'élection"(1). En d'autres termes, on ne pourra jamais dire avec certitude que les résultats qui ont été certifiés à Québec reflètent exactement la volonté de l'électorat.

De plus, les responsables des élections à Québec se sont-ils demandés s'ils pouvaient vraiment se fier à ces machines ? Aux États-Unis, la responsabilité de la vérification des machines de votation revient à des laboratoires que l'on nomme Independent Testing Authorities (ITA). Notons tout d'abord que ces laboratoires n'ont rien d'indépendant puisqu'ils sont entièrement financés par les manufacturiers eux-mêmes. Ils ne font pas non plus un travail exhaustif. Selon Bill Carson, de Carson Manufacturing, la compagnie qui fabrique les machines de MicroVote - eh oui, le sous-sous-traitant ! - "si l'on veut que les machines fonctionnent convenablement, les ITA devraient, pour qu'elles soient testées minutieusement et qu'on puisse prévoir toutes les éventualités, dépenser 10 fois le temps et l'argent qu'il en a fallu pour les concevoir. Et au moment où les tests sont effectués, ces derniers sont déjà désuets parce que la technologie change trop rapidement."(2)

Il semble donc qu'aucun organisme crédible et indépendant n'ait vérifié les machines électroniques à écran tactile de dimanche dernier, que ce soit aux États-Unis ou au Québec.

Electronic counting fails Quebec


nine polling stations in Quebec City stayed open 30 minutes longer, because of a computer problem.

At the beginning of the day, ballots were being fed into the system too quickly, and the computers crashed, city officials say. The glitches caused a backlog in the voting process, and officials decided to leave the polls open longer as a result.

In Lévis, Que., one polling station will stay open until 8:50, because a power failure at the polling station during the day.

CBC November 6, 2005 Voting extended in several polling stations

via Electronic voting machine troubles

Saturday, November 12, 2005

UK Workshop on Electronic Voting and e-Government

Workshop on Electronic Voting and e-Government in the UK
27 February 2006 09:00 AM - 28 February, 06 05:30 PM
e-Science Institute, 15, South College Street, Edinburgh
Mass-scale systems intended to deliver e-Government in a democratic context pose a range of under-explored design problems. In particular, we are far from having identified a core set of requirements for such systems. The need for confidentiality, privacy, transparency, accountability and user control are all critical to the success of such systems yet we are still far from determining how to implement such requirements and how the design of such systems will affect user behaviour. In this workshop we aim to address these very broad issues in general together with a more focused examination of e-voting as an exemplar of e-government systems. This exemplar provides a sharp characterisation of many of the issues and design tradeoffs we encounter in many e-Government systems. Despite support for trial and adoption of new voting technologies by the government, which sees electronic voting as a means of increasing turnout, we have not seen wide-scale adoption of the technology. E-voting requirements cover topics as varied as privacy/anonymity, authentication, verifiability, flexibility (with respect to different electoral systems) and usability. In addition, there is a need to specify the requirements for a trusted electronic voting system for UK elections. The diversity of issues suggest deployment of e-voting requires an interdisciplinary approach.

Saturday, October 01, 2005

recul-democratique.org - Le vote électronique en France

I was contacted by Pierre Muller, webmaster of the recul-democratique.org site.

Nous sommes des citoyens réunis par notre inquiétude face à l’arrivée des machines à voter dans nos villes respectives.

Nous ne sommes en rien opposés à la technologie, nous nous interrogeons seulement sur son bon usage. Certains d’entre nous sont informaticiens.

Le vote électronique est en voie de se généraliser en France, dans un grand silence. Nous n’entendons parler que de modernisation inéluctable, de problèmes d’organisation et d’économies, sans la moindre réflexion de fond.

/

We are French citizens, many of which computer scientists. We are preoccupied with the recent infatuation about electronic voting. It is taking place without any large scale debate. We are told it is all about inevitable modernization, organization, and saving money. No background discussion.

They have a small section on Canada.

Friday, September 09, 2005

UK Elections: Web and text vote trials dropped

Government plans to introduce e-voting for next year's local council
elections have been dropped. According to the government spokesman
(Elections Minister Harriet Harman), "the time is not right". The
government has not ruled out further attempts to introduce e-voting. Oliver
Heald MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, has
described the whole process as a shambles, citing the security concerns with
e-voting.

from Risks Digest

Additional info:
BBC News Web and text vote trials dropped
The Register UK.gov ditches 'Big Brother'-style e-voting

Saturday, July 16, 2005

site updates

RSS feed changed to FeedBurner, added my linkblog in the sidebar on the right.
Most of my new info will be in the linkblog generally speaking, as I have less time and energy to blog every story.

Wired e-vote intro and comments on US e-voting guidelines

Wired News - Machine Politics

An Introduction to E-Voting July 7, 2005

E-Vote Guidelines Need Work July 7, 2005

The guidelines, published in late June, call for vendors to follow better programming practices and make some suggestions for addressing problems with vote integrity.

Computer security experts say the guidelines are a step in the right direction, but fall short of making voting systems secure. They also don't require systems to produce a voter-verified paper audit trail, which would allow voters to confirm their vote.

You can comment on the guidelines: EAC - Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.

The Voluntary Voting System Guidelines were developed under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) Section 202 mandate that the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) update the 2002 Voting System Standards to address increasingly complex voting system technology. They were designed for state and local election officials to help ensure that new voting systems function accurately and reliably.

The Guidelines are provided for a 90 day public comment period which officially began June 29, 2005 upon notice in the Federal Register. All comments must be received by EAC on or before 5:00 p.m. EDT on September 30, 2005.

Monday, July 04, 2005

Houston, we have a problem

The Houston Chronicle Clear up misinformation about electronic voting: E-votes are reliable in ways paper ballots could never be June 29, 2005

Wow, this article is some spectacular bulls--t.
The authors are Sonia Arrison and Vince Vasquez from the "Pacific Research Institute", which appears to be a charming US right-wing "think tank". So wise are they that they have produced an entire 25-page report on electronic voting Upgrading America's Ballot Box: The Rise of E-Voting">Upgrading America's Ballot Box: The Rise of E-Voting (PDF).

The report starts like this

Electronic voting has, unfortunately, moved from the realm of science and statistics to conspiracy theory by overheated partisans. Sonia Arrison and Vince Vasquez puncture the myths of the conspiracists in their paper. Even leading Democrats such as Joe Andrew, Bill Clinton’s handpicked chairman of the Democratic National Committee, have pointed out that while problems remain that demand vigilance, electronic voting aids the poor, the elderly, minorities, and is more accurate. Last year, Mr. Andrew lamented that “When it comes to electronic voting, most liberals are just plain old-fashioned nuts.”


This is my favorite quote from the body of the report With the click of a button, many Election Day errors have been innovated out of existence.

I would paraphase the report as follows With the click of keyboard keys, many electronic voting issues have been written out of existence.

The argument made is that it is easier to hack paper than electronic.
Oh, and concerns about the security of the machines can be addressed with "a simple code review".

Um, I have years of experience and training in computer science.
Code review is dauntingly difficult for any non-trivial program.

I like this too manual counts are prone to human error. Ah yes, much better to have electronic non-recounts, free from meddlesome human intervention.

Here is some distilled BS from the Houston Chronicle article.

While it is true that no system is tamper-proof, it is also true that it takes significant expertise and plotting to hack a machine, ironically making the system more secure than traditional paper ballots.

Historically, paper ballots were overly manhandled, being placed into boxes, moved around and passed through the hands of low-level poll workers to precinct supervisors and county officials. Fraud was less detectable, and more prevalent, because prescored ballots could be easily corrupted or votes altered with a simple punch through a hole, or mark of a pen. With DRE, features such as remote vote storage and a visual verification screen of voter selections are innovating these problems out of existence. America's voting system could become even healthier if other new procedures are adopted at the same time.

E-voting opponents demand a verified paper-trail backup to make sure votes are counted properly. But paper trails are meaningless if manual counts and voter verification are still prone to fraud and human error. And verified paper trails for DRE's have proven to be expensive, potentially bankrupting cash-strapped counties and eroding the efficiency of voting management. The back-up issue is serious, but there are less-Luddite solutions, such as electronic or audio verification.

The real key to making sure that the electronic back-ups are secure will be in reviewing the code that runs the machines, a simple procedure that counties should make part of the normal election-preparing process. And all indications are that the public approves of such a move. Indeed, despite the newness of the use DRE technology, public approval for electronic voting remains strong.

Thursday, May 12, 2005

i am still around

I'm still around but mostly posting to my work blog.

You can track my bookmarks related to electronic voting and other Paper Vote Canada topics at

http://linkroll.com/?action=links&user=papervotecanada

Wednesday, March 23, 2005

Scottish e-voting news


The First Minister was dazzled by dancing robots and shown the latest developments in electronic voting as he visited Scotland's oldest university.

Mr McConnell opened the Gateway and John Cole buildings, two state-of-the-art facilities at St Andrews University. About A£10 million has been invested in the buildings, which house the university's schools of management and computer science.

Staff and students from the computer science department showed the First Minister how the latest hi-tech electronic voting software could be used in future elections.

I think dancing robots should be mandatory for all grand events.

icScotland - McConnell tries out e-voting system

Indeed, I'll take dancing robots any day over daft Internet voting schemes.

[30 April 2003]

On the eve of the elections, a computer scientist in St Andrews is researching the possibilities of voting over the internet in the future.

Tim Storer, a Computer Science PhD student at the University of St Andrews is working with Microsoft under their studentship scheme to investigate Remote Electronic Voting over the internet. The system he is investigating could see the possibility of voters being able to vote from home or anywhere in the World via email or text messaging.

Tim began the £50,000, three year project with Microsoft last September, and will go to Washington this Saturday for a three week internship to inspect voting machines currently used there. The e-voting project is a combination of Tim’s main interests of politics (especially electoral history and statistics) and computer science.

from The Future of Voting?

T. Storer and I. Duncan, "Practical remote electronic elections for the uk," in Privacy, Security and Trust 2004 Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (S. Marsh, ed.), (Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada), pp. 41-45, National Research Council Canada, University of New Brunswick, October 2004. Best Student Paper.
[.pdf]

from the Digital Privacy, Security and Trust Group at the University of St. Andrews

Monday, March 21, 2005

get your vote on

www.getyourvoteon.ca
they are counting down to the May 17, 2005 provincial election in BC

Young people in British Columbia can now use their mobile phones to make their voices heard on key voter issues, thanks to a new mobile network developed by the University of British Columbia’s Mobile MUSE Project.

from Government of Canada Helps Youth “Get Their Vote On” With Groundbreaking New Technology

This is fine by me as long as they don't get some addled idea that we should vote using text messaging.

If you want to engage young people with flashy electronic gizmos that's fine, just remember that for the actual voting it must be on paper and counted by hand.

Here's what the CBC reported

Political organizers in British Columbia are hoping to use cellphone text messaging to get young people interested in politics.

The non-partisan group "Get Your Vote On" plans to blitz the cellphones of its young members with polls and alerts in anticipation of the May 17 provincial election.

The program is based on the idea that young people need to be engaged on their own terms, said group spokesperson Olive Dempsey. She thinks the future of democracy may rest with the cellphone.

"Democracy does not begin and end with a ballot box," said Dempsey.

"Democracy is about building democratic habits and it is about engagement and that is what we are going to be doing."

from B.C. group texting to raise voter awareness

e-voting wiki

George Washington University Experimental Networked Systems Lab E-Voting Resources wiki.

Wednesday, March 16, 2005

Jamaican electronic voter identification


a couple weeks ago, the chairman of the E.A.C. [Electoral Advisory Committee] announced the introduction of electronic voting of which fingerprinting of voters is a feature.

from Proposed electoral reforms

I think the above is not correct, from what I have read.
Initially at least, it is a fingerprint system that gives you a ballot.

The E.A.C. is part of the Electoral Office of Jamaica.

ORDERS FOR the procurement of 40 machines capable of triggering a ballot by matching fingerprints are likely to be placed with the two overseas-based companies shortlisted for the purpose within the next two weeks.

The machines should arrive in the island in time to be used in local government elections due by September, following a pilot test to determine their effectiveness.

The cost of the equipment has not been disclosed although the chairman of the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC), Professor Errol Miller, told The Gleaner some time ago a budget had been set aside for the purpose.

He told The Gleaner on Monday that the technical committee set up in April to determine the specifications to which United States-based Cogent Systems Ltd, and French company SAGEM, would build the equipment had completed its work.

...

Mr. Brieffs [senior vice president at Cogent] confirmed Jamaica would be the first country to use the equipment in an actual election, but said he anticipated no major problems.

According to him, "it does not matter what the system is being used for. Whether for immigration purposes or for border control, the concept remains the same." He said the software designed for Jamaica was "user friendly and designed to keep the election flow."

...

With the cost likely to run into millions of dollars, the EAC is already exploring other uses to which the equipment can be put when not being used in elections. Areas being examined are law enforcement and the education and social security systems.

from Jamaica Gleaner Ballot machines on order

The House of Representatives on Tuesday (March 1 [2005]) amended three Bills paving the way for the electronic voter identification system to be introduced to the island's electoral process.

...

The system, which depends on finger print identification, will issue a ballot paper once the fingerprint has been applied and is found to be the appropriate fingerprint for the elector, who has presented it. Voting will then take place in the normal way.

The Bill also makes allowances for the presiding officer to revert to the original system in situations where the mechanism malfunctions and in such a case, the individual will be required to prove his identification by other means.

from House Clears Way for Use of Electronic Voter System

Australia to present at e-voting conference


A senior Australian election official will attend a conference this week on electronic voting to be organized by the National Election Commission, Korea's top election watchdog.

The Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, ..., will share its experience at the "E-voting and Electronic Democracy: Present and the Future" conference in Seoul, March 17-18 [2005]

from The Korea Herald Australia to share e-voting skill.

Note: The ACT is the only Australian jurisdiction to use electronic voting for parliamentary elections.

Bulgarian e-voting


An experimental online vote for the parliamentary elections will take place on March 20 in 50 different Bulgarian towns.

An initiative committee will start a campaign for popularizing the e-vote among the people aged 16 to 25 across the country, the initiators announced Monday in Veliko Tarnovo.

The March 20 e-vote will begin 7.00 a.m. to end 7.00 p.m. and more than 1,000 young people are expected to cast their vote. The experimental vote will be organized although there is no e-vote law adopted in Bulgaria.

It was earlier announced that building Bulgaria's online-voting system will cost at least BGN 4 M.

Bulgaria's MPs have introduced a bill for e-voting in general and presidential elections, as well as in the election of Bulgarian members for the EU Parliament. According to the bill, those who want to take part in the vote online would have to file applications three weeks earlier. A few days later, they would receive user name and password in a registered letter.

Lawmakers hope that introducing the e-vote can boost polls turnout.

from Bulgaria Launches Experimental E-Vote March 20 [2005]

If you want to increase voter turnout, make it mandatory to vote.
Don't undermine your democracy, while incidentally spending money that could be better used elsewhere.

e-voting technology


Comfidex Corporation of New York, New York will introduce a secure, Web-
based e-voting system that provides paper-based audit trails for
recounts while preserving the anonymity of both the vote and the voter.
VoteFiler is implemented using commodity PCs, and is designed to
transparently coexist with traditional voting systems so that it may be
adopted at a pace acceptable to the voting public.

from ... e-Voting ... Among New Technologies at FOSE 2005, April 5-7 in Washington, DC

secure, Web-based, using commodity PCs?

Um, that's unpossible.

Friday, March 11, 2005

Japan - court voids e-vote


The Nagoya High Court on Wednesday declared void a city assembly election held in Kani, Gifu Prefecture in July 2003 after finding a temporary malfunction of electronic voting machines had gravely affected the election result.

According to the Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry, the ruling is the first to nullify the result of an election using an electronic voting system.

...

A total of 189 electronic voting machines were set up at 29 polling places for the city assembly election held on July 20, 2003.

But the voting system was halted temporarily for between nine minutes and 83 minutes due to overheating of the servers and other reasons.

...

Prof. Shigeki Yokoi of Nagoya University's graduate school said the Kani municipal government did not hold a trial election to verify whether the voting system properly worked. He said it was necessary for municipal and prefectural governments planning to employ electronic voting to test the system thoroughly. He added the central government should provide financial help for the introduction of electronic voting system because they are expensive.

Electronic voting: it's expensive, it's untested, and it doesn't work.

Court nullifies e-voting election result Daily Yomiuri On-Line March 10, 2005.

Thursday, March 10, 2005

Maryland e-voting


A review of voting machines used in Maryland's most populous county for the November elections found that 7 percent of the machines had problems such as frozen screens or failed to boot up.

An additional 5 percent in Montgomery County had vote tallies that were considerably lower than other machines used in the same precincts, causing elections officials to deem them ``suspect,'' according to the report released Tuesday. It was drafted by the county in December for the local election board.

But state officials disputed those figures, saying a review of the county's machines conducted by the state and the equipment's manufacturer showed that only 0.4 percent had significant problems in the Nov. 3 election.

from Report shows problems with some Maryland e-voting machines March 9, 2005

municipal e-voting in Japan


The municipal government of Niimi, Okayama Prefecture, which held the nation's first elections using electronic voting, will return to the traditional handwritten voting system for its April 24 mayoral and city assembly elections, following a merger with four neighboring municipalities.

The municipal government, which used the electronic voting system for its past two elections, proposed the electronic system for upcoming elections to the four municipalities that will merge on March 31.

However, the plan was rejected on the ground that there was not enough time to prepare for the next election.

...

The Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry's election department said 10 municipalities had used e-voting in 12 elections and predicted that the system would become widely used in the future.

from Daily Yomiuri On-Line

Sunday, February 27, 2005

open-source voting software

Is it better if you can inspect the code for voting machines?
Yes.

Can you solve the problem of providing that the code you inspected is actually running on the machine on election day?
No.

Anyway,
Senators Clinton and Kerry Submit Open Voting Bill

DailyKos is reporting that a group of senators and representatives including Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, and Tubbs Jones, have proposed an 'open-source' voting bill. This bill (The Count Every Vote Act of 2005 [PDF]) corrects many of the problems in the last election. Notably, it requires paper receipts, and that the source and object code of all electronic voting machines to be open and readable by the public.

Slashdot comments also point out that "open code inspection" is quite different from "open source development".

Thursday, February 24, 2005

Uganda - evoting registration

This is not really an e-voting story, but you will sometimes see reports on "$22 million failed Ugandan e-voting project" so I thought I would link a good report. It was actually a registration system that failed for various reasons.

Failed Electronic Voter Registration in Uganda

Thursday, February 10, 2005

understanding the true costs of voting machines

Voting machines, we are told, "save money" over unreliable humans.

Ok, imagine I make to you this proposal:
In order to save money, we're going to spend millions of dollars on machines.
That will be used for one day.
Every few years.
Oh, and by the way, for all of the hundreds of days between each use, they will need to be stored. And you can't just stick them in a warehouse somewhere and forget about them. Because they must work perfectly, on that one day. Working perfectly means NO ONE has made unauthorized changes to them. And none of their systems has been damaged due to sitting in a freezing warehouse, or a leaky warehouse, or any kind of warehouse that doesn't keep them all nice and snugly protected from any possible harm.

So now I hope you're thinking: hmm, not so much with the saving money.

RTE News (Ireland): PAC discusses cost of storing e-vote machines

The ongoing cost of maintaining electronic voting machines was discussed again at the Oireachtas Public Accounts Committee today.

Questions were raised about the big variations in the cost of storing and insuring the machines in different parts of the country.

The total cost of maintaining the machines is likely to run to €1 million each year for the next 20 years.

Monday, February 07, 2005

E-voting unlikely across Australia

Not needed in cases where the ballot is simple, spokesman says.

Despite the recent decision in the U.S. to use printed records to improve the credibility of electronic voting, it seems unlikely that electronic voting will be used widespread in Australia, according to a spokesperson for the Australian Electoral Commission.

...

Tim Evans, the director of elections systems & Policy for the Australian Electoral Commission, does not believe that widespread electronic voting will be useful in Australia

...

"First of all, for electronic voting to spread throughout Australia, there would need to be an amendment to the Australian Commonwealth Elections Act. This will only happen if Parliament is persuaded that it would create advantages to voting, and the security of each vote would be maintained or improved.

...

Despite electronic voting trials being successful in the Australian Capitol Territory, Evans, believes that this is only because the region is different to the rest of Australia.

"ACT has a very complicated voting system. Many people cannot access many of the 100 voting stations in the region and the electoral process has complicated layers attached to it, so it takes a long time to count the votes. So electronic voting is useful for this region. However, there are over 8,000 polling stations in the rest of Australia, which are within easy access to populations.

"It would take a much bigger effort to transform 8,000 polling stations into electronic voting stations, than it took to build these systems in ACT.

from E-voting unlikely to spread through Australia
Image and Data Manager Online - Feb 7, 2005

Ireland does things right

The good news is that Ireland is handling things properly.
The bad news (for e-voting enthusiasts) is that when you handle things properly, it immediately becomes apparent that the real costs of electronic systems are very high.

To analyze them, store them, certify them for each election...

Compare this with paper. How much analysis do you need to trust the paper voting system?

The Sunday Times - Ireland
E-voting study costs spiral

An independent assessment of the electronic voting system has cost the state €640,000 in less than a year.

The Commission on Electronic Voting was set up last March to advise the government on the safety and accuracy of the system. It has run up a bill of €640,000 up until the end of last year and its final cost is likely to be substantially higher. The group is planning to hire experts to run extensive tests on the voting system — which could take nine months — before it will be able to determine if it is usable. The technical work is likely to be costly.

Computerised voting was set to be rolled out last June in the local and European elections but was withdrawn at the last minute amid concerns over its accuracy. The government was attacked for failing to assess the reliability of the €52m system fully before purchasing it.

The 6,200 electronic voting machines are now being stored in warehouses across the country at a cost so far of €660,000.

“The system is flawed and will always be — the government should cut its losses. Spending more and more money on it may not be a wise thing to do. It has already cost a fortune and it doesn’t make any sense to keep throwing money at it in the vain hope that they will be able to use it in the future,” said Joe McCarthy, a chartered engineer and a strong critic of electronic voting.

Friday, February 04, 2005

Irish Commission on Electronic Voting reports

April 2004 - Interim Report
December 2004 - First Report

The risk analysis identified 5 material risks in connection with the use of the system at the June elections:

* error in the system as a whole;
* error in voting machine software affecting all machines;
* tampering with software to alter election result;
* tampering with ballot modules during transportation;
* damage to machines before elections.

Remember, e-voting proponents, risks are ACROSS THE ENTIRE LIFE OF THE SYSTEM.

That means it's got to be secure when designed, it's got to be secure running in the polling place, and it must be secure between elections. If you cost these security requirements out fully, there is no way electronic is cheaper than paper. Paper needs security at the polling place and until counted, and that's it.

Incidentally, the Irish name for the commission is
An Coimisiún um Vótáil Leictreonach

reaction to the Diebold printer: one small, late step


The prototype that Diebold Inc. is now touting is exactly what some critics of the ATM-like machines have been demanding for several years.

Even so, paper records alone are not enough to satisfy computer scientists who say transparency in the electronic machines' design and software must complement paper backups.

...

Critics of North Canton, Ohio-based Diebold say the AccuView Printer Module is a step in the right direction but doesn't address the potential for buggy software or malfunctioning hardware that could misrecord votes or expose voting systems to hackers, deletions or other disasters.

...

Computer scientists also are concerned that the handful of private laboratories licensed to certify voting equipment, including the printer module, still operate in secret and without any federal guidelines.

"It's a very, very small step forward in terms of security of elections," said Avi Rubin, technical director of the Information Security Institute of Johns Hopkins University and co-author of a scathing report on Diebold machines.

ABC News - AP - Feb. 3, 2005
Prototype E-Vote Printer Fails to Satisfy
the story is in three pages, or you can view the one-page printable version

The issue, as most of these computer scientists well know, is that it is impossible to create a "transparent" computer system.

Thursday, February 03, 2005

ICTE e-voting mailing lists

lists.stdlib.net

E-voting
E-voting_announce
E-voting_press

Canadian e-voting officials, behold your future: Ireland

Ireland On-Line Dept officials to face questions about e-voting fiasco Feb. 3, 2005

Officials ... are due before the Oireachtas public accounts committee today to answer questions about the electronic voting debacle.

The department spent around €50m on the initiative, which was then shelved due to security concerns.

The Government was planning to introduce the system nationwide during last year's local and European elections.

However, this plan was abandoned six weeks before the vote after an independent commission expressed concern about the accuracy of the voting machines and the possibility of electoral fraud.

ElectricNews.net Ireland faces EUR50m e-voting write-off - Thursday, February 03 2005
UPDATE 2005-02-09: This article has been corrected by the publisher. I have included corrections in bold.

A lack of public confidence in e-voting means that the Government may be forced into writing off its EUR50 million investment in electronic ballot systems

...

The government was due to introduce e-voting at local and European elections on 11 June 2004 but had to abandon its plans following the publication of an interim report of the Independent Commission on Electronic Voting (ICTE) [Ed. note: should be CEV] which raised doubts over the accuracy of the software used in the system.

According to the Irish Citizens for Trustworthy E-Voting (ICTE) submission to the CEV, the chosen Nedap/Powervote electronic voting system had a fundamental design flaw because it had no mechanism to verify that votes would be recorded accurately in an actual election. Consequently, results obtained from the system could not be said to be accurate, claimed the five-member independent body.

Other flaws in the system identified in the ICTE submission included possible software errors and the use of the graphical user interface programming language Object Pascal for a safety-critical system.

Although the commission's remit was advisory, the government abided by its recommendation that the system not be used until further testing had established just how secure it was.

However, Michael Noonan told the Irish Times that even if the system was found to be safe, few ministers would give it the go-ahead because the public would have little trust in it.

...

"The criticisms contained in the report of the Independent Commission on Electronic Voting make it clear that this was a fiasco of the highest order," said Fergus O'Dowd TD., Fine Gael's spokesman on the Environment. "Considering all the information that is available to him, Minister Roche needs to fully explain the findings of these inquiries."

The above article unfortunately seems to have attached the acronym for the Irish Citizens for Trustworthy E-voting (ICTE) to the Independent Commission on Electronic Voting (CEV). An easy enough mistake to make.

You know what's easier than spending millions of taxpayer dollars on an insecure, unnecessary system? I suggest spending the money on things the taxpayers actually need and want instead.

Wednesday, February 02, 2005

voting system performance rating

This article has useful content but a misleading title.
Standards aim to secure e-voting systems
CNet News - January 31, 2005

Um, standards won't secure jack.
Standards may help you to evaluate how good or how bad a job of security is being done.
That being said, it is essentially impossible to design a real-world electronic voting system that is not vulnerable to a vast number of potential problems.
This is the fundamental point: if there is stuff happening inside the machine that I cannot see, there is no way I can trust the machine.

The Voting System Performance Rating (VSPR) project ... [will provide] a set of tests will be published that will let e-voting systems be evaluated in areas such as privacy, accessibility and accuracy.

Diebold produces paper, ITAA manufactures excuses


Diebold Election Systems, a target of many electronic-voting critics during the 2004 U.S. election, announced Thursday it has completed the design for a printer that would give its e-voting machines a paper trail.

I imagine that must have been quite the piece of design work, considering the voting machines already have internal paper printers, and Diebold has been producing ATMs that give paper receipts for years.

Fortunately, Diebold has the ITAA to explain away the need for a paper trail.
You know what I think about industry lobby groups?
I think they should shut up.
Why don't they just lead into all their statements with "we are stating the following for the financial gain of corporations".

Here's my enhanced version of the report

The Information Technology Association of America, which has defended e-voting machines as accurate and safe, says

the following to help protect the financial gain of corporations:

Diebold's move appears to be focused on the demand for paper-trail ballots. "It's a situation where companies are going to provide what their customers want," says Bob Cohen, executive vice president of the ITAA, which counts e-voting machine makers among its members.

ITAA officials have questioned if voter-verified paper trails will provide a significant benefit while adding costs to e-voting machines. Though the ITAA maintains that widespread attacks on e-voting machines are unlikely, officials there suggest that programmers smart enough to change ballots inside e-voting machines could also manipulate the printouts.

"Our point all along is that paper-based solutions are one alternative," Cohen says. "It gets to be as much an issue of peace of mind for the voters as anything else."

Oh yes those silly voters, they shouldn't worry their pretty little heads.

Mr. Cohen, that is an idiotic statement.
An election is the transformation of a collective act of voting into confidence that the government was fairly selected. Why is that important? Well for example, in the US national government, a few hundred elected officials decide the policies for THREE HUNDRED MILLION PEOPLE. Elections give a tiny number of politicians power over the lives of millions. Without the confidence of those millions, the system falls apart.

As for this voter-verified paper, it's fixing the effect, not the cause.
The cause is that you can't trust the computer.
I say, cut out the middleman. Vote on paper. Count the paper. See how easy that is?

Story is from PC World - January 27, 2005.
Diebold to Market Paper-Trail E-Voting System

On a related note, I'm thinking of buying a new book that just came out:
Your Call Is Important to Us : The Truth About Bullshit.

Monday, January 31, 2005

Iraqis vote


"It's amazing to see people's faces when they drop the ballots in the box ... Many have waited their whole lives to vote," said Copeland, who also described Iraqis dancing and singing in the Maryland hotel parking lot. "People were clapping when their families voted."

Unlike the high-tech electronic voting and short paper ballots seen in November's U.S. election, Iraqi ballots were four 8-inch-by-11inch pages that listed 111 political entities and more than 7,000 candidates, Copeland said.

Oddly, we never hear the descriptions of people's pride in voting when they touch a button on a computer screen.

from the Washington Times, January 30, 2005
Iraqis head to vote in the United States

Tuesday, January 25, 2005

John Hollins: e-voting is already decided


Does voting by any method other than traditional polling booths and paper ballots jeopardize either voters' right to privacy or their guarantee that their vote will be counted fairly? Not only has it been debated, but the issue has been settled for several municipalities right here in Canada.

Talk to John Hollins, the chief electoral officer for the Province of Ontario, and he'll give you the story. "It started back in 1976 when East York and Mississauga brought in punch card voting and evolved in the eighties with the optical scan in places like Etobicoke and Scarborough. At the time they used a centralized optical scan where you brought all the ballots into one place and the machine scanned them."

By the 1988 elections Toronto and North York went with the optical scan at the polling level because they didn't like the idea of ballots travelling from the polling locations. "They started with one machine for every three or four polls, but they ran into a few problems, so by 1991 they brough in scanners to all the polls."

By 1996 the experiment was working well enough to encourage the Ontario government to advance things... During the voting on Metro Toronto's amalgamation the City of North York used telephone voting. They had so much success that other municipalities followed suit."

but wait, it gets better

Why did Ontario decide to forsake the tried and true for something that, almost by defintion, has a margin of error? ... Elections -- at least the operational side -- are about credibility. So why did Ontario municipalities opt for systems which were, if only slightly, less credible?

According to Hollins, the quality of the people who were staffing the polling stations was not what it had been, or what it should be

That's right. John Hollins believes that unverifiable machines are BETTER than people. And apparently would rather buy machines, than try to fix people problems (if indeed any such exist). And so we continue

The feeling was that by introducing new voting techniques and technology into the mix they could weed out incompetent staff, thereby increasing the quality and accuracy. In addition, voting by mail or phone would improve accessibility. Finally, it would be more efficient.

I try to remain fairly objective about what I report, but this is bulls--t.

(All emphasis in above extracts is mine.)

in Summit "Canada's magazine on public sector purchasing" (in annoying locked PDF format) October 2004

Special: Focus on IT section
More on e-voting - Coming soon to an election near you - David Eadie

Ohio goes back to paper

This is an incredibly strong argument for staying with paper ballots.

Blackwell orders counties to use optical scanning
Touch-screen voting out in Ohio

COLUMBUS - Ohio Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell took the option of computerized touch-screen voting machines off the table yesterday and ordered all counties to deploy optical-scan devices using paper ballots by the November election.

"We have a tight election reform deployment schedule, too few allocated federal and state dollars, and not one electronic voting device certified under Ohio's standards and rules," he said.

from the Toledo Blade, January 13, 2005
via j-dom.org

also reported in The Morning Journal Touch-screen voting machines dumped January 13, 2005

The unfortunate followup:

Blackwell's demand to install optical scans angers counties

COLUMBUS - County elections officials yesterday voiced frustration over what they perceive to be another shift in direction for Ohio when it comes to updating voting systems.

"We have got boards [of elections] that have been working as long as two years toward [touch-screen voting], and all of a sudden the secretary of state has given us approximately five weeks to change course," said Keith Cunningham, Allen County elections director and incoming president of the Ohio Association of Election Officials.

from the Toledo Blade, January 14, 2005

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

like, totally digital

In the Economist, The World in 2005, Carly Fiorina of HP writes in "Totally Digital" (page 111)

And [this digital transformation] will change democracy. Today millions of consumers vote for "American Idol" finalists using their mobile phones. How long before they expect to cast ballots the same way?

Hopefully never.

Tuesday, January 18, 2005

more on Swiss e-voting

Ok, this is a bit of a vague trail as the article isn't available and I don't read German.

Anyway, Google turned up

Telecom Paper (subscription) - Houten,Netherlands
The majority (54 percent) of the Swiss adults with voting rights, would
use electronic voting if that option was available, according to gfs.bern's
study ...

At gfs.bern I found a news release from today in German, which Babelfish translates as

The vote électronique - the elektronsiche casting of votes - has under the voter a Mehrheitspotenzial, as an evaluation of a special part of VOX analyses shows in the years 2003 and 2004.

Wandering around the gfs.bern site I found www.polittrends.ch/modernisierung/vote-electronique.php which says in German (again, translated)

e-voting today under be correct one and voter knows the scarcely majorityable Potenzial. The most important requirement e-voting from citizen view is the simplicity of the instrument on. The most important doubts concern the different aspects of the security of the casting of votes. Primarily it might come to a substitution of the brieflichen casting of votes; it can come however in second line also to a change of the composition of the being correct. The use will be coined/shaped by three generation-specific experiences with political participation

There is a report, also in German Das Potenzial der elektronischen Stimmabgabe (PDF/1.3mb) (The Potenzial of the electronic casting of votes).
It is dated January 4, 2005.

Previously:
2004-02-24 Switzerland
2004-02-28 Geneva
2004-09-27 Swiss national e-voting

Monday, January 17, 2005

telephone voting proposed for Canada in 1999

In 1999, Bill C-268 was proposed to allow "electronic voting" (actually telephone voting as the French translation makes clear).

Bills of the House of Commons, 2nd session, 36th parliament, 48 Elizabeth II, 1999. Ottawa. Bilingual.
C-268.--An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act (electronic voting). (Mr. White, North Vancouver.) Title in French: Loi modifiant la Loi électorale du Canada (vote par téléphone). First reading, October 26, 1999. 6p.

Bill C-268 - First Reading

I am currently assuming this was a private members bill that didn't pass.

Note for non-Canadians: The bill numbers are repeated again, so you need to know the year or session of parliament to know which bill C-268 someone is referring to. Also, private members bills almost never pass (the government controls the official legislative agenda).

Friday, January 14, 2005

Bush election certified over objections

I am not going to be blogging a lot about US election controversies.
I am more interested in the vulnerabilities of electronic voting systems to both technological and social "hacking".

Anyway,

Democrats allege e-voting problems in Ohio
from News.com January 6, 2005

Congress on Thursday certified President Bush as the winner of the November election, despite efforts by a handful of Democrats to stall the process by protesting alleged electronic voting irregularities in Ohio.

The main point is, electronic voting systems open an election up to a huge variety of challenges. Maybe the software didn't work. Maybe the hardware malfunctioned. And on and on and on.

How many times do paper and pen malfunction?

Council of Europe e-voting recommendation


Falling participation rates in elections and referenda and the perception that many citizens are losing interest in politics are concerns common to many Council of Europe member states.

Some member states are already experimenting with e-voting, or electronically enabled voting as it is also known, in the hope that modernising their electoral methods and allowing voters to cast their vote via electronic voting machines or even from their PCs will increase participation as well as providing a quicker and more cost effective means of organising public consultations.

But if e-voting has the potential to bring about many benefits, it also carries with it certain risks. How to ensure the security and secrecy of the vote in this new environment? How to ensure that e-voting is accessible to all?

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, entrusted the Multidisciplinary Ad Hoc Group of Specialists on legal, operational and technical standards for e-enabled voting (IP1-S-EE) with the task of developing a set of standards which could be used as a reference by member states considering the introduction of e-voting programmes. The Integrated Project “Making democratic institutions work” provided the Secretariat for this group.

These standards are set out in Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting, which was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 September 2004 at the 898th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies

www.coe.int/t/e/integrated_projects/democracy/02_Activities/02_e-voting/

old Washington Post report

This is old, but for the sake of completeness:

Washington Post E-Voting: Promise or Peril?

It includes some video.

Thursday, January 13, 2005

ukraine - paper voting

Just a brief comment: I am going to look into the Ukrainian voting system, which I am fairly sure was paper-based.

I think the Ukrainian situation was one of the strongest cases showing the importance of being able to visually verify that elections were properly conducted.

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

still alive

I have been pretty busy with my work blog lately, but I will have some new postings soon.

I did recently update the Wikipedia entry with info on the Democratic Renewal Secretariat.

Wednesday, December 22, 2004

issues with e-voting machines in Russia

Pravda.ru reports

This seems to be the first time Russian electronic system for counting paper ballots has had such major glitch.

...

Apparently, what the electronic system for counting paper ballots had displayed had little to do with reality! Distrustful observers from the majority of candidates preferred to stand in close proximity to the electronic counting devices and counted each ballot manually. Hours later, the elections results were announced.and as it turned out, the results did not match at all! In fact, they weren't even close! Nonetheless, representatives of the elections committee refuse to conduct hand recount of the ballots. "This isn"t America!" they claim in unison.

Here is a real paradox: electronic machine manual FORBIDS hand recount of paper ballots. The situation resembles events in Abkhazia, Georgia and Ukraine.

(Sounds like they are optiscan type ballot scanners.)

Pravda.ru - December 22, 2004
Major scandal evolves around e-voting machines in Russia

Monday, December 13, 2004

improving US elections

Kim Alexander of the California Voter Foundation gave a talk "The Need for Transparent, Accountable and Verifiable U.S. Elections" on Dec. 9, 2004

Prior to 2000, few people ever bothered to look at the mechanics of voting. Elections were like the sausage factory—people wanted to enjoy the end product without thinking too much about what went into making it.

The 2000 Presidential election vote counting fiasco in Florida brought a huge dose of sunlight and scrutiny into the nuts and bolts of our voting and vote counting processes. Basically lots of people started looking under the rock and we are finding that oversight and security of our voting systems is miserably inadequate. We’ve also learned that election security is incredibly complex. There are thousands of voting jurisdictions in the United States, all with their own systems and procedures.

The loss of transparency has been underway in this country for 40 years, ever since punch card voting was introduced. In most places, the software that is used to tabulate the vote is not verified. This is propriety software, made by private companies, which is being managed by thousands of people with limited computer skills. This software is not required by federal law to meet any security, accuracy or reliability standard. It is unregulated by the federal government and in most states, is poorly regulated.

The presentation was for the National Academies Framework for Understanding Electronic Voting project. They received a number of interesting papers.

Thanks to Glen Newton for pointing this talk out.

Saturday, December 11, 2004

strange rhyming FAQ answer from Elections Canada


Q. Under what circumstances may an elector be offered a ride to the polls or be paid an allowance or provided with a benefit to cover travel expenses to a polling place?

A. Basically, a ride that's a bribe is prohibited, a ride that is not, is not caught.

Friday, December 10, 2004

UK e-voting: ODPM and Electoral Commission

The UK Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) says

Key steps towards electoral modernisation

Public engagement, convenience and confidence in the electoral system are the key themes of the Government's responses to The Electoral Commission's reports Voting for change: an electoral law modernisation programme and Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting. Our responses to these reports were jointly published on 9 December by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Department of Constitutional Affairs.

continuing through their news release of Dec. 9, 2004 Government responses to The Electoral comission reports

In responding, the Government has reaffirmed its goal of multi-channelled elections, a vision shared with the Commission, as the way to offer voters the choice they want about how they can cast their votes.

(emphasis mine)
The jargon "multi-channelled elections" means voting on paper, electronic, cellphone, television, whatever.

Reports:
The UK Electoral Commission Voting for change - An electoral law modernisation programme 24 Jun 2003
UK Electoral Commission Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting 25 Nov 2004

Government Responses:
Response to Voting for change – An electoral law modernisation programme December 2004 (PDF)
Response to Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting December 2004 (PDF)

UK e-voting alert


The U.K. government will launch a Parliamentary inquiry next year [2005] into the practicalities of electronic voting. The House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee will carry out an inquiry on the first steps towards electronic voting, working with a sub-committee of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. They have requested public testimony and evidence by Jan. 14 [2005].

The U.K. government has long prized the benefits of e-government, though it has been struggling to meet its own deadline of putting all government services online by 2005. The government sees electronic registrations as the first building blocks for electronic voting.

...

The committees are requesting that written evidence be submitted in an electronic format, preferably by e-mail, in either Microsoft Word or Rich Text format. The e-mail address for sending information to the inquiry is odpmcom@parliament.uk .

The Industry Standard - December 9, 2004
UK to launch Parliamentary inquiry into future e-voting

Wednesday, December 01, 2004

review of US election day problems


More than 4,000 votes vanished without a trace into a computer's overloaded memory in one North Carolina county, and about a hundred paper ballots were thrown out by mistake in another. In Texas, a county needed help from a laboratory in Canada to unlock the memory of a touch-screen machine and unearth five dozen votes.

In other places, machine undercounting or overcounting of votes was a problem. Several thousand votes were mistakenly double-counted in North Carolina, Ohio, Nebraska, and Washington state. Some votes in other areas were at first credited to the wrong candidates, with one Indiana county, by some quirk, misallocating several hundred votes for Democrats to Libertarians. In Florida, some machines temporarily indicated votes intended for challenger John F. Kerry were for President Bush, and vice versa.

In the month since the election, serious instances of voting machine problems or human errors in ballot counts have been documented in at least a dozen states

Boston.com (Boston Globe) - December 1, 2004
Voting errors tallied [US] nationwide
includes map of areas with most incidents reported

via Macintouch

Sunday, November 28, 2004

NY Times gets it right on evoting reliability

Battling columnists: James Fallows of the New York Times responds to the trust the machines article.

A columnist in The Washington Post recently suggested that nostalgia for paper ballots, in today's reliably computerized world, must reflect a Luddite disdain for technology in general or an Oliver Stone-style paranoia about the schemings of the political world.

Not at all. It can also arise from a clear understanding of how computers work - and don't. The more you know about the operations of today's widely trusted commercial computer networks, the more concerned you become about most electronic-voting systems.

The phenomenal reliability of the systems we trust for banking, communication, and everything else rests on two bedrock principles. One is the universal understanding in the technology world that nothing works right the first time, and maybe not the first 50 times.

New York Times - November 28, 2004
Electronic Voting 1.0, and No Time to Upgrade

via Slashdot Buggy Voting Machines /.

democratic renewal - action opportunity


And we’ll examine whether and how to modernize our voting process, use technology better, and make it easier to vote.

from Ontario Democratic Renewal Secretariat - Next Steps

We need to use whatever feedback processes they have to ensure we DO NOT get provincial electronic voting.

Thanks to Bob Bailie for pointing this site out.

UPDATE 2004-12-10: There is a mailing list that you can join. I don't know if it's specifically about elections or about Democratic Renewal in general.

Wednesday, November 24, 2004

TENdotZERO Opens Up Its E-Voting Code


TENdotZERO, a pioneer in standards-based solutions, today announced that it is opening up the code base for TdZ e-Vote, its e-Voting software, to the Open Source Community on a Dual Use License basis.

Simon Bain, CTO of TENdotZERO, said: “We have decided to release the TdZ e-Vote code under the GPL license, to provide a firm foundation for other developers and users to take a proven product and adapt it for their own requirements.”

The original software was developed alongside the software which helped manage a number of the UK local government pilot elections in 2003. This new version additionally provides cross-platform compatibility, enhanced security, and easy management.

eMediaWire - November 24, 2004
TENdotZERO Opens Up Its E-Voting Code to the Open Source Community

Open code is certainly better than closed, but it doesn't address the fundamental issue that you have no way of knowing exactly what code is actually running on voting day on each and every voting machine.

Tuesday, November 23, 2004

US e-voting investigation requested


Six Democratic congressmen have asked the Government Accountability Office to investigate reports of voting irregularities in the Nov. 2 election, many of them involving electronic touch-screen voting machines.

A Nov. 5 letter to Comptroller General David Walker cited news reports of problems in California, Florida, North Carolina and Ohio in which thousands of votes were erroneously recorded, deleted or added.

Signing the letter were Reps. John Conyers of Michigan, Rush Holt of New Jersey, Jerrold Nadler of New York, Robert Scott of Virginia, Melvin Watt of North Carolina and Robert Wexler of Florida.

Washington Technology - November 22, 2004
E-voting investigation requested

Australian e-democracy

(Note: This is Victorian as in Australia, not as in steam-punk retro-fiction.)

The Age reports

A Victorian parliamentary committee has called for public comment on the issue of e-democracy following the release early this month of a discussion paper.

Victorian Electronic Democracy: Your say in the future raises what the committee believes are the key issues, including such questions as how new technologies can be used to draw citizens into policy development, whether parliament has the resources to use interactive technologies and the security implications of using technologies such as online voting systems.

The Age - November 16, 2004
Time to have a say on e-democracy

I found the report Victorian Electronic Democracy - Discussion Paper (November 2004).
All of the links in the report are broken (they didn't make them fully-qualified), so that's not such a great start.

You can discuss the report at victorianedemocracy.info

Thursday, November 18, 2004

statement of US election verification project


WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 -- For eight months, the Election Verification Project, a national coalition of technologists, voting rights and legal organizations, has worked to raise public awareness of the need to reduce computerized voting risks, and ensure that votes will be recorded and counted as cast.

On November 2 more voters cast paperless ballots than ever before in a U.S. election: roughly 30 percent compared to 12 percent four years ago. The Election Verification Project is not questioning the legitimacy of the presidential election results. Instead, we are questioning a voting process in which 30 percent of the ballots cannot be verified and, of the remaining 70 percent, most will not be verified.

While there was no nationwide meltdown, the election was far from error-free. Our preliminary analysis of nearly 900 reports of e-voting irregularities, gathered by the Election Incident Reporting System, indicates that electronic voting machines need much improvement. Problems were reported with all vendors and across most of the states that use e-voting. Electronic voting machines lost votes in North Carolina, miscounted votes in Ohio, and broke down in New Orleans, causing long lines and shut-downs at polling places.

The documented problems with touchscreen machines, vote-counting irregularities, and the fact that votes cannot be verified or recounted show us how vulnerable our democracy will be in the future if there is a disputed or unclear result.

from CalVoter.org - November 18, 2004
Statement of Election Verification Project

why worry, the machines are always right

The kindest thing I can say about this article is that it is smug and uniformed.
In ATMs, Not Votes, We Trust

Last weekend the New York Times published an editorial that found "no evidence" of vote fraud but called electronic voting "a problem" all the same. After all, the editorial noted, there is "no way to be sure" that votes weren't changed "by secret software" inside the machines. If you're tempted to believe that analysis is rational, just ask yourself this question: Are you really sure that your bank isn't using secret software to steal $9.72 from your retirement account every week? And if the answer is no, why aren't you up in arms about that, too?

The bank is an ongoing set of transactions that are repeatedly, multiply audited.
You check, the bank checks, and if it's wrong, it gets corrected.
Your transactions are information that is shared between you and the bank.
And probably to various auditing partners (the tax man, banking associations) beyond the bank.

A vote is a one-time transaction.
It's a secret ballot.
No information about it is supposed to be shared with anyone.
Now, tell me how you audit if a vote is correct, if you are supposed to have NO WAY OF KNOWING how someone voted?

The reason you need paper is you have a visible indication of a vote.
Inside a computer you have nothing but anonymous, unauditable bits.

Hey, article lady, how about we try this scenario.
You give me $972 and I will promise to deposit it for you.
But you don't get to check whether I deposited it.
You just have to trust me.

This (hmm, how to say this kindly) misguided article is by Anne Applebaum in the Washington Post, November 17, 2004.

Now I want to emphasize: this voting conspiracy theory stuff gets us nowhere.
Talk about the FACTS of unauditable systems. Don't speculate about things that (by design) are impossible to prove or disprove.

Monday, November 15, 2004

preliminary report on US election e-voting


What:

A national coalition of voting rights and computer security experts will hold a post-election press conference to provide a preliminary analysis of electronic voting problems and solutions, and their implications for increasing voters’ confidence in the legitimacy of elections.

Who:

-- Kim Alexander, California Voter Foundation

-- Lillie Coney, National Committee for Voting Integrity/Electronic Privacy Information Center

-- David Dill, Ph.D., Verified Voting Foundation

-- Will Doherty, Verified Voting Foundation/Election Incident Reporting System

-- Chellie Pingree, Common Cause

-- Matt Zimmerman, Electronic Frontier Foundation

When:

Thursday, Nov. 18, 10:30 a.m. to 12 Noon

Common Dreams Progressive Newswire - November 15, 2004
Voting Rights Coalition Grades E-Voting, Calls for National Standards

I guess related to CPSR's Election Incident Reporting Project.

There is CPSR Canada, I wonder if they're doing any e-voting anything.
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